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Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are a part of firms’ strategic resources. 
Consequently, CEO succession which refers to CEO turnover and selection is an 
important issue for any corporation. It is arguably one of the most crucial decisions 
that a board of directors makes. Most of the studies on CEO succession focused on 
dispersed ownership that is different from Nigeria   concentrated ownership structure. 
Relying on agency theory as the underpinning theory and supported by resource 
dependence theory, human capital theory and social networking theory, this study 
examines the influence of corporate performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms on CEO succession in Nigerian Public Listed Companies (PLCs). It also 
examines the moderating role of CEO power over corporate performance, internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and CEO turnover. The hypotheses of the study 
were tested using logistic regression for the 72 succession events that occurred in the 
non-financial PLCs in Nigeria from 2011 to 2015. The findings indicate that 
accounting-based performance (ROA) is a significant determinant of CEO turnover. 
Meanwhile, board gender diversity is the most significant board structure elements in 
the study of CEO succession in Nigerian PLCs. Thus, the appointment of female 
directors on the board influences the decision to change and replace the CEOs. 
Furthermore, this study finds that CEO power effectively moderates the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and CEO turnover. In addition, board 
religiosity and blockholders have significant influence on the CEO selection choice. 
Consequently, this study recommends that the Nigerian government should enact a 
legislation on gender quota to ensure that more female directors are appointed to the 
boards. This study provides some insights and guidance to the regulators, companies 
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Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif (CEO) adalah sebahagian daripada sumber strategik firma. 
Oleh itu, penggantian CEO yang merujuk kepada tukarganti dan pemilihan CEO 
pastinya merupakan isu penting bagi mana-mana syarikat. Ianya boleh dikatakan 
sebagai salah satu keputusan yang paling penting yang dibuat oleh lembaga pengarah. 
Kebanyakan kajian ke atas penggantian CEO memumpukan  kepada pemilikan 
tersebar yang agak berbeza dengan struktur pemilikan tertumpu Nigeria. Berdasarkan 
teori agensi sebagai teori utama dan disokong oleh teori kebergantungan sumber, teori 
modal insan dan teori rangkaian sosial, kajian ini mengkaji pengaruh prestasi syarikat 
dan mekanisme tadbir urus dalaman syarikat terhadap penggantian CEO di syarikat 
tersenarai awam (PLCs) Nigeria. Ia juga mengkaji peranan penyederhanaan kuasa 
CEO terhadap prestasi syarikat, mekanisme tadbir urus dalaman syarikat dan 
pertukaran CEO. Hipotesis kajian telah diuji menggunakan regresi logistik untuk 72 
peristiwa penggantian CEO yang berlaku di syarikat tersenarai awam bukan kewangan 
di Nigeria dari tahun 2011 hingga 2015. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa prestasi 
berasaskan perakaunan (ROA) adalah penentu signifikan pertukaran CEO. Manakala 
kepelbagaian jantina lembaga merupakan elemen struktur lembaga yang paling 
signifikan dalam kajian penggantian CEO di syarikat tersenarai awam  Nigeria. Oleh 
itu, pelantikan pengarah wanita dalam lembaga pengarah mempengaruhi keputusan 
untuk menukar dan menggantikan CEO. Tambahan lagi, kajian ini mendapati bahawa 
kuasa CEO berkesan menyederhanakan hubungan di antara mekanisme tadbir urus 
syarikat dan pertukaran CEO. Di samping itu, kepercayaan agama lembaga pengarah 
dan pemegang saham blok mempunyai pengaruh signifikan terhadap keputusan 
pemilihan CEO. Sehubungan itu, kajian ini mencadangkan supaya kerajaan Nigeria 
harus menguatkuasakan undang-undang mengenai kuota jantina untuk memastikan 
lebih banyak pengarah wanita dilantik dalam lembaga pengarah. Kajian ini mmberikan 
beberapa penemuan dan panduan kepada penguatkuasa undang-undang, syarikat dan 




Kata kunci: penggantian CEO, prestasi syarikat, kepelbagaian jantina, kepercayaan                 
agama, Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Background of the Study 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover globally has been on the rise since 2010, and 
it even reached a record high of 15% in 2013 and has continued to rise (Walberg, 
2014). This phenomenon has also been observed in Nigeria as indicated by a report on 
CEO success study conducted by the Booz Company a subsidiary of Pricewaterhouse 
Cooper (PwC) in 2015. The study reported that CEO turnover in Nigeria rose from 
15.90 % in 2010 to 16.30% in 2012. It even went higher in the year 2015, up to 16.70%. 
Several high-profile CEOs across the globe have faced this phenomenon in the recent 
past, for example, Tony Fisher of Target Canada, Aaron Regent of Barrick Gold, Dov 
Charney of American Apparel and Ian Troop of Toronto 2015 Pan Am Games and 
Gachao Kiuna of TransCentury. The rise in turnover has been mainly due to poor 
corporate performance (Munda, 2016). Although, CEO turnover is a sign of effective 
corporate governance and oversight which ultimately affects a firm’s performance, the 
cost of CEO turnover to a company could be very high aside from the undeniable 
disruption of organisational structure it brings on management. 
As observed by Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988), CEO turnover or 
dismissal is very important in the organisational theory. It mostly requires the 
comprehension of other organisational factors. Dismissing a CEO is certainly a very 
significant issue for any corporation, and it is arguably one of the most crucial 
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decisions that a board of directors makes. The CEO is a part of the strategic resources 
of the firms; as such the turnover and subsequent replacements ultimately result in both 
short-run and long-run financial losses for the shareholders and the corporation. These 
successions clearly have some serious consequences on the organisations, especially 
owing to the disruptions it brings on the organisational structure (Foreman & 
Soebbing, 2015). The threat of turnover or replacement of the CEO, specifically owing 
to poor firm performance serves as an economically significant incentive for directors. 
This is in line with Bates, Becher, and Wilson (2015), who opined that those in the top 
management positions are not only disciplined for poor performance by way of 
dismissal, but they also face ex post settling up in the labour market a very rough time 
in securing another job.  
The CEO has the responsibility of putting in place the organisational structure, 
strategy, and performance. The CEO occupies a central position in an organisation and 
plays a vital role in the performance of the firm. As a result of this significant influence 
on the organisation, any changes in the CEO’s position will ultimately have a 
significant influence on the performance of the firm (Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013; Syed 
Ahmad, Hassan & Jaffar, 2016). It is common knowledge that board structure plays a 
vital role in the effective functioning of the companies and by implication the board of 
directors play a very important role in corporate governance. Thus, with effective and 
proper corporate governance in place, the top management team of the firms are more 
likely to pursue the interests of the shareholders (Ngweya, 2014).  
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The importance of corporate governance cannot be overemphasised, because poor 
corporate governance as observed by Erah, Samuel and Izedonmi (2012), results in 
poor performance and the ultimate failure and collapse of the corporations as in the 
case of Enron, and WorldCom. In addition, CEOs are responsible for the day to day 
running of the firms in which they have the fiduciary duty to enhance the firm 
performance and create value for the shareholders. They are subjected to disciplining 
action by way of dismissal in the event of poor corporate performance by the board of 
directors and in some severe cases by the regulatory authorities, government and the 
judiciary (Erah et al., 2012).  
In the developing economies, accounting-based measures of firm performance like 
shareholder’s returns appear to be more informative to shareholders in the CEO 
dismissal decision (Conyon & He, 2014). However, due to the lack of adequate 
information and also weak enforceable contracts, agents (managers / CEO) may act 
opportunistically to the detriment of the principal (owner/ shareholder). This situation 
leads to agency cost associated with the separation of ownership from the control 
(Conyon & He, 2014). Therefore, with effective corporate governance mechanisms, 
both internal and external, the CEO can be effectively and properly monitored by the 
board, and held responsible for the firm performance, and could be replaced in the 
event of poor performance. The threat of sacking or dismissal also serves as a strong 
motivation to the CEOs to pursue the interests of the owners/ shareholders; which is 
in line with the extant literature establishing a negative relationship between 
performance and CEO turnover (Conyon & He, 2012; Ishak, 2010; Ishak & Abdul 
Latif, 2013; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2010). 
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The threat of dismissal of the CEO as a result of poor performance is a fundamental 
monitoring or oversight function of an effective board of directors to keep the CEOs 
alert and active in the discharge of their responsibilities and make them strive to satisfy 
the interests of the shareholders. However, this has not been the case in Nigeria as 
Sanda et al. (2010) observed that, in Nigeria, the CEOs have a strong control over the 
board including the outside directors. They found that CEOs directly and indirectly 
influence the appointment or renewal of board members’ contacts. This makes the 
directors compromise their positions and makes them unable to carry out the sort of 
control over the CEOs as required of them. Furthermore, Sanda (2008) reported that, 
there is a significant concentration of ownership in the form of family holdings leading 
to family control in which they influence the governance structures, whereby, many 
members of the same family surround the CEO. These dominant family holdings 
entrench the CEO, such that in the event of poor performance they are hardly or rarely 
disciplined or replaced. This situation results in the expropriation of minority 
shareholders, thereby necessitating the intervention of the government and the 
regulatory agencies to protect the minority shareholders. Based on their finding, they 
recommended the review of the corporate codes to enhance the effectiveness of the 
board in check mating or monitoring the CEOs. 
In order to enhance good corporate governance practice in Nigeria, the government 
introduced the reviewed NCCG in 2011 to attract both local and international interests, 
especially since it is Africa’s largest market with a significant influx of foreign 
investment. For example, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) recorded a total of $3.0 
billion in 2012, up from $2.7 billion in 2011 (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 2013). 
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However, the problem of poor corporate governance and reporting in Nigeria has 
remained unabated. For instance, nine years ago, the Chairman of Cadbury Nigeria 
Plc, its Managing Director (MD), and the finance directors were all sacked over the 
monumental scandalous case of the financial re-engineering of the company’s 2006 
statement of account reported to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) by the 
minority shareholders.  In the year 2015, the same FRC suspended the Chairman of 
Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc, Mr. Atedo Peterside, its MD/CEO Mr. Sola David – 
Borha, and other top officers of the company over its 2013 and 2014 accounts’ mis-
statements. It was explicitly a case of material irregularities that was concealment, 
accounting irregularities, and poor disclosures in the financial statements reported by 
some minority shareholders of the company (Daily Independent, 2015). 
In a similar case, Premium Times (9th Nov. 2015) reported the resignation of Mr. Sifiso 
Dabengwa, the Group CEO of telecommunication company, MTN, as a result of the 
whopping N 1.04 trillion ($5.2 billion) fine, levied on the company by the Nigerian 
government through its regulatory agency the Nigerian communication commission, 
(NCC). This was as a result of the MTN’s failure to disconnect or deactivate more than 
five million unregistered subscribers, attracting two hundred thousand naira for each 
unregistered subscriber. Though, Mr. Dabengwa took responsibility for the fine levied 
against the company (MTN) which automatically wiped off about 16 % of the 
company’s value. In order to fill up the vacant post, the incumbent chairman of the 
company who was also a former CEO of MTN, Mr. Phuthuma Nhleko was asked to 
step in again as the CEO, but in an acting capacity for six months pending the 
appointment of a substantive successor.  These and many more instances show that, 
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there has been a significant rise in corporate scandals and failures amongst public 
enterprises in Nigeria mainly perpetrated by CEOs teaming up with other principal 
officers of the companies to defraud the stakeholders and the general public (Ngwube, 
2013).  
Related to the above examples, CEO succession is a recurring phenomenon in the life 
of a corporation, it could either be planned succession or unplanned, voluntary or 
forced, performance-induced or otherwise, and several studies have been conducted in 
this regard (Jenter & Lewelle, 2014). Change at the top is destabilizing for any 
company. CEO turnovers lead to shifts in the top team, corporate strategies and 
priorities, which are related to the financial effect (John, 2015). It is also argued that, 
when a company is undergoing turnover for any reason, its total shareholder’s return 
drops in the year after the turnover takes place and the fall will be more if the turnover 
is a forced one (Favaro, Karlsson & Neilson, 2015).  
Top management succession events have attracted serious attention from researchers 
since the first empirical and quantitative study on managerial succession by Grusky 
(1963). It includes replications and even extension of the studies covering all aspects 
of the succession process (Ishak, 2010). Specifically, this study introduces the 
moderating variable (CEO power) and two new variables, namely, board members’ 
gender diversity and board members’ religiosity to the study of CEO succession in 
Nigerian PLCs. Previous studies have found that gender diversity of the board can 
serve as an important internal governance mechanism, especially in countries where 
the external governance mechanism is less developed (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 
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2008). Therefore, considering the inadequacy of the regulatory framework for good 
and effective corporate governance mechanisms, as well as a series of corporate 
failures in the financial and non-financial sectors in Nigeria, it is believed that the 
board members’ gender diversity can serve as an important factor that can influence 
the CEO succession in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, Boytsun, Deloof, and Matthyssens (2011) suggested that religion 
translates into good economic attitudes, which, in turn, engenders good corporate 
governance. Similarly, individuals are influenced by social norms, and this impacts 
corporate individuals’ (CEOs, boards of directors, shareholders) decision making 
related to corporate governance. Influenced by informal institutions from Protestant 
churches, corporate persons such as boards of directors and shareholders are more 
likely to have greater monitoring against management (Kim & Daniel, 2016). Hence, 
board members’ religiosity is expected to influence the CEO succession in Nigeria. 
Therefore, these factors coupled with the fact that this study was carried out in a 
different environment and culture makes it so distinct and unique from the previous 
studies. The CEO succession consists of two events: CEO turnover and selection of a 
new successor, and these two events were studied concurrently, since after the event 
of the turnover, there must be a replacement or the appointment of a successor.  
Previous studies globally found that CEO succession is related with poor performance 
(Kaplan & Minton, 2006; Rachpradit, Tang, & Ba Khang, 2012). Similarly, there 
seems to exist a connection between corporate failures and CEO succession, though 
limited studies to the best of the researcher’s knowledge have been conducted in 
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Nigeria. Hence, this study attempts to uncover the influence of the corporate 
performance, and corporate governance mechanisms on CEO succession in Nigerian 
PLCs. This study introduces a moderator due to the inconsistences and mixed findings 
from the previous studies. Specifically, CEO power was used to investigate the 
moderating role of CEO power in the relationship between corporate performance and 
corporate governance mechanisms and CEO turnover. On CEO power, prior 
researchers have suggested that granting CEOs stakes in the ownership of shares in the 
firms ensures goal congruence and the alignment of their personal interests with those 
of the shareholders; the owners of the firm (Xie, 2014).  
The potential for CEOs to leverage their position or ownership to pursue or advance 
their personal goals is referred to as CEO power (Ronghui & Hailin, 2006). Thus, 
CEOs with more power may want to use their influence over the board composition to 
have a pliable board. The degree of this power can influence board action, as the CEOs 
possess the means of entrenching themselves and securing authority within the 
company, such as in decisions related to the selection of investment projects 
(Baldenius, Melumad, & Meng, 2014). Companies with an entrenched CEO may find 
it difficult to fire the CEO, which suggests that CEO power can create a barrier to 
effective monitoring (Boivie et al., 2016; Fisman, Khurana, Rhodes-Kropf, & Yim, 
2014).  
This argument is consistent with the opinions and recommendations of previous 
researchers like Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, and Donahue (2007) and Ishak, Ku 
Ismail, and Abdullah (2012) that CEO power may moderate the corporate performance 
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and CEO succession relationship. Similarly, as argued by  Cannella and Shen (2001), 
there are three most widely used sources of CEO power in the corporate governance 
literature namely; duality, ownership, and tenure. However, this study focuses on CEO 
ownership as a proxy for CEO power because in the case of Nigeria, CEO duality and 
tenure are not viable.  Part B Section 5.1 (b) of the Code stipulates that for all public 
companies with listed securities, the positions of the chairman of the board and chief 
executive officer shall be separate and held by different individuals. This is to avoid 
over concentration of power in one individual which may rob the board of the required 
checks and balances in the discharge of its duties (SEC Codes, 2011).   
Besides that, the NCCG restricted the CEO tenure to a term of four years, subject to a 
maximum of two terms. Moreover, CEO ownership has been adjudged by the previous 
studies to be the most influential proxy for CEO power, this study thus, adopts CEO 
ownership as the proxy for CEO power consistent with prior studies (Boone, Field, 
Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Combs et al., 2007) and hence, CEO ownership is the most 
suitable moderator for this study.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Corporate performance has been established to be the most used yardstick in assessing 
the effective performance of a CEO (Kaplan & Minton, 2006; Marion & Mark, 2013). 
Results from previous studies have revealed that poorly performing firms have higher 
rates of CEO turnover than the good performing firms (Ishak, Ku Ismail & Abdullah, 
2013; Rachpradit, Tang & Khang, 2012; and Guo & Masulis, 2015). In line with these 
findings the authors concluded that CEO turnover is caused by poor corporate 
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performance.  Nonetheless, there are instances of the sacking of CEOs by their 
corporations while their performances were good. For example, the CEO of Microsoft 
Inc., was sacked even though the company was enjoying a healthy performance. In 
contrast, the CEO of Dangote Flour Mills Plc., remained in his position even though 
the company was facing a period of bad performance.  
A review of the 2010 to 2014 annual reports of some PLCs on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) revealed that several companies had been reporting declining 
revenues, low profits, dwindling shareholders’ fund and earnings per share (EPS) and 
even total loss. For example, Dangote Flour Mill Plc reported a decline in the amount 
of EPS from 111 kobo in the year 2009 to 54kobo in 2010 and down to a total loss in 
negative figure of (55.39) kobo in 2012. Similarly, Julius Berger Nig Plc reported 
decline in its EPS from 648kobo in 2012 to 399 kobo in 2013, while Ashaka Cement 
Plc went down from 140kobo in 2012 to 126kobo in 2013. All these companies had 
their CEOs/ MDs unchanged all through the period of their poor performances. While 
extant literature in the field of corporate governance and established empirical studies 
have posited that poor firm performance leads to CEO turnover, the Nigerian reality 
contradicts this established empirical finding, hence, there is need for further 
investigation to unravel the reasons for these anomalies.  
            Furthermore, in response to the corporations’ failure and collapse across the globe both 
from developed markets and developing markets such as Barings Bank, the Mirror 
Group, Polly Peck International, Enron, and Arthur Andersen, serious attention has 
been focused on the role of corporate governance. This is due to the fact that poor 
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corporate governance mechanisms have been mostly responsible for the failures even 
though there were other factors linked to the problem (Ishak, 2010). In Nigeria, the 
global crisis has brought about serious attention on corporate governance which has 
resulted into the setting up of the Atedo Peterside led committee on corporate 
governance, which was commissioned by the Security & Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to consider corporate governance issues in Nigeria. It produced the 2003 SEC 
corporate governance code which has undergone two revisions; 2011 and 2014 
respectively.  
The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) stipulated board independence 
and emphasized that, for all public companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE), the positions of the chairman of the board of directors and the CEO/ MD shall 
be separated and occupied by different persons/ individuals. This is to prevent too 
much power in the hands of an individual, which could deprive the board of the much-
needed checks and balances targeted at enhancing the monitoring and disciplining 
responsibilities. The board influences corporate policy and strategy and even the 
dismissal of the CEO and top management in the event of poor performance. However, 
it seems that the board has not been effective in carrying out its monitoring duty even 
with the separation between the post of CEO and the chairman. As a result of which 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had to intervene in 2009 by dismissing eight CEOs 
and executive directors of some Nigerian banks in a single swoop over issues 
concerning poor corporate governance (LPC, 2014).   
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           In addition, the Nigerian corporate environment confers controlling shareholders with 
the powers to influence board compositions and decisions. This has affected the board 
qualities and effectiveness coupled with corruption and fraudulent practices (Ngwube, 
2013). Furthermore, weak board governance, company domination by self-seeking 
CEOs and weak executive monitoring and accountability coupled with the presence of 
founding families who persistently retain control of the firm, play a central role in the 
management and setting the strategic direction and performance outcome of some 
public listed companies in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2014; Adegbite et al., 2013). All these 
factors make the issues much more complicated in the Nigerian context. Therefore, the 
ability of the board of directors to monitor CEOs is questionable.  
Several studies on CEO turnover in the developed markets, such as the UK, the US 
and Canada have reported a negative relationship between CEO turnover and corporate 
performance (Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014; González, Guzmán, & Pombo, 
2014; Guo & Masulis, 2015). This situation is characteristic of dispersed ownership 
where boards of directors live up to their responsibilities of monitoring and sanctioning 
under-performing CEOs. Similarly, in some emerging markets with concentrated 
ownership like Malaysia, China and Thailand, the researchers established negative 
relationship between corporate performance, CEO turnover, and the selection of 
outside CEOs as successors (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Ishak, Ku Ismail, & 
Abdullah, 2013; Rachpradit, Tang, & Ba Khang, 2012; Ishak, 2010). However, studies 
like Cheng, Hu, and Saffar (2014); Conyon and He (2012) Maalu (2010);  Maalu, 
Mccormick, and Machuki (2013) and Marion and Mark (2013) reported contrary 
findings on the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate performance. They 
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found that CEO turnover is not related to poor performance. While in the same 
developing markets, Ishak, Ku Ismail and Abdullah (2012) and Cook (2015) did not 
find any links between corporate performance and outside CEO selection. 
These inconsistences in the findings or mixed results could be as a result of other 
factors that influence the relationship, such as ownership structures, board structures, 
CEO characteristics, and business environment, among other factors. Among the 
factors that have been considered by the prior researchers in the corporate governance 
literature on CEO succession, are the board structure and ownership characteristics 
(Chen, 2014; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Guo & Masulis, 2015). Prior studies have 
concentrated on the common attributes of board structure such as, board size, board 
composition, board committees, and diversity. Limited studies have considered the 
influence of board members’ gender and board members’ religiosity on CEO 
succession. These variables have the potential to enhance the effectiveness of the board 
in discharging its monitoring and oversight function on the management. 
 In line with the agency theory, the boards of corporations play very important role in 
mitigating the principal to agent problems by their monitoring function (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This monitoring function enhances the 
behaviour of the management and aligns their interests with those of their principals, 
which subsequently affects the firms’ performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Nevertheless, some aspects of the board that serve as effective monitoring 
mechanisms, depends on the extent to which the board is diverse with regards to 
gender diversity, or the presence of female representation on the board. This is because 
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gender diversity enhances the effectiveness of the board of directors and adds value to 
the company in a tangible manner (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Gender diversity also 
facilitates creativity as well as enhances the functioning and the efficiency of both the 
board and its committees (Adams et al., 2015). Furthermore, as at January 2015, the 
population size of Nigeria was put at 51,199,237 males and 49,451, 476 females who 
were above 15 years of age (MacDonald, Wong, & Sheldon, 2015). As the proportion 
of women to men is a 4 to 5 ratio, the importance of women as policy maker cannot 
be neglected (Ekpe & Bisong, 2016). Due to that the Nigerian government has 
reviewed the policy with the focus on gender equality and women empowerment 
(Amadi, 2017a, 2017b; Ekpe & Bisong, 2016). Hence, the need to consider board 
members’ gender in this study. 
Similarly, several studies have examined how corporate decision making is affected 
by the religiosity of the individual director or decision maker (Grullon, Kanatas, & 
Weston, 2009; McGuire, Newton, Omer, & Sharp, 2012). However, few studies have 
been conducted on the developing economies on this phenomenon (Ali & Azmi, 2016). 
The diversity in the world population, and the great influence of religion on human 
behaviour affects the responsibility of monitoring and disciplining the CEOs and other 
succession decisions (Kim & Daniel, 2016). In addition, both religious affiliation and 
religious commitment are used to measure religiosity. In other words, adherence by an 
individual to a particular religious group, such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism or 
Hinduism is a measure of religiosity (Abdullah & Sapiei, 2018; Hirschman, 1983). 
Furthermore, Nigeria is a predominantly Muslim country with over 60% of its 
population being Muslims, with the other 40% comprising the Christians and others 
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like traditionalists and atheists (Pew Research Centre, 2015). Therefore, it is expected 
that the high ethical standard and moral accountability which is the hallmark of Islamic 
teachings as asserted by Abuznaid (2009) and Abuznaid (2006)  respectively, will 
influence the behaviour of the board members who are Muslims and such board 
members will be more effective in monitoring the CEOs. Hence, board members’ 
religiosity is expected to influence CEO succession in the Nigerian corporate 
environment. 
On the other hand, the resource dependence theory views that, board gender diversity 
can assist companies to obtain crucial resources and have the ability to withstand 
various external uncertainties that will increase firm value.  In the light of the preceding 
discussion, this study considers the extend of the religiosity of the board members and 
the gender of the members on the board of directors to influence the CEO turnover and 
selection choice. 
Meanwhile, the ownership structure variables that have been frequently considered by 
prior studies are blockholders, family ownership, institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership (Ishak, 2010; Ishak, Ku Ismail & Abdullah, 2013 and 
Rachpradit, Tang & Ba Khang, 2012). Nonetheless, foreign ownership is also an 
important variable of ownership structure, especially given its significant proportion 
in most emerging economies like Nigeria (Adelegan, 2009). For example, in 2012 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria amounted to 8 billion US dollars 
representing 15 percent of the FDI in the entire African continent. It constitutes 25 
percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country (Akinmulegun, 2012). 
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This was in addition to the favourable government policies on foreign ownership 
which allowed foreign investors to own up to 100 percent ownership in the firms with 
exceptions of the oil and gas sector, which was limited to 40 percent (Adelegan, 2009; 
Tsegba, Herbert, & Ene, 2014). Hence, this study considers foreign ownership as a key 
variable in determining the influence of ownership structure on CEO turnover and 
selection choice. 
            Furthermore, the relationship between CEO turnover and performance is not simple or 
direct. For example, Fiodelisi and Ricci (2013) argued that past performance usually 
provides explanations for a very little segment of the turnover phenomenon. Based on 
this, they suggested further studies to identify the roots of this relationship.  Therefore, 
in line with the suggestions of Ishak, Ku Ismail, and Abdullah (2012), Hsu, Chen, and 
Cheng (2013) and Chen (2014), this study adopts CEO power as a moderator which 
can influence a firm’s governance mechanisms and performance which consequently 
moderate the relationship with the CEO turnover. Moreover, a sizeable number of prior 
studies for example Combs et al. (2007) and Ishak, Ku Ismail and Abdullah (2012) 
suggested that CEO power could moderate the relationship between performance and 
CEO turnover. One aspect of CEO power that is commonly and widely identified as a 
strong yardstick for measuring CEO power is CEO ownership (Hsu, Chen & Cheng, 
2013 and Chen, 2014). Ownership is an important source of power, but because it 
binds the CEO’s and the shareholders’ wealth, it also furnishes a strong performance 
incentive (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, because CEOs are susceptible to self-
serving bias, they attribute poor performance externally. In addition, CEOs with 
ownership power can and do hold on to their positions beyond their point of 
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effectiveness (Combs et al., 2007). For example, a study by Combs et al. (2007) used 
CEO power as the moderating factor for the board composition and corporate 
performance relationship. The selection of CEO power in the moderating role was to 
fill the gap, as the previous studies had only examined the moderating role of CEO 
power on the board composition and corporate governance relationship (Combs et al., 
2007). 
1.3 Research Questions 
In line with the discussion contained in the preceding problem statement, this study 
made attempts at answering the following questions: 
(1)   Do corporate performance and corporate governance mechanisms (board    
structure and ownership structure) influence CEO turnover in Nigerian PLCs?  
(2)       Does the CEO power moderate the relationship between corporate performance, 
corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) 
and CEO turnover?   
Following the incidence of CEO turnover;  
(3)    Do corporate performance and corporate governance mechanisms (board 
structure and ownership structure) influence the CEO selection choice in 
Nigerian PLCs? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
For the purpose of answering the aforementioned research questions, the following 
objectives were developed accordingly: 
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(1)      To examine the influence of corporate performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) on CEO turnover in 
Nigerian PLCs. 
(2)      To investigate the moderating role of CEO power over corporate performance, 
corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) 
and CEO turnover. 
 (3)     To examine the influence of corporate performance and corporate governance    
mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) on the CEO selection 
choice in Nigerian PLCs. 
Answering the research questions (1) to (3) requires a comprehensive and deep 
literature review; this was undertaken with the aim of identifying the effects of 
corporate performance and corporate governance mechanisms on CEO succession in 
Nigerian PLCs. The CEO dismissal and selection models put forward by Frederickson 
et al., (1988) and Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) respectively with some few 
modifications were adopted. The variables of board structure, ownership structure, 
corporate performance, and CEO power taken as a moderator were looked at as factors 
influencing the CEO turnover and selection choice in Nigeria. The Nigerian economy, 
being an emerging market, is like Malaysia which was studied by Ishak (2010), but its 
focus was on the direct relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variables. This current study introduced CEO power as a moderator to 
moderate the direct relationship that has already been studied.   
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
The importance and relevance of studying CEO succession cannot be over emphasised, 
given the cardinal role the CEOs play in the life of any enterprise. It is very crucial to 
study CEO succession in Nigeria, not just because Nigeria is the largest emerging 
economy in Africa, but more so because most studies on CEO succession were 
conducted on the developed economies with strong capital markets like the UK, the 
US and Canada. There are a few on developing economies like Malaysia and Thailand 
(Rachpradit, Tang, & Ba Khang, 2012; Ishak, 2010). However, these studies are no 
doubt inadequate to address the CEO succession phenomenon in most developing 
economies owing to the differences in their respective corporate environments and 
ownership structures. Therefore, given the scanty nature of research as regards CEO 
succession (CEO turnover and selection) in developing economies and Nigeria in 
particular, this study provides evidence on the factors determining CEO turnover and 
the selection of successor in the Nigerian PLCs. Specifically, this study provides both 
the theoretical and practical contributions as follow: 
1.5.1 Theoretical Significance 
For the theoretical contribution, this study expands the existing literature on corporate 
governance with special attention on its mechanisms such as board structure, 
ownership structure and CEO characteristics and its influence on CEO succession in 
Nigerian PLCs. Beyond the agency theory which is the underpinning theory, this study 
introduces three supporting theories namely; the resource dependency theory, social 
network theory and human capital theory together with new variables like board 
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gender diversity, board members’ religiosity and board nominating committee 
independence to explain the CEO succession in Nigeria. 
 These theories were adopted to deepen the understanding of CEO succession in 
Nigeria owing to the differences in its culture, business environment and corporate 
governance structure from other countries. This study has equally taken the frontier of 
the previous studies to a new height by using CEO power as a moderator to intervene 
the direct relationship between these variables already studied by the previous 
researchers. These fill the gap in the scanty literature as regards CEO succession in 
emerging markets with weak corporate governance structure like Nigeria.  
1.5.2 Practical Significance 
 In addition, the findings from this study may be useful to the government and the 
regulatory agencies like the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), NSE, SEC, FRC and 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) in formulating and enforcing reforms that 
would entrench good corporate practices that will strengthen the weak corporate 
markets. The findings of this study highlight the good corporate mechanisms that can 
be adopted and enforced by the government and regulatory agencies to mitigate the 
collapse of corporations due to weak corporate practices and poor regulation, which 
will in turn, boost the investors’ confidence in Nigeria’s business landscape.  
This study also provides insights as well as serves as guide to the companies, the 
shareholders and those charged with the responsibilities of hiring and firing CEOs on 
decision to either retain or replace its CEOs and whether to select internal or external 
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candidates as successors. This is because, survival and wellbeing of a firm depends so 
much on the quality of its top management especially the CEO. 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
This study addresses the CEO succession in Nigerian public listed companies between 
2011 to 2015. This period was selected for this study because the Nigerian code of 
corporate governance was revised in 2011 and a harmonized draft of a general code 
for all the companies in Nigeria was also produced in the year 2014. Hence, the 
suitability of this period to capture all the changes in the corporate environment and 
regulations in Nigeria and it dwelled on the determinant factors of CEO turnover and 
those that influence the selection of a successor. Thus, the study of the CEO succession 
is comprised of two major segments, namely: CEO turnover and CEO selection. The 
sample of the study is the entire publicly listed non-financial companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). As at 31 December 2015, there were a total of 176 
active companies on the main board of the NSE (NSE Q4 2015 Fact Sheet). This study 
uses secondary data sourced from the Audited Annual Reports of the companies, Facts 
book and data from the NSE database. 
 This study is divided into two parts as depicted below in Figure 1.1. The first segment 
of this research explores the effect of corporate performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms on CEO turnover. The potential data for the CEO turnover is all public 
listed companies in Nigeria. Based on data from the turnover companies, the second 
stage of the study examines the influence of corporate performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms on the selection of a successor following the occurrence of a 
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turnover, that is, whether an outsider or insider successor will be selected to replace 
the ousted or incumbent CEO.  
 








Figure 1.1:  
Structure of the Study 
  
1.7 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the background of the study, problem statement, research 
questions, research objectives, significance and scope of the study. The major aim of 
this study is to determine the extent to which corporate performance, board 
characteristics, ownership structure, and CEO power influence CEO turnover in the 
Nigerian PLCs. The results of this study might not necessarily be the same as the 
previous studies, owing to the peculiarities of the Nigerian corporate governance 
environment and the nature of its capital market. 
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This chapter reviews the literature on CEO succession with specific focus on publicly 
listed companies. The chapter comprises ten Sections. Section 2.1 is the introduction, 
while in Section 2.2 and 2.3 CEO turnover and CEO selection were discussed together 
with their respective models. The next is Section 2.4 where the literature review relates 
to the overview of the corporate governance code across the globe and then focuses on 
Nigeria to project the clear delineation of the factors that determine the CEO 
succession in Nigerian PLCs.  
Section 2.5 presents a comprehensive discussion on the underpinning theories utilised 
in this study. Section 2.6 discusses the influence of corporate performance on CEO 
succession in general. Section 2.7 gives a comprehensive discussion on board structure 
as an important internal corporate governance mechanism that can possibly influence 
CEO succession, this is followed by Section 2.8 which discusses another key internal 
corporate governance mechanism; i.e., ownership structure while Section 2.9 focuses 
on the moderating role of CEO power on the relationship. Finally, Section 2.10 reviews 
the control variables and concludes with the summary of the chapter. 
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2.2 CEO Turnover 
Turnover can be defined in a general term as the rate at which workers leave their 
workplace or industry. It is about the rate at which employees are being fired or 
replaced by their employer within a given period. During economic growth and 
expansion, the turnover rate increases, while it falls during economic stagnation and 
depression, in other words turnover generally has a negative correlation with the rate 
of unemployment in the economy. CEO turnover occurs for several reasons. Aside 
from forced departure owing to unsatisfactory performance, violating specific laws 
and codes is another reason. CEOs most often leave their posts voluntarily. It could be 
due to getting more attractive appointment, retirement, health challenges, or simply 
passing away while in active service (Guo & Masulis, 2015). 
CEO turnover is theoretically hinged on the agency theory. The principal-agent 
relationship that exists between the shareholders (principal) and the managers/ CEOs 
(agent) whereby the shareholders (principal) use the turnover as a tool by which the 
CEOs are threatened with dismissal in the event of the ineffective or poor 
performances of the companies. On the other hand, turnover serves as an incentive to 
the CEOs to implement proper strategies and manage the firms efficiently and 
effectively to increase the shareholders’ wealth and enhance the performance of the 
firms to avoid being fired by the  shareholders (principal) (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 
2014). 
A high turnover rate is a sign of good corporate governance mechanisms, especially 
as it avails the managements of the corporations the opportunity to replace less 
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productive staff with more competent and qualified ones. It equally presents them the 
chance to renegotiate and reset the salaries of the employees thereby leading to saving 
cost. Likewise, turnover allows the organizations to introduce innovative technology 
by phasing out old employees who lack the technological knowhow with young and 
innovative ones (Maharjan, 2015).  In a nutshell, most companies engage in frequent 
turnover to address the aforementioned needs and objectives. 
Lower level employee turnover is quite different from that of CEOs.  While in the case 
of the employee turnover, the turnover could be as a result of dissatisfaction with the 
management, job role, wages, or possibility of better pay elsewhere or job security, 
career advancement or dismissal or termination. However, the CEO turnover is largely 
due to performance decline. It could be accounting performance or market based 
performance. Coates and Kraakman (2010) and Maharjan (2015) observed that 
shareholders through the board of directors are disposed to fire or dismiss the CEO 
because of poor firm performance. They also reported that corporate performance, 
especially recent stock price has a negative relationship with the forced CEO turnover. 
2.2.1 Types of Turnover 
Most of the prior empirical studies categorized CEO turnovers into two broad 
categories; voluntary and involuntary turnover (Gopalan, 2014; Huang, Maharjan, & 
Thakor, 2015; and Maharjan, 2015), standard/internal turnover and non-standard 
/external turnover (Kaplan & Minton, 2006), normal and forced turnover (Kind & 
Schläpfer, 2011) and forced and planned turnover (Gopalan, 2014; Huang et al., 2015). 
In sum, voluntary/standard /normal/planned turnover have been collectively defined 
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by these researchers as normal if the CEO has attained the retirement age, usually 
above 60 years, or is due to take over as a result of merger or acquisition, death or poor 
health/illness. Any other type of turnover outside the reasons highlighted above is 
termed involuntary/ non-standard / forced. It is quite difficult to identify forced 
turnover because the press releases hardly ever mention them as such. However, 
Huang et al.,(2014) and Maharjan (2015) classified as forced, all turnovers for which 
the CEO is announced to be fired, or reported to be forced out or to vacate his position 
as a result of disagreement with the shareholders, or refusal by the board to renew the 
contract. They equally classified as forced, any turnover due to scandals, lawsuits or 
turnover triggered by probes. Nonetheless, giving the importance of the CEO position 
as head of the management of the firm, poor firm performance is the most adduced 
reason for the CEO turnover (Kaplan & Minton, 2006).  
The succession theory has provided an elaborate explanation to highlight the 
differences between the forced turnover and the voluntary type. The theory suggests 
four normal or voluntary (non-dismissal) circumstances, which are (1) Normal CEO 
retirement (2) Early retirement (3) Relay succession and (4) Death or retirement due 
to poor health/ illness. The first type of voluntary turnover is the statutory or normal 
retirement. A common categorization procedure is to use some variants of the Parrino 
(1997) algorithm as cited by Fee, Hadlock, Chase, and Pierce (2015) in their recent 
study on the models of CEO turnover. They suggested that, in the absence of any 
revelation, the common choice has been to treat it based on young versus old 
executives that departed from the company as forced versus voluntary, using the age 
of 60 years old as the decision yardstick. Although, this approach is intuitively 
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appealing, it however, contains some systematic biases (Fee et al., 2015).  In Nigeria, 
the retirement age for public/ civil servant is 65 years. However, as observed by 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1993), many companies have rules and traditions that require 
that their officers retire at a particular age, usually 65 years, but these restrictions do 
not affect the directors. Consequently, organizations and companies that do not adopt 
the relay type of succession will mostly retain outgoing (incumbent) CEOs as 
directors. In Nigeria, there is no prohibition or age barriers to the appointment as a 
director of a public company as far as the public listed companies are concerned. The 
code of corporate governance is silent on the age limit of the director for eligibility for 
appointment onto the board of directors. The corporate governance codes only 
emphasises competence and capability. 
The second type of voluntary turnover is early retirement. Early retirement occurs 
when the outgoing CEO remained a director, does not retain the officer-ship and he/ 
she is under the age of 64. Meanwhile, a turnover event is regarded as dismissal/forced 
or involuntary when all officer-ship and directorship relationship between a company 
and its departing CEO are completely cut off as at the succession time.  Furthermore, 
different reasons could account for the severance of the relationship; it could be either 
board-initiated termination, pride on the part of the outgoing CEO to avoid the 
embarrassment of dismissal or an outgoing CEO who voluntarily jumps a sinking ship. 
The third is relay succession which is defined by Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) as 
when an heir apparent emerges as CEO while the departing CEO is moved to the 
chairperson position. They further stressed that relay connotes a smooth power shift, 
    
 
28
less disruption to current strategies, and full-scale involvement of the substantive or 
current CEO in the selection processes and decision. The fourth type of non-dismissal 
turnover is a change which is as a result of the demise or incapacitation due to the 
deteriorating health status of the outgoing CEO. This is discernible from the firm’s 
announcement in the media or/ and Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) website. 
Finally, with regards to CEO turnover behaviour, careful consideration the effects of 
age is always necessary. In addition, information that could be used in determining  the 
forced versus voluntary nature of a specific type of turnover  should be exploited fully 
whenever possible (Fee et al., 2015), for example, information on severance payment, 
and information on the subsequent labour market. Nevertheless, poor corporate 
performance is the most recognised reasons for forced CEO turnover. Eisfeldt and 
Kuhnen (2013) opine that empirical literature on CEO turnover shows that CEOs are 
more likely to be subjected to dismissal or forced out of their position for their poor 
performance relative to the industry average and are also less likely to remain in their 
positions when the overall industry performance is poor, regardless of the effect of 
their relative performance. 
2.2.2 Models in CEO Turnover 
There are different varieties of modeling choices on CEO turnover as contained in the 
empirical literature. This is expected because of the coarse guidance provided by the 
underpinning theories and the wide differences  in data accessibility and availability 
across different settings (Fee et al., 2015). In addition, they argued that, in several 
turnover studies, the researchers were confronted with numerous modeling decisions, 
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each with multiple and reasonable choices, and this invariably led to many possible 
model problems. There are two models that are mostly used by researchers in 
succession studies. These are; (1) the socio-political model developed by Fredrickson, 
Hambrick and Baumrin (1988) and (2) the cognitive model which was designed by 
Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2006). This is because both models specifically relate to 
CEO dismissal. 
Prior to the aforementioned models was the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) model 
developed by Schneider in 1987, wherein he posited that it is the people who make the 
place, and the organisational culture, practices, and climate are determined by the 
individuals in that organisation. The  theory as suggested by Schneider (1995) holds 
that: (1) people are attracted to organisations in which its members share common 
similarities with themselves in terms of personality, interests ,values, and other 
attributes; (2) organisations are more inclined to select those individuals that  possess 
knowledge, skills, and the required  abilities similar to those of  their existing members; 
and (3) with time, individuals that do not fit in properly  are  likely to leave the 
organization. As a result of these factors, the personal attributes of those who work 
together in an organization are more likely to become similar over time, resulting to 
the consolidation of the organisational culture.  
 As argued by Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988), corporate performance 
influences CEO dismissal but the relationship is not so direct as it is mediated by 
certain social and political factors. They listed four constructs which are supposed to 
mediate this relationship; they are as follow; (1) board’s expectations and attributions, 
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(2) board’s values and allegiances, (3) availability of alternative CEO candidates, and 
(4) the incumbent CEO’s power. They claim that the observable determinants for these 
constructs are found in the board characteristics, the firm, the industry and in the CEOs 
(incumbent and predecessor). Usually, the organisation’s desire to change direction, 
leads to dismissing the CEO and it is a major event normally initiated by the 
organisation’s board (Dikolli et al., 2014; Kind & Schläpfer, 2011; Maharjan, 2015).  
In analysing successions, the forced or the voluntary exit of the incumbent CEO 
receives the greatest theoretical attention because it is just in these two cases that actual 
choices are made. Nevertheless, dismissing the CEO is of particular importance to the 
organisational theory, especially as this type of turnover mostly requires 
comprehending the organisational factors (Fee et al., 2015; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  
Therefore, Fredrickson et al.(1988) defined CEO dismissal as a situation whereby  the 
CEO's departure is not part of a compulsory retirement policy and is against his/ her 
wish. 
 In line with the prior empirical studies like McEachern (1975); Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1980); and James and Soref (1981), as cited by Fredrickson et al. (1988) which  have 
shown that poor performance is not the sole reason for the dismissal of the CEO, as 
organisation’s performance accounts for not up to half of the variances in the CEOs’ 
dismissal and the turnover rate. As such, they further emphasised their argument that, 
other factors apart from performance play significant roles. Consequently, Fredrickson 
et al. (1988) came up with a dismissal model which postulated that, for a CEO to be 
either dismissed or retained, the board of directors draw a comparison between the 
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firm’s current actual performance and the board’s performance expectation. The 
yardstick is, the CEO is likely to be subjected to disciplinary action by the board in the 
form of dismissal or demotion (Maharjan, 2015) if the actual current firm’s 
performance falls below the board’s expected performance. On the other hand, the 
CEO is most likely to be retained by the board, if the actual current firm’s performance 
exceeds the board of directors’ performance expectation. 
In expatiating on the board’s expectations and attributions which is one of the four 
sociopolitical constructs, Fredrickson et al. (1988) maintained that, the board of 
directors depends solely on their knowledge of what good corporate performance 
entails, the performance of other firms across the industry and their beliefs as regards 
the severity and seriousness of the particular organisational problem and attributions 
with regard to the CEO’s ability to change the company's performance. These 
influence the board members in carrying out their responsibilities of monitoring and 
firing the CEO. They further cited Salancik and Meindl (1984) and Bettman and Weitz 
(1983) as stating that board members' attributions as they relate to the top 
managements are especially important because, they are subject to manipulation by 
that management arguing that every member's beliefs regarding the top management 
power differs. Therefore, if some members of the board of directors anticipated better 
organisational performance than what was achieved, and they hold the belief that the 
CEO is instrumental in achieving that performance, the CEO is likely to be dismissed. 
  


















A Model of CEO Dismissal 
source: Adopted from Fredrickson et al.(1988) 
 
On the board's allegiances and values, they stressed that the individual director has 
his/her unique motives for being on the boards, for example it could be wealth 
maximisation, guaranteed directors' fees or status and reputation. Likewise, many 
directors have allegiances to some specific individuals such as, the CEO, dominant 
stockholder or the former CEO.  These allegiances and values as suggested by 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) affect the intensity and direction of the board’s determination 
to gather information on the performance of the CEO and it will also impact on the 
meaning attached to the information about dismissing the CEO. The third 
sociopolitical construct that moderates or facilitates the dismissal of an incumbent 
CEO is the availability of an alternative candidate to replace the CEO in the event of 
dismissal. The board of directors considers, both implicitly and explicitly, the 
availability of a competent candidate to replace the CEO either internally, that is, from 
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within the company or externally (i.e., outside the firm). When there are more suitably 
qualified alternative candidates to replace the CEO, the more likelihood there is for the 
CEO dismissal. 
 The fourth and last of the sociopolitical constructs as canvassed by Fredrickson et al. 
(1988), is the incumbent CEO’s power. When the current CEO acquires some 
extraordinary powers, such as; voting control, having control of some vital resources 
like, proprietary technology, major clients, key regulatory contacts, and personal 
characteristics, such as being a founder or charismatic personality, all of these can give 
the incumbent CEO extra power and substantial influence which will make his or her 
dismissal by the board of directors in the event of poor firm performance difficult and 
most unlikely. In a nutshell, these four variables; the board of directors, the 
organisation, the industry, the incumbent CEO, and the predecessor CEO to a great 
extent, determine the influence of the aforementioned sociopolitical constructs in 
shaping the actions and decisions of the board.  
 Fredrickson et al. (1988) took only a socio-political approach to CEO dismissal and 
focused specifically on the effect of board composition even though they briefly 
touched on cognitive expectations and attributions. On the other hand, Haleblian and 
Rajagopalan (2006) explained in more detail the influence of board composition on 
board cognitions. They provided an in-depth treatment of the causal mechanisms 
through which board interpretations impact CEO dismissal actions. They developed a 
three-stage model of CEO dismissal which relies on previous studies in cognitive 
psychology, it is linked between managerial cognitions and strategic actions. It 
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incorporates the board’s perceptions and the attributions of the company’s 
performance and assesses the CEO efficacy, which results in an enhanced 













Sense making (Stage 1)                  Interpretation (Stage 2)              Action (Stage 3) 
Figure 2.2 
Three Stages of CEO Dismissal Framework 
Source: Adopted from Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2006)  
 
A core assumption of the framework is that specific requirements must be fulfilled for 
the model to progress from one particular stage to another. In the first stage, as 
presented in Figure 2.2, it entails sense-making, whereby, the board of directors makes 
performance perceptions by assessing the current firm performance. To move from 
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stage one to the second stage (interpretation), the performance of the firm must be 
perceived to be below expectations. And to move from the second stage 
(interpretation) to the CEO dismissal which is the third stage, the CEO must have been 
assessed by the board of directors and found to have been inefficacious and recorded 
a poor performance. 
Conclusively, the two CEO dismissal models discussed emphasised the relevance and 
significance of the board of directors especially its role in the monitoring and 
disciplining of the CEOs by way of dismissal or retention in accordance with the firm’s 
performance. Substantial empirical evidence abounds with regard to the direct 
relationship between firm performance and the decision to dismiss or retain the CEO. 
However, there are prior studies that have equally established that the link is moderated 
by some socio-political constructs, such as (a) the board of directors' expectations and 
attributions, (b) the board's allegiances and values, (c) the availability of alternative 
candidates for the CEO, and (d) the power of the incumbent CEO which strengthen 
this relationship (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Ishak et al., 
2012; Rachpradit et al., 2012). Hence, this study considers board structure as well as 
the moderating role of CEO power on the CEO turnover in the Nigerian PLCs. 
2.3 CEO Selection Choice 
Selection of the CEO is one of the major responsibilities of a company’s board of 
directors (Jenter & Lewellen, 2010), and whatever choice of a successor the boards 
make, has significant consequences on the company's future direction, strategies and 
structure (Ishak et al., 2012). Therefore, CEO successions as suggested by Ishak, Ku 
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Ismail, and Abdullah (2013) provide the means for the assessment of the efficacy of a 
leader in shaping the firms’ fortunes. As the CEOs have great influence on the 
corporations, any changes in the position of the CEOs will have a significant effect on 
the investors’ perceptions, which will in turn affect the price fluctuation in the firms’ 
stock prices in the immediate term, and in the long term affect the firms’ profitability 
(Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013). 
Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) classified CEO selection into insider and outsider 
successor.  The authors argue that the selections are made by the directors who most 
of the time rely on public information in their assessment of the CEOs. They also claim 
that for their subsequent selecting of external candidates for the CEO’s job, the 
directors’ assessments rely specifically on the current performance of the CEO 
candidates. Kim (2011) defines inside selection as the successor originating from 
within the firm while the outside selection is when the successor is recruited from 
outside the firm. Depending on the origin of the successor, whether insider or outsider, 
the succession is expected to affect both the strategic change and post succession 
performance of the firms (Custódio et al., 2011; Kim, 2011).  
There is no consensus among the researchers on the determinants of appointing an 
external or internal CEO. The possible reasons could be due to differences in the 
corporate environments and other internal governance mechanisms of the respective 
context of the studies. For example, some scholars like Fatima, Goergen and Mira 
(2014) and Rachpradit et al. (2012) argue that an external successor is usually 
appointed when the change was due to poor performance, while an internal CEO will 
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be appointed following good performance. On the contrary, Boeker and Goodstein 
(1993) asserted that the successor is always appointed from within the firm or/and 
within the family regardless of poor firm performance. Similarly, Ishak et al. (2012) 
based on their study on the determinants of external versus internal succession in 
Malaysia concluded that poor firm performance will not necessarily result in the 
external CEO selection choice. They suggested that some other factors such as board 
composition, firm ownership and sociopolitical factors could be moderating the 
relationship between poor firm performance and external succession.  
Larcker, Miles, and Tayan (2014) claimed that, annually, approximately between 10% 
to 15% of the companies, globally, change their CEOs. However, due to the inherent 
advantages and disadvantages of either internal or external successors, the debate on 
which is better preferred by the managers of employment remains topical and unabated 
among the academics and professionals. The authors identified four approaches 
generally adopted in the selection of CEOs. The first approach is the CEO-in-waiting: 
In this approach the firm promotes a prospective candidate to the rank of Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) where he / she will be groomed to eventually ascend to the 
position of the CEO. This approach gives the board of directors, the first-hand 
opportunity to observe how the executive will perform when eventually given the CEO 
responsibilities. The second approach is internal development; this method allows the 
company to identify a pool of potential candidates from within the firm and establishes 
a developmental plan for every one of them. Subsequently, the most viable candidate 
is elevated to the position of CEO.  
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The third approach is external recruitment: The company hires or employs the CEO 
from outside the company. This approach is mostly adopted when the company lacks 
qualified and competent talents internally, or the organisation needs a turnaround that 
requires significant strategic and operating change. The last approach is referred to as 
the inside-outside approach. The firm/ organisation combines the internal development 
plan together with the external search. This method enables the firm to compare the 
leading internal candidates with the external candidates from the market and select the 
most competent and qualified individual. There is no one best approach amongst these 
methods, there exists tradeoffs to each of the approaches, hence, firms fall short at 
succession because  they mostly select the wrong method for their peculiar situation 
(Larcker et al., 2014). 
2.3.1 CEO Selection Choice Views 
Basically, there are four views that are mostly suggested in the discussion of 
managerial succession. These are the adaptive, inertial, scapegoating and contingency  
views (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2014; Ishak et al., 
2012). 
          2.3.1.1 Adaptive View 
The advocates of the adaptive view have stressed that CEO selection is a vital 
mechanism of adaptation evolved by the corporation or organisation in reaction to the 
challenges in its environment. Therefore, poor firm performance leads to top 
management turnover and when the turnover occurs due to poor performance, the 
board of directors are likely to bring on board an outsider candidate as a replacement 
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because of the belief that the outsider has the capacity, skills and expertise to bring 
about the desired changes for the betterment of the firm much more than the insiders 
of the firm (Bereskin & Hsu, 2011; Ishak et al., 2012). Thus, CEO dismissal can occur 
as an adaptive response to changing environmental conditions or when the CEO is not 
a good fit for the firm (Bereskin & Hsu, 2011). 
2.3.1.2 Inertial View 
The inertial view holds that, due to the size of the corporations and too many vested 
interests, organizations resist change. Thus, even in the event of poor performance, the 
board of directors will still prefer an insider candidate to an outsider (Larcker et al., 
2014).  Ishak et al. (2012) argued that, in line with the inertial view, in the event of 
poor firm performance the firm is more likely to select an insider candidate for the 
CEO. This is consistent with the view of the proponents of inertia that despite the 
continuous changes in the environment, large firms in particular tend to resist change 
irrespective of the poor performance (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). 
            2.3.1.3 Scapegoating View 
            The third view on the selection choice is the scapegoating view. In this circumstance, 
the CEO transfers or shifts blames to his/her subordinates by firing them in the events 
of poor firm performance. Doing so, he/she absolves himself/herself (CEO) of any 
blames as it relates to the poor performance and remains in his/her position (Gangloff 
et al., 2014; Ishak et al., 2012).  Taking the argument further, Gangloff et al. (2014) 
opine that, scapegoating can also be carried out on a CEO by the board of directors, in 
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a case where the CEO is dismissed for financial misrepresentation or poor 
performance. 
            The scapegoated CEO is replaced though with an internal successor just to give the 
public impression that the problem has been addressed as if the individual is the source 
of the problem. In this scenario no change will be witnessed in the post succession 
performance because the policies and strategies of the company remain (Gangloff et 
al., 2014; Ishak et al., 2012). Hence, scapegoating simply leads to succession but not 
necessarily resulting in the appointment of an external candidate as the CEO. It also 
conforms to the inertial view in the sense that powerful executives only place the blame 
on their subordinates by dismissing a less powerful officer in order to satisfy the 
external pressure for change (Cannella & Lubatkin,1993). 
           2.3.1.4 Contingency Views 
The fourth and final view is the contingency view. Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) 
observed that, neither the adaptive nor the inertial view was able to offer an explanation 
on outsider selection, hence, the contingency view which is centered on the 
sociopolitical approach to the CEO succession process has received current attention. 
It advocates that, there are several sociopolitical factors which are deemed to moderate 
the relationship between firm performance and board of directors’ decision making 
process which also differ from firm to firm based on the information available to the 
board (Cannella & Lubatkin,1993; Ishak et al., 2012). Based on these four views, this 
study attempts to test or determine which of these views suit the Nigerian corporate 
environment. 
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2.4 Overview of the Code of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance can be defined as a set of relationship between a corporation’s 
management, board, shareholders and stakeholders [(Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, OECD), 2004]. Meanwhile, Cadbury (1992) defined 
corporate governance as a system through which companies are controlled and 
directed. From which ever perspective one chooses to view or define corporate 
governance, it will simply sum up to the processes, systems, procedures and practices 
together with rules and regulations that govern the institutions as well as the manners 
in which the rules and regulations are complied with (Garba & Abubakar, 2014).  In 
other words, the main objective of corporate governance is the enhancement of 
transparency and accountability full disclosure of the management’s actions and 
corporate activities, accurately, and as timely as possible to the concerned 
stakeholders, protection of investors, total disclosure of the compensation of the 
executive, assessment of the impact of corporate activities on the environment among 
others (Garba & Abubakar, 2014). 
 In response to the corporations’ failures and collapse across the globe both from 
developed economies and the emerging markets such as Barings Bank, the Mirror 
Group, Polly Peck International, Enron and Arthur Andersen, corporate governance 
has become a central issue and has been given serious attention on its role. This is 
because corporate governance has been mostly responsible for the failures even though 
there were other factors linked to the problem (Ishak, 2010). In the USA, with the 
collapse of Enron the seventh largest company in the USA, the government responded 
with the enactment of the public company accounting reform and investor protection 
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Act 404 in 2002 known as the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Similarly, in Australia the 
Corporate Law, Economic Reform Programme (CLERP 9) also known as the Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004 was enacted due to the failure of Enron, 
HIH and One Tel (Elochukwu, 2014; Kurawa & Kabara, 2014; Lel & Miller, 2015; 
Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). The key differences between SOX and CLERP 9 is that, SOX 
focuses on setting requirements for all US public company boards, management and 
public accounting firms. CLERP 9, on the other hand focuses on corporation 
disclosure, strengthening the financial reporting framework and introducing new 
provisions to the auditor independence and amendments affecting the audit function 
and audit oversight.   
Furthermore, the global economic recession of 2009 accounted for the need to develop 
and promote safe and healthy corporate governance principles globally. In line with 
this, regulated corporate governance has significantly benefited from immense 
consideration and attention. This has encouraged and sustained an active debate with 
various discussants consisting of scholars from different disciplines, vocations, policy 
makers, self-regulatory organisations, professional accountants, and auditing 
associations, to stock exchange authorities. On one side of the argument, the central 
issue is the need to increase the regulations and enforce punitive punishment for the 
corporate offenders and violators. 
As a sequel to the phenomenon, most nations across the globe, including Nigeria 
introduced new codes of best governance practices and a framework of control 
mechanisms that support the company in achieving its goals (Hassan & Ahmed, 2012; 
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Kurawa & Kabara, 2014). An effective governance mechanism should, therefore, be 
capable of converging managers’ decisions, both operating and investment, with that 
of the shareholders (Hassan & Ahmed, 2012).  
2.4.1 Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
In Nigeria, the global crisis brought about serious attention on Corporate Governance. 
In the year 2003, worried by the weakness in the corporate governance practices in 
Nigeria, the government established the Committee on Corporate Governance of 
Public Companies in Nigeria (CCGPCN). It was charged with the responsibility to 
identify the weaknesses and proffer the necessary reforms that would enhance 
corporate discipline and transparency and improve accountability and the general 
corporate governance practices in the country. This committee was referred to as the 
Atedo Peterside committee for corporate governance. It was inaugurated by the 
Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to consider corporate governance 
issues in Nigeria. It produced the 2003 SEC corporate governance code which has 
undergone series of revisions (2008, 2011, and 2014) respectively. 
The Nigerian Corporate Governance Code (NCCG) 2011 issued by the SEC has been 
adjudged as the most comprehensive and detailed corporate governance regulation 
currently operational in Nigeria. It has deepened corporate governance practices and 
addressed the inadequacies inherent in the 2003 code while at the same time it has 
entrenched the code of best practices on corporate governance in the country. The most 
spectacular feature of the 2011 NCCG is the strong emphasis on the separation of the 
position of Chairman from the CEO / MD to avoid over concentration of power in the 
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hands of a single individual. It equally spells out the duties and responsibilities of the 
chairman as to oversee the affairs of the board, while the CEO/MD is charged with the 
responsibility of the day to day running of the company which the chairman is 
restricted from interfering. However, the most remarkable of these features in the code 
is the clarity in the definition of the independent director which had hitherto remained 
vague and ambiguous, confusing the term with non-executive director. All 
independent directors are non-executive, not all non- executive directors are 
independent; this was made conspicuously clear in the 2011 code.   
The NCCG is relatively different from other CG acts issued by other countries 
especially developing countries. For example, both the NCCG and the Malaysia 
Corporate Code of Governance (MCCG) advocate the separation of power between 
the chairman’s position and the CEO, nevertheless, some differences exist between the 
two codes. For instance, the NCCG 2011 requires that one third of the board members 
should be made of independent directors while the MCCG 2017 stipulates that half of 
the members of the board should be comprised of independent directors. Further, the 
MCCG 2017 incorporates gender diversity which stipulates that at least 30% be 
women directors on the contrary, the NCCG has no regulation on gender diversity.  
Moreover, the NCCG recommends the minimum board size of five members while, 
the MCCG is silent on the minimum board size. Similarly, the MCCG recommend that 
the nominating committee should be headed by an independent director, the NCCG 
has no specific regulation on the nominating committee.  
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 There are also other codes which are industry specific developed to enhance and 
strengthen corporate governance mechanisms, such as; the: Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 2004 (CAMA), Investment & Securities Act 2007, Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN CODE 2006) (i.e. for Banks & Other Financial Institutions), Pension 
Commission Code (PENCOM 2008), and National Insurance Commission (NAICOM 
Code 2009).  In addition, corporate governance in Nigeria also attracts both local and 
international interests, especially being Africa’s largest market with a significant 
influx of foreign investment for example, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
recorded a total of $3.0 billion in 2012, up from $2.7 billion in 2011 (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 2013) and the uniqueness of its corporate systems. Therefore, 
the importance of corporate governance cannot be overemphasised, because poor 
corporate governance as observed by Erah, Samuel and Izedonmi (2012), results in 
poor performance and ultimate failure and collapse of the corporations as were the 
situations in the case of Enron and WorldCom. 
2.5 Underpinning Theories 
           The main underpinning theory of this study is agency theory, however, other relevant 
theories like the resource dependence theory, human capital theory and social network 
theory have been integrated into the body of theories to thoroughly study the CEO 
succession. A collection of these theories was adopted for this study to enable the 
researcher to examine the relationship between the corporate performance, internal 
corporate mechanisms, and CEO succession and also to identify the suitable variables 
for the research. The discussion on these theories are provided in the next sub-sections. 
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2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory in the context of corporate governance has been unarguably 
attributed to Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, due credit must be given to the 
duo of Ross and Mitnick for their works in 1972 and 1973 respectively, although 
elements of the agent/principal relationship in a corporate context could also be traced 
to the legendary Adam Smith in the early 18th century. An agency relationship is 
simply defined as a relationship whereby one or more individuals (the principals) 
engage other individuals (the agents) to carry out or perform some certain tasks or 
services on their behalf, which entails the delegation of some authorities to the agent 
on decision making (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency theory is simply about 
the study of the relationship and other issues and problems that emanate from this 
principal and agent relationship, during their working together toward the same goal, 
but perhaps not necessarily same interests most of the times. 
The agency theory is about the separation of the ownership of the corporation from the 
management. This separation creates agency cost or problem between the managers 
and the owners of the firms. The agency theory is the most adopted theoretical 
framework in most of the previous academic literature in the field of corporate 
governance. This is because, it tends to dominate the recommendations on board best 
practices in the various codes of corporate governance (Mallin, Melis, & Gaia, 2014). 
The modeling of the relationship between the owners and the managers to such that 
exists between the principal and the agent is a key feature of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976).  
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The owners hire the managers to execute the task of controlling the firm; as such both 
seek to maximise their personal benefits which lead to a conflict of interest. Since the 
managers are entrenched in the firm, they have the control over the resources of the 
company which they manipulate to their advantage and to the detriment of the owners. 
It is this divergence or conflict of interest between the owners and the managers that 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) referred to as agency cost. The aforementioned agency 
costs consist of (1) monitoring expenditures by the shareholders, (2) bonding 
expenditures by the managers, and (3) the residual loss (Mallin et al., 2014).   
To mitigate the agency problem, Fama and Jensen (1983) recommended delegating 
the internal control to the board to monitor the management decisions and corporate 
behaviour of the managers. They equally made suggestions of some specific board 
attributes that could enhance the effectiveness of the board in monitoring and ensuring 
that the managers act in the best interest of the shareholders. Some of these 
characteristics are board independence, size, and ownership, especially managerial 
ownership which could be used as an internal control mechanism to address the  
agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
2.5.2 Social Network Theory 
Social network theory posits that social capital is created through repeated interactions 
between the various individuals. This social capital could be goodwill, trust or 
reciprocal expectations among others. It can be further categorised into, namely; (1) 
bonding social capital and (2) bridging social capital. The bonding social capital refers 
to the links with individuals within similar organisational settings and roles, while the 
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bridging social capital is concerned with the links between people across 
organizational boundaries (Lee & Phan, 2006). In the context of corporate governance, 
it perfectly highlights the accumulation of power by the CEOs using various 
mechanisms at their disposal. 
They revealed that CEOs utilise political pressure and social co-optation to neutralise 
and weaken the power of the board of directors especially with regards the decision to 
fire them for poor performance. CEOs being insiders of the companies and the control 
of the crucial resources of the firms have acquired this social co-optation mostly 
through their ownership in the companies, or in some cases, through CEO duality. 
They subsequently, derive social co-optation and political power. Because of this 
power conferred on them by the board of directors most often the CEOs tend to abuse 
this power by subjecting it to their personal advantages and interests. They are equally 
protected from being properly monitored and supervised by the board of directors, and 
consequently, not being dismissed for ineffective and poor performance (Lee & Phan, 
2006).  
2.5.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence theory (RDT) originated from the basic framework of the 
classic work of Pfeffer and Salancik of 1978. The basic theoretical foundation of the 
resource dependence theory can be summarised as firstly, an organisation’s external 
environment, consisting of other organizations with their respective peculiar interests 
and objectives; secondly, the power organisations hold over a focal firm, and it may 
influence its behaviour especially if they control the vital resources that are needed for 
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its operations and cannot be gotten elsewhere. The theory highlights several strategies 
that organisations can adopt in order to overcome the problems associated with the 
dependence relationship (Davis & Cobb, 2009). 
 The resource dependence theory considers the organisation to be dependent on its 
external environment, as such; the effectiveness of the organisation significantly 
depends not just on its management of the resources, but the company’s ability to 
harness the vital resources from the environment. The theory views the board of 
directors as having the extra responsibility of linking the company to the external 
environment. This linkage would enable the company or the organisation to acquire 
the vital resources required for the attainment of the various strategic decisions 
required by the management to enhance the performance of the company and 
guarantee its survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
The board structure provides the company the needed competitive advantage by way 
of networking and contact with the business environment with easy and quick access 
to a huge amount of external capital. An optimal board structure is key to achieving 
this target, as the company with a sub-optimal board is likely to perform poorly in this 
regard. Thus, board size and the board composition, especially the quality of the 
outside director enhances the organisational access to the external resources. 
Moreover, the resource dependence theory postulates that companies which acquire 
the critical and vital resources from the external environment are more likely to 
outperform their counterparts that do not have access to the vital resources from their 
external environment.  
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Hence, the more independent directors on the board of a company, the higher the 
chance of the company to have access the crucial resources from the external 
environment and, consequently, there will be better performance of the company. In a 
nutshell, the theory suggests that the board of directors’ size and composition serve as 
important links between the company and the essential resources from the external 
environment necessary for the maximisation of the company; performance. 
2.5.4 Human Capital Theory 
The human capital theory is also very relevant in the CEO succession research. It 
underscores the importance and value of human capital in the existence, survival and 
wellbeing of the firms and the employees. The most vital components of human capital 
are education and training (Nafukho, Hairston, & Brooks, 2004). The education and 
training enhance the quality the of manpower of the firms in terms of specific 
knowledge, skills and expertise. Marion and Mark (2013) used the human capital 
theory to shade light on the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate 
performance. The authors opined that CEOs represent the most vital human capital to 
the firms which enhances the firms’ performances. 
Some corporate governance scholars like Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) 
categorised human capital into two basic categories; general managerial capital and 
firm-specific human capital. The general managerial capital is not specific to any firm 
or organisation. Thus, generalist CEOs are more valuable to the firms as compared to 
the firm- specific human capital CEOs. This statement aligns with the findings of 
Custódio et al. (2011)  that general CEOs attract a high premium in the CEOs’ labour 
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market.   Marion and Mark (2013) stressed further that knowledge and skills are mostly 
transferrable among firms, as such, the elasticity of supply of CEOs in the labour 
market increases. Hence, the probability of replacing a firm- specific CEO is higher 
than that of a generalist. Consequently, when selecting a successor, firms are more 
disposed to appointing CEOs with general managerial human capital which are mostly 
from outside the firms (Custódio et al., 2011; Marion & Mark, 2013). Therefore, the 
human capital theory has been used as a supporting theory in this study. 
2.6 Corporate Performance and CEO Succession 
             Corporate performance has been useful not only in assessing the performance of the 
CEOs but also the ability of the CEOs to create value and maximise shareholder’s 
wealth. Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2014) found empirical evidence that firm 
performance is more predictive of CEO turnover when there is higher uncertainty with 
regards to CEO capability and ability. In their study of US firms, they found negative 
relationship between corporate performance and CEO turnover using both the market 
measurement and accounting measurement. They specifically found that when 
company performance was poor the CEO was replaced as a result of the inference of 
the shareholders who believed that the CEO was not able to create wealth for the 
shareholders and improve the fortune and prospects of the firm. The bulk of the 
previous studies lay credence to the empirical evidence that most forced or involuntary 
turnovers have been linked to company performance (Cook, 2015; Fiordelisi & Ricci, 
2013; Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013). 
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In view of the significance and importance of the nature of the responsibility of the 
CEO in a corporation, several studies had concentrated on the CEO turnover and firm 
performance relationship (Cook, 2015; Fiordelisi & Ricci, 2013). Although, most of 
the prior studies found negative associations between firm performance and CEO 
turnover, there have been remarkable divergent results on the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to performance across the countries. Whilst the studies from the UK and US 
reported that current performance affected CEO turnover, most of the studies in the 
developing markets established that poor performance had a lagged effect on CEO 
turnover (Conyon & He, 2014; Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013; Ishak, 2010; Sanda, 
Mikailu, & Garba, 2010).   
Furthermore, the relationship between CEO turnover and corporation performance has 
gained prominence because it has, over time, been used as an indicator of the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance of the firm (Cook, 2015; Dimopoulos & 
Wagner, 2012; Ishak, Ku Ismail, & Abdullah, 2013). It is argued that the negative 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance was a measure of how 
effective the corporate governance of a firm was, which was reflected in the reaction 
of the board of directors by removing the CEO in the event of the poor performance 
of the firm.  
Ishak et al. (2013) measure firm performance using both accounting performance (i.e., 
ROA) and market-based performance (Tobin’s Q) and found that corporate 
performance was negatively related to CEO turnover. Poor firm performance was an 
evidence of failure on the part of the management which therefore triggered the 
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dismissal of the CEO. They equally found that in the events of poor performance the 
CEOs were dismissed, and outsider successors were selected to replace the fired CEOs 
and the post succession performances improved. However, when the CEO was fired 
due to poor performance and an insider replaced the CEO, the post succession 
performance subsequently declined. Similarly, Rachpradit et.al, (2012), found 
negative relationship between corporate performance and CEO turnover, though they 
solely used the accounting measure of performance rather than the market-based 
performance because of its inherent drawbacks, such as discounts in the stock price 
and illiquidity of stock market, especially in the developing markets. 
Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012) examined the importance of accounting and market-
based information in considering turnover in Indonesia. Using samples from all the 
firms that experienced CEO turnover between 1998 and 2006, they found that when 
the accounting and market performance decreased, the probability that the CEO was 
dismissed was higher and vice versa. Though, they did not consider the reasons and 
types of turnovers, whether voluntary or involuntary, the results lay credence to the 
high sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance using both market and accounting-
based measurements. 
Due to the complex nature of thecorporations’ operations, the shareholders represented 
by the board of directors are unable to manage the day to day running of the 
corporations. As such, they engage the services of professionals as CEOs to administer 
the affairs of the companies on their behalf. However, due to lack of goal congruence 
between the shareholders and CEOs, the agency problem is created (Dimopoulos & 
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Wagner, 2012; Puffer & Weintrop, 2015). While the board is primarily concerned with 
increasing shareholders’ wealth by improving stock price, the CEOs as argued are 
concerned with self-interest and maximising their personal wealth and other non-
pecuniary benefits (Puffer & Weintrop, 2015). In order to ensure that the CEOs’ 
interests align with the shareholders’ interests, CEO dismissal becomes a key 
controlling mechanism in that regards. For the board of directors to execute this 
decisive action, they normally depend on the firm performance as a reliable yardstick 
in assessing the ability and effectiveness of the CEOs.  
While several prior studies have reported negative relationship between corporate 
performance and CEO turnover (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Ishak et al., 2012; 
Puffer & Weintrop, 2015), there have been inconsistencies in the findings of the 
previous studies on the relationship between performance and CEO turnover. These 
inconsistences have been claimed to be due to insufficient attention being paid to the 
nature of the performance indicator adopted by the board of directors in making the 
turnover decision (Puffer & Weintrop, 2015). They further suggested that the 
sensitivity of firm performance will be higher when the performance measures used 
reflect the expectations of the shareholders.  
           Furthermore, Puffer and Weintrop (2015) in the study of a sample of 408 CEOs in US 
corporations, found that the actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) and analysts’ 
expectations were both strongly sensitive to CEO turnover and not accounting ratios. 
In their study on the UK and German corporations, Dimopoulos and Wagner, (2012) 
found that the corporate performance was negatively related to CEO turnover and it 
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enhanced the fortune of the firm after the replacement. On the other hand, while 
utilising a sample of 809 CEOs from the Fortune Global 500 firms, Choi (2015) 
observed that the accounting performance of the firms remained the major driver of 
the forced CEO turnover. He found that the forced turnover reduced significantly as 
the firms’ accounting performance improved but there was no significant effect from 
the stock performance.  This indicates that the board of directors of firms is more likely 
to dismiss underperforming CEOs relying on accounting performance and not stock 
performance in taking the turnover decision. 
Similarly, Maharjan (2015) argued that the low sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance in some firms is due to the existence of alternatives to firing which are 
often overlooked even though they form part of the involuntary turnover. He 
documented that demotion of CEOs and splitting the role of CEO/Chairman are all 
disciplinary mechanisms like dismissal which the board of directors adopt, especially 
when the CEOs are entrenched and the consequence of firing the CEO is costly. An 
example of this is, CEOs with firm-specific managerial skills, strong prior long-term 
performance, and weak governance. The author claimed that this form of disciplinary 
measure accounts for forty percent of the involuntary turnover, hence, magnifying the 
performance to turnover sensitivity.  
           When the investors disagree with the management of the corporation especially on the 
optimal course of corporate decisions as it affects the performance of the firms, the 
CEOs are more likely to be fired. Maharjan (2015) stressed that this is usually the case 
whenever the firms face financial constraints, CEOs of the firms are less entrenched, 
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and the firms have strong shareholder governance. The author further argued that, the 
firms are more likely to recruit or engage an outsider CEO as a successor or 
replacement, if the disagreement between the investor/ management and the dismissed 
CEO was high. A summary of some articles reviewed on corporate performance and 
CEO turnover is presented in Table 2.1. 




Summary of the Articles on CEO Succession and Corporate Performance 
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          2.7 Corporate Governance and CEO Succession 
           The importance of studying the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on CEO 
succession cannot be over emphasised. Corporate governance mechanisms have been 
established by previous empirical findings to have significant influence on the CEO 
succession (Ronghai & Hailin, 2006). There are two broad categories of corporate 
governance mechanisms that influence CEO succession, namely, board structure, and 
ownership structure. Regardless of the nature and size of the economy, each element 
of the corporate governance mechanisms affects the CEO succession in a specific way, 
even though not much attention has been paid to it by either the economic theory or 
company laws across the countries (Baysinger & Butler, 2014). 
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2.7.1 Board Structure and CEO succession 
The board of directors is an integral part of the governance structure of corporations. 
It is shouldered with the important responsibilities of hiring and firing as well as 
compensating the managements of the companies on behalf of the owners and 
shareholders of the corporations, and also to advise the management on the strategic 
decisions of the firms (Bates et al., 2015; Baysinger & Butler, 2014). In the same vein, 
Ishak et.al (2012) stress that the cardinal function of a board entails acting as the 
representative of the principal (shareholders) and serves as the main body responsible 
for decision making in a company.  
In carrying out these tasks of monitoring and advising, the agency problem is created 
as a result of the separation of ownership from the control of the corporation. How 
well and effective the board of directors perform these vital functions greatly 
determines the quality and effectiveness of the board in the corporate decision making 
(Bates et al., 2015). However, Baysinger and Butler (2014) argue that the economic 
theory and company laws across the countries have not paid adequate attention to the 
issues concerning the size and  composition of the board among others. For instance, 
there are variations in terms of the ratio of the insiders to outsiders, independent to 
non-independent directors, number and functions of committees and other board 
attributes even among similar corporations. Consequently, the influence of the 
variations in the corporate governance mechanisms on the CEO succession is expected 
to vary from firm to firm and across industries. Hence, this study considers variables 
such as; board size, composition, gender diversity, religiosity, and nominating 
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committee independence in the context of an emerging and developing economy to 
deepen the understanding of the influence of these variables on CEO succession. 
2.7.1.1 Board Size 
Board size is defined as the total number of members of a firm’s board of directors. In 
other words it is the total number of both the executive and non-executive directors of 
a firm (Combs et al., 2007; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Mobbs, 2013; Nielsen & 
Huse, 2010; Sanda et al., 2010; You & Du, 2012). Board size is suggested to have 
influence on the relationship between CEO turnover in a firm. However, a large board 
size has an adverse effect on the quality of the monitoring of the board, as the smaller 
boards are more likely to replace a poorly performing CEO (Bekiris, 2013; Cook, 
2015a; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012). Furthermore, CEO turnover frequency is 
negatively related to the board size. Thus, the smaller the board size, the higher the 
probability and frequency of the CEO turnover (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012).  
Bekiris (2013) argues that a smaller board size enhances the ability of the board to 
monitor the CEO, hence, more likely to replace the underperforming CEO. However, 
in the event of a turnover an insider successor will be selected because of the size of 
the board. Similarly, Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2014) opine that smaller boards lead 
to higher monitoring. Indicating that, the smaller the board size the higher the 
probability of CEO turnover (Dikolli et al., 2014b; You & Du, 2012). Firms with large 
board size have more connections with the external environment, as such, in the event 
of selection of a new CEO the board will be more disposed to appointing outside 
candidate because of the links to the outside (Barnea & Guedj, 2007). 
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A large board size is reported to have a negative impact on firm performance (Ujunwa, 
2012). This in turn can weaken the supervisory role and the monitoring functions of 
the board, thereby making the board of directors ineffective and less likely to dismiss 
the poorly performing CEOs (Bates et al., 2015; Obembe & Soetan, 2015). 
Furthermore, Sanda et al. (2010) in their study on the Nigerian corporate governance 
mechanisms found an optimal board size of ten members consistent with prior studies 
in the developed economies. In fact, the NCCG recommended a minimum of five 
members on the board of listed companies in the stock exchange but did not stipulate 
the maximum number of members. 
           2.7.1.2 Board Composition 
The composition of the firm’s board of directors is believed to have a great impact on 
the firm’s internal control system and a balanced board, consisting of both outside and 
inside executives, will enhance the role of the board as an internal control mechanism 
(Ishak et.al., 2012). Likewise, Fivos (2013) argued that a board composition with more 
independent directors enhances the ability of the board to monitor the CEOs. The 
NCCG stipulate that the board should be composed of both executive and non-
executive directors and it recommends that most of the board members should be non-
executive directors with at least one of them being an independent director.  
Independent directors are believed to be more capable of challenging the CEOs than 
the inside directors and they also possess the incentives to develop their reputations as 
skilled decision controllers in the corporate directorship market. However, the 
appointment of too many independent directors to the boards can also worsen a free-
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rider problem and weakens the monitoring of the independent directors (Guo & 
Masulis, 2015).  
Therefore, in line with Adams et al. (2010) this study has categorised directors into 
two basic groups; insiders and outsider directors. While insider directors are those 
directors that are in full-time employment of the firm, outsiders, on the other hand, are 
those of which their primary employment is not with the firm. Similarly, all outsider 
directors are assumed to be independent and non-executive while insiders refer to non-
independent and executive directors, thus these terms have been used interchangeably. 
Most of the corporate governance reforms are geared towards increasing the outside 
directors representation on the boards, because it is believed that outside directors are 
independent and are capable of protecting the interests of the shareholders by 
effectively monitoring and sanctioning the CEO when necessary (Duchin, Matsusaka, 
& Ozbas, 2010). They find that the mere addition of outside directors to the firms’ 
boards does not increase or decrease the performance on average, rather outside 
directors improve the performance significantly when the information cost is low and 
decrease the performance if the information cost of the directors is high. Irrespective 
of the performance measure used whether it was Tobin’s Q, stock return, or earnings, 
the findings remained unchanged (Duchin et.al, 2010). In other words, they found that 
an independent board improved corporate performance for firms with low information 
cost and decreased firm performance with a high information cost, hence, it was less 
sensitive to CEO turnover in the event of poor firm performance. 
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 As regards CEO succession decisions, Ishak et al. (2012) reported that inside directors 
are inclined to support the appointment of insiders and are opposed to outside 
candidates in line with the agency theory predictions. This is premised on the 
assumption that an internal CEO candidate will add value to the firm because the new 
CEO being an insider is already involved in formulating and implementing the current 
policies of the firm. Similarly, the accessibility and affordability of the relevant 
information to the outside directors enhance the performance of the firm; it equally 
improves the effectiveness of the board in the discharge of its monitoring and 
supervisory role over the management. Hence, outside directors are more likely to 
select external candidates as replacements for the CEOs in the events of turnover 
(Duchin et al., 2010). 
Moreover, Guo and Masulis (2015) observed that both institutional investors and the 
regulators have advocated for a greater representation of independent directors on the 
corporate boards as a means of improving the boards’ oversight, although the 
effectiveness of this measure lacks a clear theoretical support and the empirical 
evidence remains inconclusive and weak. While Guo and Masulis (2015) further 
argued that, appointing more independent directors to the boards can also worsen a 
free-rider problem and weaken the monitoring of the independent directors. Others 
like Fivos (2013) established a negative correlation between board independence and 
board size, suggesting that more independent directors in the composition of the board 
with small size enhances the effectiveness of the board in the monitoring of the CEO, 
hence, it is more likely to dismiss the CEO in the poor performing firm and, 
subsequently, appoint an outsider as the successor.  
    
 
65
2.7.1.3 Board Member Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity or female representation on the companies’ board of directors have 
become a central focus point in the corporate governance discussions and studies 
globally, with several companies being enjoined to appoint females to their boards. 
The importance of board diversity is essentially noticeable and relevant if only it 
enhances the effectiveness of the boards and, consequently, the firms’ performance. 
Otherwise, it will be regarded as a mere tokenism, that is something done to satisfy the 
societal pressure only (Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2013). Meanwhile, Abdullah (2014) 
establish a positive relationship between board independence and the proportion of 
women directors on the board, suggesting that the presence of women on the board 
enhances the independence of the board. For a balanced board, the board members 
need to come from different background. Thus, the boards’ decision making will be 
enhanced and more effective because of the heterogeneous background of the 
directors. 
            Although, several research works across the globe have shown that corporate 
performance is enhanced by board diversity, yet it has remained to a great extent an 
alien concept in the majority of the boardrooms worldwide (Diplock, Wilderotter, & 
Kilaas, 2011). For example, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy (2014) reported that Norway 
in 2004, adopted a compulsory quota law on gender, requiring 40 percent of the board 
positions for all the  listed companies to be allocated to  women. This initiative inspired 
many countries across Europe to follow suit in the appointment of women as directors, 
such as Finland in 2005, Spain in 2007 and Belgium in 2011. Similarly, in the other 
regions, several countries like Australia in 2009, adopted it, followed by Malaysia in 
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2011, Hong Kong and New Zealand both in 2012 and several others revised their 
corporate governance codes to accommodate this initiative. However, the Nigerian 
corporate governance codes were revised in 2011, it remains silent on the quota law 
for the boardroom gender diversity.  
In line with the agency theory, the monitoring role of the board of directors serves as 
an extremely important mechanism for mitigating the conflicts between the principal 
and the agent, which ultimately affect corporate performance. Recent studies suggest 
that greater boardroom gender diversity can strengthen the monitoring function. For 
instance, Nguyen et al.(2014) and Adams, Nowland, and Grey (2011) observed that 
female directors appeared to have a superior monitoring ability and are also able to 
think more independently, and they are not influenced by the usual male-dominated 
syndrome.  Furthermore, greater board gender diversity can also improve better 
monitoring because female director representation can enhance managerial 
accountability, and CEO responsibility. Consequently, female directors can act as 
additional independent directors that can help in improving the monitoring role of the 
board of directors (Nguyen et al., 2014 and Adams, Nowland, & Grey, 2011). It 
therefore follows that, companies with greater gender diversity of the board of 
directors are more likely to fire or dismiss their CEOs for poor firm performance. 
The resource dependence theory opines that the security of companies' crucial 
resources and the linkage between the firms and their external environment could be 
enhanced by increasing the diversity and size of the board. Impliedly, firms with more 
diverse boards can have advantages in acquiring and maintaining their vital resources, 
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such as: (1) the human capital of the boards like knowledge, talent, and skills; (2) 
advice and counsel; (3) communication channels; and (4) legitimacy (Liu, Wei, & Xie, 
2014). Thus, female representation on the board of directors of the firms improves the 
information processing ability of the boards, leading to higher quality decisions and 
better corporate performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). 
Although, most of the studies on board gender diversity were carried out in the 
developed economies, the empirical findings were mixed or inconclusive. While some 
researchers found that there is a positive relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012), some others reported a negative relationship 
(Ujunwa 2012; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). In fact, others documented that there was no 
evidence of any significant relationship (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). 
Consequent upon this mixed empirical evidence, Nguyen et.al, (2014) suggested that 
the differences in the research contexts and the econometric methods used were 
responsible for the mixed findings. Furthermore, Ku Ismail and Abdul Manaf (2016) 
examined market reactions in the wake of the appointment of women to the corporate 
boards and observed whether women’s attributes and the roles they played in the 
discharge of their monitoring responsibilities affected the firms’ values. They 
examined 127 Malaysian companies that appointed women directors from 1999 to 
2011, using the market model in assessing the abnormal returns that surrounded the 
appointment of the women from day −10 up to day 10. They found positive 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from day 1 to day 10, suggesting that 
the appointment of women directors was welcomed by the investors, hence, greater 
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women participation on corporate boards is good for the welfare of the firms and 
protection of the shareholders’ interest. 
Similarly, Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2015) empirically analyse the relationship 
between the board diversity and capital structure using data of 2427 firms sourced from 
33 countries between 2006 to 2010. Their findings provided evidence that a more 
gender diversified board of directors enhances the board’s independence and 
efficiency. Hence, logically and consistent with the position of other scholars, a more 
gender diversified board increases the independence and efficiency of the monitoring 
role of the board of directors, and as such, more likely to dismiss an underperforming 
CEO and subsequently hire an external replacement. 
Abdullah (2014) examines the determinant factors of women being appointed to the 
boards of large firms in Malaysia. He observed that for the 54 board seats apportioned 
to women, 14 were independent directors, 24 were non- executive directors while the 
remaining 16 of these positions were executive directors. He therefore suggested that, 
the large board size encourages the appointment of more women directors, because the 
large board size is more disposed to appointing female directors in contrast to the small 
board size. The results further revealed that gender diversity has a positive association 
with the board size and the presence of family members on the corporate board. 
Indicating that, the bigger the size of the board, the higher the chance that women will 
be appointed to sit on the board. He further argued that there was also a positive 
association between women’s presence on the board and the presence of family 
members on the board suggesting that the appointment of women to the board was 
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influenced by their family ties instead of commercial motives. In all, he presented 
evidence that appointing women to the board was a mere tokenism and based on family 
connection as opposed to the supposed business purpose.  
On the contrary, García-Meca and Martínez-Ferrero (2014) studied a sample of 159 
banks in nine different countries between 2004 to 2010. Their detailed analysis showed 
empirical evidence that gender diversity of the board of directors enhances the 
performance of the firm. Furthermore, Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2013) study board 
diversity in 100 top non-financial firms in Malaysia, using the 2007 annual reports of 
the companies , their multivariate analyses indicated a lack of diversity, specifically, 
the authors found a negative association between gender diversity and firm 
performance using the ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
           From the aforementioned studies, gender diversity has not been studied in the context 
of CEO succession, therefore, this study has strived to ascertain that board gender 
diversity affects the CEO succession in public listed companies. As the involvement 
of females on the board increases the performance of the company through enhanced 
and effective monitoring, it is expected that turnover is less likely to occur. However, 
in the event of turnover, the board will be inclined to select an outside candidate 
because of the availability of external potential candidates who are attracted to the 
company because of its good performance.  
           2.7.1.4 Board Members’ Religiosity 
           Researchers have argued that religiosity prevents undesirable and unethical corporate 
behavior. For instance, religiosity has been established to have a negative effect on the 
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possibility of unethical and inappropriate corporate behaviour (Grullon et al., 2009). 
Several studies have examined how corporate decision making is affected by the 
religiosity of the individual director or decision maker (Grullon et al., 2009; McGuire 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, McGuire, Newton, Omer, and Sharp (2012) opined that 
religiosity influences firms in ways that impact on the shareholders’ wealth. This is 
consistent with the previous findings by Kennedy and Lawton (1998) that in societies 
where religions play a greater role, there is a higher likelihood of religions affecting 
the choices and decisions of the corporate managers.  
Thus, it is expected that the greater participation and involvement in religious activities 
of the board members increases the amount and quality of the monitoring, control and 
supervision within the firm and consequently, the board more is likely to fire the CEO 
for poor firm performance. Du, Jian, Du, Feng, and Zeng (2014) examined the 
influence of religion on corporate philanthropic giving, using listed Chinese firms 
between 2004 to 2010 and established that religiosity had a noticeable effect on the 
behaviour and thinking of the individual (Du et al., 2014). In the same vein, researchers 
have argued that high religiosity among the corporate directors influences the 
management of corporations to strive to attain the wealth creation and maximisation 
for the shareholders (El-Bassiouny, Darrag, Seoudi, & Zahran, 2015). 
Similarly, Kim and Daniel (2016) investigate the influence of religious denominations 
on corporate governance mechanisms. Using panel data from thirty-two countries 
between the period of 2006 to 2010 they find that the higher the proportion of the 
Protestantism of the board members, the stronger the corporate governance of the 
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firms, and that social norms specifically religions, have strong influence on the 
corporate governance practices. This is similarly to the findings of Volonte (2015) who 
studied the influence of culture on corporate governance in Switzerland, and suggested 
that religious groups have certain values in common which to a great extent determine 
the type of corporate governance mechanisms that firms adopt.   
Although, several researchers have examined the effects of religions on corporate 
governance and firm performance, limited studies to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge have examined the influence of board members’ religiosity on the CEO 
succession. Religious affiliation and religious commitment are used to measure 
religiosity. Several studies like Kim and Daniel (2016) and Abdullah and Sapiei (2018) 
used similar measurements In other words, adherence by an individual to a particular 
religious group such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism is a measure of 
religiosity (Abdullah & Sapiei, 2018; Hirschman, 1983). 
Moreover, with the diversity in the world population, the rapid globalisation and the 
great influence of religion on the human behaviour, there is a need to investigate the 
influence of religion on the corporate boards especially as it affects their 
responsibilities of monitoring and disciplining the CEOs and other succession 
decisions. This is in line with the view of Kim and Daniel (2016) that corporate persons 
like shareholders and board of directors are more likely to have more effective and 
greater monitoring of the management because of high board accountability as a result 
of the board members’ religiosity.  
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Furthermore, Nigeria is a predominantly Muslim country with over 60% of its 
population being Muslims, and the rest 40% comprising the Christians and others like 
traditionalists and atheists (Pew Research Centre, 2015). Hence the primary religion 
of Nigeria can be unequivocally said to be Islam. Kim and Daniel (2016) defined the 
primary religion of a state as the religion practiced by the largest segment of the 
nation’s population and posited that the corporate governance of a country is affected 
by the dominant religion in that country. Moreover, Islamic ethics as contained in the 
Qur’an and Sunnah influence the conducts and behaviours of the adherent Muslims 
greatly. It increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the Muslims in discharging 
their responsibilities; it makes a Muslim to refrain from deceit and cheating; enhances 
cooperation and consultation and guarantees a better quality of every activity 
performed (Abuznaid, 2009).  
Therefore, it is expected that the high ethical standard and moral accountability which 
is the hallmark of Islamic teachings will influence the behaviour of the board members 
who are Muslims (Abuznaid, 2009; 2006). Such boards will be more effective in 
monitoring the CEOs and, consequently, will be more likely to dismiss the 
underperforming CEOs as suggested by Kim and Daniel (2016) and Volonte (2015).  
Similarly, in the event of appointing a successor, the religion of the board will play a 
great role which is consistent with the social network theory, religious membership 
will create bonds and connections amongst the board members, hence, the board will 
be more likely to appoint an insider who is of the same religion with the board 
members.  
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2.7.1.5 Board Nominating Committee Independence  
The boards of corporations normally perform most of their functions in board 
committees. The independence of these board committees is very vital in enhancing 
the effectives in the monitoring function of the board. Most corporate boards as 
observed by Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) carry out their oversight 
responsibility in committees, however, the extent of the influence of these board 
committees on the effectiveness of the overall board monitoring is unclear (Guo & 
Masulis, 2015). The board nominating committee is one of the most important 
committees through which the corporate boards perform one of their most crucial tasks 
(Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).  In the same vein, Guo and Masulis (2015) argued that the 
board nominating committee is very important in determining the effectiveness and 
quality of the CEO’s monitoring and supervision, the nomination of new directors for 
election at the annual general meetings and evaluating the performance of individual 
directors for re-nomination. As such, the composition of the nominating committee 
will affect not just the entire board, but the true independence of the directors which 
will consequently affect the quality of the oversight function of the board. 
Adams et al. ( 2010) cited April Klein (1998) who reports that, the overall board 
composition had no correlation with firm performance but finds a positive relationship 
between board committees especially finance and investment committee and firm 
performance. This indicates that the composition of board committees is very vital to 
the effectiveness of the board in its monitoring of the CEO. Hence, the composition of 
the nominating committee is crucial to the effectiveness of the board, especially where 
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the CEOs are not members of the nominating committees and the committees are 
dominated by outsiders or independent directors. 
 Similarly, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) argue that powerful CEOs are likely to 
nominate or influence the nomination of directors into the nominating committee. This 
scenario is capable of leading to CEO entrenchment which can ultimately lead to the 
CEOs influencing the selection of their successors. The authors further stressed in their 
findings that, the absence of a nominating committee or the presence of the CEO in 
the nominating committee and fewer independent directors being appointed to the 
nominating committee can allow the CEOs to have control over the board selection 
and appointment. Moreover, the independence of the board of directors and 
nominating committee have different rules but their effects on the board’s monitoring 
are complementary, especially the forced CEO turnovers’ sensitivity to firm 
performance increases as the nominating committee becomes more independent. 
However, insider dominated boards in all the firms lack independent nominating 
committees (Guo & Masulis, 2015). Table 2.2 presents the summary of some key 
articles reviewed. 




Summary of Articles on CEO Succession and Board Structure 
Author/Year/Country Title/Period Methods Sample Findings 
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board meeting 
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with Tobin’s q and 
ROA. And Ethnic 
diversity, on the other 
hand, is found to be 
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have a strong effect on 
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practices. And   that 
religious social norms 
serve as a mechanism 
of corporate 
governance 
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The study finds that 
investors are 
more likely to favour 
women who are 
prominent, younger, 
have no international 
exposure and no family 
relationship with any 
other directors 
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the board of directors’ 
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2.7.2 Ownership Structure and CEO Succession 
            Prior studies have established how ownership structure affects CEO succession and 
these effects tend to vary considerably across the economies. This is essentially due to 
the differences in the markets and the contexts in which the studies were conducted, 
such as, developed economies with strong capital markets and developing or emerging  
markets with weak corporate governance mechanisms (Ishak, Ku Ismail, & Abdullah, 
2013; Rachpradit, Tang, & Ba Khang, 2012; Ishak, 2010). There are different 
categories of ownership structures in the corporate landscape, such as family 
ownership, government or state ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership, blockholders, and managerial ownership, amongst others.  
Fisman, Khurana, Rhodes-
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Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash 
(2011) 











The authors find that 
monitoring quality 
improves when most 
independent directors 
serve on at least two of 
the three principal 
monitoring 
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The study finds that 
when the CEO serves 
on the nominating 
committee or no 
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exists, firms appoint 
fewer independent 
outside directors and 
more gray outsiders 
with 
    
 
80
The basic argument in the study of CEO succession is that regardless of the size and 
nature of the economy, each of the aforementioned categories of ownership has its own 
specific influence on the CEO succession (Ronghui & Hailin, 2006). Conventionally 
there are two broad classifications of corporate ownership that distinguish the 
categories of ownership structures; concentrated and dispersed ownership (Acero & 
Alcalde, 2014). Most of the developing and emerging markets are characterised with 
concentrated ownership (Nguyen et al., 2014).        
The Nigerian corporate environment is characterised by concentrated shareholding 
mostly by family and foreign ownerships (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 2013; 
Sanda, Mikailu & Garba, 2010). The concentration of ownership by family and foreign 
ownership in Nigeria has been due to the liberalization of the economy embarked upon 
by the federal government through the promulgation of the legislations which removed 
all obstacles on the free flow of capital from abroad into the economy (Tsegba & 
Herbert, 2013; Tsegba et al., 2014). Concentrated ownership has the capacity to curtail 
agency problems and enhances effective monitoring targeted at improving the firm 
performance. Hence, the dominant shareholders in the Nigerian PLCs are foreign, 
families, managerial and block holders. Concentrated ownership is defined as the 
minimum shareholders’ number in a firm that has joint control over the firm (Tsegba 
et al., 2014). Concentrated ownership has a positive relationship with performance, 
however too much concentration of ownership might lead to the expropriation of the 
minority interest, but it can curb the excesses of the management (Tsegba & Herbert, 
2013; Tsegba et al., 2014).  
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Rachpradit et al. ( 2012) observe that, the likelihood of CEO turnover as a result of 
poor firm performance is influenced by both the ownership and board structure of the 
firm. With regards to the ownership structure the likelihood or probability of CEO 
turnover is affected by the categories of the controlling owner. While Vafeas and 
Vlittis (2014) argue that ownership structure is a very important determinant of 
appointing an outside CEO. Ownership structure is equally seen as an important 
determinant of CEO succession ( Liu, Wang, Zhao, & Ahlstrom, 2013). 
2.7.2.1 Blockholders 
A blockholder is a crucial internal corporate governance mechanism.  It aligns the 
interests of the shareholders and the managers as well as reduces the agency problem. 
Blockholder ownership is the percentage of shares owned by individuals or institutions 
which is from 5 percent and above of the total shares (Acero & Alcalde, 2014; Goyal 
& Park, 2002; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012). Several researchers have argued that 
blockholder ownership enhances and improves the effectiveness of the board 
monitoring and it equally leads to separation of the roles of the CEO and the chairman 
positions into separate individuals which ultimately increases the sensitivity of 
turnover to performance. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) reported a positive relationship 
between the blockholder and CEO-performance sensitivity. In other words, the 
presence of blockholder ownership increases the probability of CEO turnover.  This is 
because blockholder promotes better contracting and monitoring of the CEO. 
Further, blockholder ownership increases the independence of the board which in turn 
enhances the monitoring effectiveness of the firm thereby leading to high CEO 
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turnover probability and selecting an outsider successor (Acero & Alcalde, 2014; 
Bekiris, 2013). Blockholders have the needed resources and capacity to hire an 
outsider successor who can meet the demand of the shareholders (Thanh & Heaney, 
2013). In other words, blockholder ownership increases the probability of CEO 
turnover. Therefore, the greater the blockholder ownership in a firm the more the 
likelihood of CEO turnover (Bates et al., 2015; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Kaplan 
& Minton, 2008). 
Moreover, when a CEO turnover occurs, a firm may select an insider or outsider 
successor. Ishak et al., (2012) study CEO succession in Malaysian listed companies 
from the period of 2002 to 2005. The results of the logistic regression analysis of 145 
succession events indicated that the blockholders are inclined to select an outsider 
successor. This is more so, as the blockholders are independent of the shareholders 
and are not influenced by them in the monitoring of the management. While Thanh 
and Heaney (2013) believed that blockholders have the needed resources to remove 
the CEOs who are not meeting the objective of creating wealth for the shareholders 
and, subsequently, have the capacity to also hire an outsider successor who can meet 
the demand of the shareholders.  
2.7.2.2 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership brings about enhanced firm performance due to the competition it 
engenders in the corporate market, as such, it is a crucial aspect of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Foreign ownership is perceived to have a more informed 
board and well experienced management with commensurate training and expertise 
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that distinguishes such firm from the local counterparts, hence, it has better 
performance. Foreign ownership is simply the percentage of shares owned by foreign 
individuals (Tsegba, Herbert, & Ene, 2014). In Nigeria, the government eliminated all 
barriers to foreign ownership; hence, foreign investors can own 100 percent ownership 
of a firm except in the oil and gas sector where they are limited to not more than 40 
percent of the shareholding [Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission]. 
Similarly, Tsegba et al. (2014) report that foreign ownership structure shows  
significant improvement in corporate performance. These findings underscore the 
inherent competitive advantages of foreign ownership over other classes of ownership 
structure. Consequently, this is a strong justification for the liberalization of the 
economy by the government and the legislation and policies geared towards attracting 
and encouraging foreign investments. Tsegba et al. (2014) study the relationship 
between corporate ownership and firm performance of the Nigerian listed companies. 
The OLS regression analysis of 70 firms for a period of six years shows that foreign 
ownership significantly improves the firms’ performance. This improvement in firm 
performance is suggestive of the effective monitoring of the CEO by the board, and as 
such would be more inclined to replace the CEO in the event of declining performance.  
Similarly, Munisi, Hermes and Randøy, (2014) examine the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm structure for listed firms of twelve Sub- Saharan African 
countries. The study utilises data covering the period of 2006 to 2009. The result shows 
that foreign ownership was negatively related to the board size. Suggesting that firms 
with foreign ownership are characterised by small board size, which enhances the 
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effectiveness of the board in monitoring and, hence, increases the probability of CEO 
turnover. In addition, foreign ownership strengthens board independence which in 
turn, improves the monitoring ability of the firms, thereby increasing the CEO turnover 
sensitivity (Boivie et al., 2016). 
Firms with foreign ownership are more effective and efficient in monitoring the CEOs. 
Thus, they are more likely to replace the CEOs that are not meeting the expectations 
of the board. This is owing to a better corporate governance and modern management 
practices which the foreign ownership brings into the firm (Ezeoha & Okafor, 2013). 
Similarly, in the event of a turnover, the firms dominated by foreign ownership are 
more inclined to select an outsider successor because of the many qualified external 
candidates being attracted to the firm. Foreign ownership firms are more effective in 
monitoring and upholding better corporate governance practices.  Hence, the firms are 
inclined to replace underperforming CEOs and as well attract outside candidates as 
replacements (He, Rui, Zheng, & Zhu, 2014). 
However, several studies have considered foreign ownership in various aspects of 
corporate governance and corporate performance (Ezeoha, & Okafor, 2012; He et al., 
2014; Tsegba et al., 2014). But few studies have examined the relationship between 
the foreign ownership and the CEO succession to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge. Therefore, owing to the enhanced and effective monitoring feature of 
foreign ownership, it is expected to influence the CEO succession especially in 
Nigerian as the foreign ownership constitutes a significant proportion of its corporate 
ownership composition. Moreover, it is equally expected that foreign ownership will 
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be more sensitive to CEO turnover in regard to its performance relationship and 
consequently, in the event of turnover an outsider candidate is expected to be selected 
as the CEO because of its broad network. 
2.7.2.3 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership otherwise referred to as insider ownership or director 
shareholding and is the total shares held by members of the board of directors of the 
company (Tsegba et al., 2014). Managerial ownership reduces agency costs as it aligns 
the managerial interests with that of the shareholders, however, higher ownership by 
the mangers could lead to the entrenchment of the management which will ultimately 
affect firm performance and weaken the governance mechanisms of the corporation 
(Tsegba et al., 2014). Stressing further, Sanda et al. ( 2010) and Tsegba et al. ( 2014) 
documented that there was a negative association between managerial ownership and 
firm performance.  
 Although the theoretical expectation is that there will be a positive relationship in line 
with the prior studies, however, this inconsistence might be due to the peculiarity of 
the Nigerian corporate environment. The inconsistency is evidence of a significant 
concentration of shareholdings in a network of family ownership, with governance 
structures in the control of the family and producing sizeable members of one family 
who surround a family-related chairman or CEO. This scenario of ownership has the 
tendency to cause the expropriation of the minority shareholders by the dominating 
family shareholders.  
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Similarly, Hornstein (2013) find that, the higher the managerial ownership level in a 
firm, the lower the probability of CEO turnover. Ruan and Tian (2011) argue that for 
Chinese listed firms, at lower level of managerial ownership (below 18 per cent), the 
CEOs’ behaviours were controlled and influenced by the board’s disciplinary 
measures, hence, the CEOs were effectively monitored and more likely to be removed 
in the event of poor firm performance. However, at a very high degree of managerial 
ownership, managers’ interests were aligned with those of the shareholders, hence it 
heightened CEO turnover and was followed with insider replacements as successors 
to protect their interests (Ishak, 2010; Ruan & Tian, 2011). The summary of the major 
articles reviewed is given in Table 2.3. 




Summary of Articles on CEO Succession and Ownership Structure 
Author/Year/Country Title/Period Methods Sample Findings 
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independent boards are 
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The study finds a 
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relationship between 
board gender diversity 
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2.8 Moderating Role of CEO Power 
Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) have argued that the link between the 
firm’s performance and the board of directors’ decisions to either dismiss the CEO or 
retain him or her is not usually direct, but rather moderated by some constructs, such 
as; the attributions and expectations of the directors, allegiances and values of the 
directors, power of the CEO (incumbent), and CEO candidates’ availability for the 
position. Other researchers have equally extended studies in that line considering some 
of the four constructs suggested to moderate the relationship (Cannella, & Lubatkin, 
1993).  
Furthermore, Ishak et al.(2012) opined that aside from the ownership structure, the 
CEO power is a key factor to be given consideration by the firms as they select their 
CEOs. In their study, they focused on the direct relationship between CEO change and 
corporate performance; however, the relationship was not significant owing to several 
sociopolitical factors suspected to be capable of moderating the relationship. Hence, 
they suggested variables like incumbent CEO power and ownership structure as 
potential moderators that could intervene in the relationship. CEOs who gain more 
power through shares ownership are not likely to be replaced or dismissed for poor 










Firms/ 2002 - 








stock market  
The study finds that 
managerial ownership 
affects capital structure, 
which in turn affects 
firm performance 
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performance. This is because, at a high level of ownership, the CEOs become 
entrenched and weaken the monitoring and disciplinary controls of the board, hence, 
they are not likely to be replaced (Ruan et al., 2011). Ronghui and Hailin (2006) found 
that CEO ownership did moderate the board composition to corporate performance 
relationship. The authors specifically argued that CEO ownership is negatively related 
to CEO succession, because CEOs are also shareholders which could lower the agency 
problem owing to goal congruence. However, at a higher CEO ownership level, 
entrenchment might result in the CEO resisting any move to discipline him/her by way 
of dismissal by the board in the event of poor performance (Combs et al., 2007; 
Ronghui & Hailin, 2006). 
            In regards to CEO power, prior researchers suggested that granting CEOs with stakes 
in the ownership of shares in the firms ensures goal congruence and the alignment of 
their personal interests with those of the shareholders (the owners of the firms) (Xie, 
2014). The potential for CEOs to leverage on their positions or ownership to pursue or 
advance their personal goals is referred to as CEO power (Ronghui & Hailin, 2006). 
CEO ownership has been argued by the previous studies to be the most influential 
proxy for CEO power, this study thus, adopts CEO ownership as the proxy for CEO 
power consistent with prior studies (Boone et al., 2007; Combs et al., 2007). 
           It is widely believed that one of the key reasons why boards exert insufficient control 
over management is that CEOs often have a significant say over the board’s selection 
process (Baldenius, Melumad, & Meng, 2014). Thus, CEOs with more power may 
want to use their influence over the board composition to have a pliable board. CEO 
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power can influence boards’ action, because the CEOs possess the means of 
entrenching themselves and securing authority within the company such as in 
decisions related to the selection of investment projects (Baldenius et al., 2014). 
Companies with entrenched CEOs may find it difficult to fire the CEOs, which 
suggests that CEO power can create a barrier to effective monitoring (Boivie et al., 
2016; Fisman et al., 2014). But, in most cases, the power of the CEO influences the 
effectiveness of outside directors and plays a key role in the board nomination process.  
CEO ownership has been found to be associated with smaller increases in board 
independence and less board turnover (Easterwood, Ince & Raheja, 2012). Similarly 
Combs et al. (2007) document that the relationship between board composition and 
corporate performance is moderated by CEO power. Similarly, Coates & Kraakman 
(2010) indicate that CEO ownership could interact with CEO turnover. This implies 
that if the CEOs are shareholders, there is the potential for an improved shareholder to 
manager goal congruence, thereby lowering agency costs and leading to better 
performance and less disciplinary action. As a result, it is expected that CEO 
ownership may negatively relate to CEO turnover. But the entrenchment effect may 
be  costly to the company because this allows the CEOs to engage in excessive self-
serving actions and they are reluctant to support any action that will lead to their 
removal (Ronghui & Hailin, 2006; Xie, 2014). Therefore, this study posits that higher 
ownership may reduce the probability of turnover of a poorly performing CEO.   
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2.9 Literature Gap 
Previous studies established that poor corporate performance leads to CEO turnover 
(Conyon & He, 2014; Fiordelisi & Ricci, 2013; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Ishak, 2010; 
Rachpradit et al., 2012). However, the Nigerian situation contradicts this empirical 
finding as many Nigerian companies are experiencing declining and poor 
performance, but their respective CEOs remain unchanged. Furthermore, several 
studies that have examined the influence of corporate governance mechanisms (board 
structure and ownership structure) on CEO succession concentrated on the common 
variables like board size, board composition, board committee, but few studies have 
considered variables like board members’ gender diversity, and board members’ 
religiosity on the CEO succession especially from the emerging economies. Similarly, 
for the ownership structure variables, most prior studies only paid attention to variables 
like, blockholder ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and 
family ownership. Foreign ownership, which constitutes a vital segment of the 
corporate ownership especially in the developing countries was not considered. Hence, 
this study, has attempted to examine the influence of the board members’ gender 
diversity, board members’ religiosity, and foreign ownership on the CEO succession 
in Nigeria. 
Finally, most empirical studies suggested the need to examine the moderating role of 
CEO power on CEO turnover, however, there has been no study yet which has 
examined this relationship. Thus, this study has introduced CEO power to moderate 
the relationship between the corporate performance, corporate governance 
mechanisms and CEO turnover in Nigerian PLCs. 
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2.10 Control Variables 
To avoid biased and outrageous results, and to boost or strengthen the confidence in 
the analysis, some variables were termed and used as controls. Which means, control 
variables are those variables that can significantly offer different explanations to the 
results if left out of the model (Combs et al., 2007). These are variables that have been 
regularly established by the previous studies as relating to CEO succession, corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate performance. For this study, the following set 
of control variables was used; firm size, firm age, diversity and leverage. 
2.10.1 Firm Size 
            Firm size has been variously established by the previous studies to influence positively 
on the dependent variables. It is mostly measured as the log of total assets (Yoo & 
Reed, 2015).  Others like Bates et al. (2015) have viewed firm size as the natural log 
of the total book value of the assets. While Gangloff et al. (2014) used firm size to 
control for the possible size related heteroscedasticity, since large and small firms are 
believed to behave differently (Elsaid & Ursel, 2012). Furthermore, Guo and Masulis 
(2015) asserted that most researchers of CEO succession used firm size measured by 
the natural logarithm of sales. Ishak and Abdul Latif (2013) found that the bigger the 
size of the firm the higher the probability of the company to restate its financial 
statements. Financial restatements escalate the probability of turnover, because most 
financial restatements are due to poor performance. Stressing further, Lindrianasari 
and Hartono (2012) used total assets as a proxy for firm size which they reported to 
have negative relationship with CEO turnover, arguing that an increase in total assets 
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leads to a positive growth of the firm which in turn reduces the possibility of CEO 
succession. 
            Similarly, Liu (2010) controlled for company size in his study of the impact of network 
on CEO turnover, appointments and compensation and established that big firms are 
more likely to replace their CEOs more frequently than the smaller firms. Therefore, 
this study envisaged that firm size would have a positive correlation with the CEO 
succession i.e., the bigger the size of the firm, the higher the likelihood or the 
probability of the firm to change its CEO due to poor firm performance and 
consequently the higher the probability of selecting external/ outsider candidates. 
2.10.2 Leverage 
Chen (2014) used leverage measured as long-term debt over total assets and reported 
that it had a negative relationship with CEO turnover. In the same vein, Alves, Couto, 
and Francisco (2015) reported that prior researchers have claimed that the greater the 
leverage the higher the agency cost and the greater the demand for monitoring of the 
CEO. Leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to the total assets.  Other 
researchers established a positive association between firm leverage and CEO 
turnover. The higher the ratio of debt to equity (leverage) the higher the probability of 
CEO turnover (Lindrianasari & Hartono, 2012). 
2.10.3 Firm Diversity 
Firm diversity was controlled in this study because the CEOs of diversified firms are 
more likely to get ideas from their colleagues in other firms within the industry and 
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the firm diversity is established to impact on the strategic choices of the firms such as, 
the CEO succession (Yoo & Reed, 2015).  Hence, CEO succession is more likely to 
occur in firms within a competitive industry.  This is so, because of the homogeneous 
nature of the firms in the industry and the availability of a large number of suitable 
candidates from the outside of the firm (Fatima et al., 2014; Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2012; 
Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013; Lindrianasari & Hartono, 2012). 
  
2.10.4 Firm Age 
Firm age is measured as the natural log of the number of years of existence of the firm. 
It is measured from the year the company was created or registered (Ezeoha & Okafor, 
2013; Xie, 2014). Yoo and Reed (2015) controlled for the effect of firm age because 
of the impact of the maturity and development of the firms on the decisions of the firm, 
and this comes with age. Older firms are assumed to have a very organised and formal 
structure of decision making, and they rely on the established routine of decision 
making due to the long existence of the firms. As a result, the decisions to replace the 
CEOs in older firms are easily arrived at and an outsider CEO is more likely to be 
appointed because of the network established by the firm due to its long existence (Xie, 
2014). 
 
2.11 Summary of the Chapter 
This Chapter discusses the review of the literature on CEO succession starting with a 
comprehensive discussion on CEO turnover, its types and models in CEO turnover. 
This is followed with a detailed discussion on the CEO selection choice, since after 
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the turnover event, comes the selection of a new replacement. Various CEO selection 
choice views were discussed. This review presented a clear delineation of the factors 
that determine the CEO succession in Nigerian PLCs. It was followed with a 
comprehensive discussion on the overview of the code of corporate governance across 
the globe and then specifically, was narrowed down to the NCCG. The review 
highlighted the development and challenges of the corporate codes in Nigeria and the 
need for effective implementation of a comprehensive corporate governance 
regulations among the listed public companies in Nigeria.  
The underpinning theory along with the supporting theories used in this research were 
fully discussed. These theories and models have been used in most studies on CEO 
succession. An extensive literature review was carried out on the corporate 
performance and CEO succession, followed by a detailed discussion on the influence 
of corporate governance mechanisms, namely; board structure and ownership structure 
on CEO succession. The review concluded with a discussion on the moderating role 
of CEO power on the relationship between corporate performance, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and CEO turnover. The four control variables used in this 
study namely; firm size, leverage, firm diversity and firm age were equally 
highlighted. 
 In a nutshell, the previous researchers found in their respective studies that firm 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms, and CEO power all influenced CEO 
succession significantly, though with conflicting and mixed results. However, most of 
the findings were reported from the developed countries with only a few from the 
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emerging economies. Hence, there is a dearth of studies that specifically consider CEO 







The main objective of this section is to give a comprehensive overview of the research 
methodology that was adopted in this study. It clearly explains the factors that 
influence CEO succession, which are, CEO turnover and CEO selection in the 
Nigerian PLCs. The striking novelty of this study is that it has introduced CEO power 
as a moderator in line with the suggestion of Frederickson et.al. (1988) and Cannella 
and Lubatkin (1993) to study the entire cycle of the CEO succession issue. It begins 
from the determinants of the CEO turnover to the factors influencing the CEO 
selection choice. The chapter starts with a discussion on the research design in Section 
3.2, followed by Section 3.3 which is the research frameworks for CEO turnover and 
CEO selection choice. Section 3.4 contains a discussion on the hypotheses 
development and 3.5 is about the data and research methodology. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
The methodology that was used in this study is based on secondary data and is 
longitudinal, sourced from the audited annual reports of the public listed companies in 
Nigeria and corporate announcements from the website of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE). The study determines the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate performance on the CEO succession and the moderating 
role of CEO power on the CEO turnover relationship. The study covers all the non-
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financial companies in Nigeria within the period of 2011 to 2015, focusing on those 
companies that had changed their CEOs within that period. Therefore, the individual 
company was the unit of analysis in this study, which consists of all the public listed 
non-financial companies on the Nigerian stock exchange (NSE). 
 
3.3 Research Framework  
In line with the theoretical foundation and the literature reviewed in the preceding 
chapter, the research framework was developed to further investigate the possible 
factors that determine CEO turnover and the choice of a successor, and the effect of 
CEO power as a moderating role in the relationship. The independent variables of this 
research are corporate performance, and corporate governance mechanisms, with CEO 
power as a moderator variable, whilst CEO succession (turnover and selection) are the 
dependent variables.  
 
This research categorises the potential variables based on previous studies into five 
basic groups (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), these are corporate performance, board structure, 
ownership structure, CEO power (moderator) and firm characteristics (control 
variables). This classification is as proposed by Ferderickson et al. (1988) in their CEO 
dismissal model and also by Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) in their CEO succession 
model. Figure 3.1 explains the potential factors that might determine CEO turnover 
and the moderating role of CEO power on the relationship. Following CEO turnover, 
Figure 3.2 describes the potential factors that might influence CEO selection choice. 
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Figure 3.2:  
Research Framework for CEO Selection 
 
3.4 Hypotheses Development for CEO Turnover  
Based on the research framework shown in Figures 3.1, this section discusses the 
hypotheses that assisted in achieving the research objectives. The hypotheses were all 
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complementary theories which are the resource dependency theory, human capital 
theory and social network theory to investigate or ascertain the effect of corporate 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms, and the moderating effect of CEO 
power on the CEO turnover in the Nigerian PLCs.  
3.4.1 Corporate Performance (CP) and CEO Turnover 
Several studies especially from the advanced and developed economies like the UK, 
and the US among others have established a negative relationship between CEO 
turnover and firm performance. For example, prior studies had shown that poor 
performance or a deviation from expected performance is a good predictor of CEO 
dismissal or a turnover decision (Conyon & He, 2012; Coates & Kraakman, 2010; 
Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Rachpradit et.al., 2012; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011; 
Zhang, Wierschem, Mediavilla & Hong, 2016).  
The decline in performance may raise the probability of the board appointing a new 
CEO. However, the measurements used in measuring performance vary among 
researchers, as some researchers may use the accounting-based measurement while 
others may opt for market-based performance.  These performance measurements have 
different influences on CEO turnover decision (Conyon & He, 2012; Fiordelisi & 
Ricci, 2013). For example, Conyon & He (2012) find that the CEO turnover is only 
related to the accounting-based measurement of performance, but not the stock market-
based measurement. Prior literature on developed countries like the US document that 
both accounting performance and stock market based measurement of performance are 
negatively related to CEO turnover (Dikolli et al., 2014). Similar results were also 
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reported in other developed countries like Germany, Japan and the UK (Dimopoulos 
& Wagner, 2012). In contrast, Cheng, Hu and Saffer (2013)’s study of companies in 
nine Asian countries document that CEO turnover is less related to performance when 
companies have shareholders with large ultimate control rights. Similar evidence was 
also reported in the case of Thai companies (Rachpradit et al., 2012).  
However, in the Chinese context, Conyon and He (2012) used both the accounting and 
market-based performance measurements for a sample of Chinese companies on CEO 
turnover decision. They find that the Chinese companies relied more on accounting 
performance than market performance when determining the CEO turnover decision. 
Additional analysis showed that after the governance reforms more weight has been 
attached to the market-based performance measurement on the CEO turnover decision. 
In a similar vein, Chang and Wong (2004) findings indicate that CEO turnover was a 
result of the incidence of negative earnings. Similarly, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) 
results show that CEO turnover is negatively correlated with a company’s accounting 
performance but not with stock returns. In contrast, Kato and Long (2006) study on 
CEO turnover revealed that a significant negative correlation exists between CEO 
turnover and company accounting performance as well as stock market performance 
among privately controlled companies. 
 In another related study, Fiordelisi and Ricci (2013) find a negative relationship 
between company specific performance and the probability of CEO change indicating 
that the threat of turnover after poor performance is credible. When a CEO is found to 
be underperforming, the board may attempt to dismiss the poorly performing CEO in 
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line with the agency assumption (Jensen & Meckline, 1976). Firm performance is 
normally used as the yardstick to evaluate and measure the quality and success of the 
management, hence, the CEO turnover is caused by poor firm performance 
(Rachpradit et al., 2012). All these studies have provided clear evidence that company 
performance is an indicator of a CEO’s ability to manage the company towards 
maximising shareholder wealth. As a result, poor performance may increase the 
likelihood of CEO turnover which is consistent with the agency theory which suggests 
that the threat of turnover ensures that CEOs align their interests with those of the 
shareholders. Hence, in line with the preceding arguments, the study hypothesises that: 
H1turnover: Firms are more likely to change their CEOs in the events of poor 
performance.  
3.4.2 Board Structure and CEO Turnover 
The board of directors is a crucial governance control mechanism that plays a dual 
function role in a company (Boivie et al., 2016). Board members are elected 
representatives of the shareholders. They perform crucial roles on behalf of the 
shareholders in the governance of the corporation. Such roles include monitoring the 
company’s management, particularly the CEO against empire building and providing 
advice to the management on key decision making towards achieving the corporate 
goals. The separation of the ownership from the management of the corporations 
created the agency problem, to mitigate this agency problem, the board of directors 
representing the shareholders (owners) take some decisions and monitor the 
management on behalf of the shareholders, which is consistent with the agency theory 
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as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Some of the most important decisions 
usually taken by the board of directors are decisions relating to the hiring or dismissal 
and replacement of the CEO, as well as managing turbulent events such as financial 
restatements or other internal and external shocks that increase the uncertainty that a 
company operates under (Boivie et al., 2016; Fisman, Khurana, Rhodes-Kropf, & Yim, 
2014). These decisions also indicate the effectiveness of the board. For instance, 
Boivie et al. (2016) justified effective board monitoring as when the board acts in the 
best interests of the shareholders, employment of the right choice as the CEO, 
compensating them properly and overseeing managerial actions. Thus, the quality of 
the CEO succession decision is a good mechanism in evaluating the effectiveness of 
the corporate board. In fact, Ronghui and Hailin (2006) find that higher CEO turnover- 
performance sensitivity is a reflection of a good corporate governance system.  
However, Baysinger and Butler (2014) argue that the economic theory and company 
laws across the countries have not paid adequate attention to the issues concerning the 
size, composition in terms of ratio of insiders to outsiders, independent to non-
independent directors, number and functions of committees and other board attributes 
even among similar corporations. Thus, these decisions to hire a CEO are influenced 
by numerous characteristics and attributes of the board such as size, composition, 
nominating committee and religiosity.  
           3.4.2.1 Board Size 
           Another important aspect of the board of directors’ attributes is the board size. Board 
size is an aspect of the board of directors’ attributes that is likely to affect the rational 
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dynamics amongst group members and their abilities to process information 
effectively. The size of the board is considered as a yardstick to determine the 
effectiveness of the board in monitoring the CEO (Chemmanur & Fedaseyeu, 2015). 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between board size and CEO 
succession. Nevertheless, the findings from these studies are mostly conflicting, mixed 
and inconclusive. For instance, there has always been a trade-off on the optimal board 
size that is beneficial to the company because, it is often argued that, board size can 
create barriers which limit the effectiveness of the board in sharing and coordinating 
information (Boivie et al., 2016).  
            Furthermore, Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2015) demonstrated that having many 
board members increase the amount of information that is potentially available to the 
board. A larger board may also help a company to gain access to resources, this is in 
accordance with the resource dependence theory as provided by Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1978). However, due to free- rider problems, larger boards may have adverse effect 
on the monitoring role of the board, which in turn affect the companies’ outcomes 
(Chemmanur & Fedaseyeu, 2015). As the board size increases, the more it becomes 
difficult to attribute responsibility to individual board members, thus, directors may 
exert less effort on their monitoring function, thereby heightening the agency problem. 
           In contrast companies with smaller boards are more likely to discipline poorly 
performing managers. Larger boards have also been associated with a greater 
likelihood of failure for companies in financial distress (Dowell, Shackell, & Stuart, 
2011). All these suggest that smaller boards are more effective monitors than larger 
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boards and larger boards are likely to present a barrier that generally makes the boards 
more constrained. In this circumstance, it is expected that smaller boards should 
increase the sensitivity of the turnover to poor performance and lead to larger 
performance improvements following a turnover. Therefore, there is possibility that 
small boards are likely to effect the change on time in a company. In the same vein, 
Rachpradit et al.,(2012) find that the probability of CEO turnover was low when the 
board size was large in a sample of Thai companies.  
On the contrary, Zahra and Pearce (1989) opine that, larger boards are not susceptible 
to managerial manipulation and domination as compared to smaller ones, they resist 
managerial entrenchment and protect the interests of the shareholders which is as well 
opined by the agency theory. They are, therefore, more active in monitoring and 
evaluating CEOs with the ultimate result of dismissing the CEO in the event of 
declining performance. However, having additional directors on the board could 
improve the monitoring function of the board, but this could as well slow down the 
corporate decision-making process. Likewise, the cost associated with a slow decision-
making process may be greater than the increased benefits by the time the board 
reaches its optimal size. Therefore, an increase in board size may make the board less 
effective and cause a failure to discipline the CEO for non-performance. Moreover, 
large board size has an adverse effect on the quality of the monitoring of the board, the 
smaller boards are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs (Bekiris, 2013; 
Cook, 2015; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012). Hence, the next hypothesis posited that: 
H2 turnover: Firms with larger board size are more likely to change their CEOs. 
    
 
108
           3.4.2.2 Board Composition 
            Board composition has its influence on the performance of the board when the board 
is properly composed of both outsider and insider directors in the right proportion. It 
impacts on the effectiveness and capabilities of the board in the discharge of its 
monitoring and advisory roles in accordance with the agency theory. An important 
way of strengthening and monitoring the board effectively is to have a reasonable 
number of independent directors on the board (Chemmanur & Fedaseyeu, 2015; Guo 
& Masulis, 2015). This is because the independent directors have the ability to 
challenge the CEO more than inside directors and they have incentives to develop 
some reputation as skilled decision control experts in the corporate directorship market 
(Chemmanur & Fedaseyeu, 2015).  
            Therefore, outsider dominated boards are more likely to take the right decision on the 
CEO. Most especially when a CEO is powerful, the composition of the board is 
important, and good governance is mostly associated with independent directors (Hsu 
& Wu, 2014). However, studies have generally documented weak to no effects on 
average for the effect of board independence on company financial outcomes (Dalton 
et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999). Specifically, with a sample of UK companies, Hsu 
and Wu (2014) find that the companies with a higher proportion of independent 
directors were likely to fail in their monitoring responsibility. 
In contrast, Dimopoulos and Wagner (2012) find that a company with a small outside 
dominated board have a higher likelihood of CEO turnover than company with an 
insider dominated board for study in the UK and German companies. Similarly, 
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Rachpradit, Tang, and Ba Khang (2012) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance was higher with the presence of a low degree of board independence. In 
a situation, whereby the independent directors choose to serve on boards that 
rigorously monitor management, the board of directors is expected to monitor the CEO 
leading to effective decision making and making the CEO act in the shareholders’ 
interests as envisaged by the agency theory.   
Based on the resource dependence theory, Zahra and Pearce (1989) maintained that 
board composition, specifically a board with the majority of their members as outside 
directors provides a better position to establish a strong link with the external 
environment. On the other hand, the board diversity and its breadth of expertise will 
enable it to offer effective monitoring of the CEO’s activities as suggested by the 
agency theory, hence it will be more likely to dismiss the underperforming CEO (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989). 
In another related study, Dimopoulos and Wagner (2012) noted that board 
independence is likely to be the key ingredient to the board in removing an 
underperforming CEO.  Likewise, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007)  also find that turnover 
to performance sensitivity was higher with a larger proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board. In fact, a higher level of board independence increased the 
possibility of CEO turnover due to poor firm performance. Others like Fivos (2013) 
established a negative correlation between board independence and board size, 
suggesting that more independent directors in the composition of the boards with small 
size enhances the effectiveness of the boards in the monitoring of the CEOs, hence, 
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they would be more likely to dismiss the CEOs in the poor performing firms. Hence, 
this study hypothesised that:  
            H3 turnover: Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors on the boards are 
            more likely to change their CEOs.  
3.4.2.3 Board Members’ Gender Diversity 
           The significance of board diversity is specifically noticeable and relevant if it enhances 
the effectiveness of the boards and, consequently, the overall firm performance. 
Relying on the agency theory, as suggested by the previous studies, the board members 
need to come from different backgrounds for the board to be regarded as a balanced 
board (Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2013). Thus, board decision making will be enhanced 
and it will be more effective in the monitoring due to the heterogenous background of 
the directors.  
            As suggested by the agency theory, boards of directors play important roles in 
mitigating principal to agent problems through their monitoring functions (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, some aspects of the board that 
serve as effective monitoring mechanisms, are dependent on the extent to which the 
board is diverse in terms of gender diversity, or the presence of female representation 
on the board. This is because gender diversity enhances the effectiveness of the board 
of directors and adds value to the company (Adams, Haan, Terjesen, & Ees, 2015).  
Appointing women to the board of a corporation should not be a mere satisfying of 
feminism pressure, that is, just done to douse the societal pressure.  A female director’s 
presence on the board  plays an important role in the effective performance of the 
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board, especially as it relates to the monitoring and advisory roles of the board towards 
the management (Abdullah, 2014; Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2013). As such, the presence 
of female directors is expected to influence the CEO turnover of the firm. Findings 
from the prior studies have yielded mixed results from both the developed markets like 
the UK and the US, and the developing and emerging markets alike. 
For example, while some researchers claim that there is a positive relationship between 
gender diversity and firm performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012), some others report a 
negative relationship (Ujunwa, 2012), while others still argued that there was no 
evidence of any significant relationship (Carter et al., 2010). However, Alves et al., 
(2015) in their findings provide evidence that a more gender diversified board of 
directors enhances the board’s independence and efficiency. Hence, logically and 
consistent with the proposition of other scholars, a more gender diversified board 
increases the independence and efficiency of the monitoring role of the board of 
directors, as such it will be less likely to replace the CEO. Thus, this study hypothesises 
that: 
              H4 turnover: Firms with high proportion of female board members are less likely 
   to change their CEOs. 
           3.4.2.4 Board Members’ Religiosity 
            Several studies have established that corporate decision making is affected by the 
religiosity of the individual director or decision maker. Religiosity has a negative 
effect on the possibility of unethical and inappropriate corporate behaviour (Grullon 
et al., 2009). This religiosity is believed to  influence firms in ways that impact on the 
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shareholders’ wealth, and, there is a higher likelihood of religion affecting the choices 
and decisions of the corporate managers (Grullon et al., 2009; McGuire et al., 2012). 
Thus, it is expected that greater participation and involvement in religious activities by 
board members will increase the amount and quality of monitoring, contro,l and 
supervision within the firm, consistent with the agency theory. 
 
           Similarly, researchers have argued that high religiosity among the corporate directors 
influences the management of corporations to attain the wealth creation and 
maximisation for the shareholders. El-Bassiouny et al. (2015) and Kim and Daniel 
(2016) and Volonte (2015) stressed that, religions have strong influence on corporate 
governance practices, suggesting that religious groups have certain values in common 
which to a great extent determine the type of corporate governance mechanisms that 
the firms adopt. 
Although, most of the prior studies examined the effects of religions on corporate 
governance and firm performance, this study focuses on the influence of board 
members’ religiosity on the CEO succession. Aligning with the view of  Kim and 
Daniel (2016) that, corporate persons like shareholders, and board of directors are 
more likely to have more effective and greater monitoring of the management because 
of high board accountability as a result of the board members’ religiosity. Therefore, 
it is expected that the high ethical standard and moral accountability which is the 
hallmark of Islamic teachings will influence the behaviour of the board members who 
are Muslims (Abuznaid, 2009), and such boards will be more effective in monitoring 
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the CEOs, and consequently, will be more likely to dismiss the underperforming 
CEOs. 
H5 turnover: Firms with a higher proportion of Muslim directors on the board are
            more likely to change their CEOs.  
3.4.3 Ownership Structure CEO Turnover  
Ownership structure, to a great extent influences the sensitivity of CEO succession.  
As an internal monitoring mechanism, various types of ownership structure exist and 
each is expected to have its own unique way it affects CEO succession. This study has 
considered three classes of ownership structure which are relevant to the context of 
this study. The incentives to monitor the management by the bigger investors vary 
from one type of ownership to the other. Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2015) argued 
that each director has incentive to replace a non-performing CEO, since he/she owns 
a certain equity position in the company, whose long-run value is affected by the true 
ability of the incumbent CEO. Therefore, the types of controlling owner may likely 
affect the likelihood of CEO turnover. Hence, this study has made hypotheses for the 
following categories of ownership structures; bolckholders, foreign, and managerial 
ownership in line with the agency theory. 
3.4.3.1 Blockholder Ownership  
            Blockholder ownership has the capacity to neutralise management entrenchment as 
canvassed by the agency theory. It makes boards more effective and active in 
monitoring the management. Several researchers have argued that blockholder 
ownership enhances and improves the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring. 
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Similarly, CEO turnover to performance sensitivity is higher in firms with 
blockholders ownership which is in line with agency theory. For example, Agrawal 
and Nasser (2012) report a positive relationship between the blockholder and CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity.   
Blockholder ownership increases the independence of the board which in turn 
enhances the monitoring effectiveness of the firm thereby leading to a high CEO 
turnover probability, and selecting an outsider successor (Acero & Alcalde, 2014; 
Bekiris, 2013). The more the blockholder ownership in a firm the more the likelihood 
of CEO turnover (Bates et al., 2015; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Kaplan & Minton, 
2008). Hence, this study has hypothesised that: 
H6 turnover: Firms with a high proportion of blockholders are more likely to change 
           their CEOs. 
           3.4.3.2 Foreign Ownership 
The ownership of firms is viewed by the agency theory to influence corporate 
performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and also impact on CEO succession which 
is a key indicator of a functional and effective governance mechanism. Due to the 
separation of ownership and control in large corporations, there is a problem with 
aligning the interests of the shareholders with that of the management, leading to the 
agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To mitigate the agency problem, a 
number of internal and external mechanisms, such ownership structure has been 
introduced. Foreign ownership is simply the percentage of shares owned by foreign 
individuals (Tsegba, Herbert, & Ene 2014). Foreign ownership is perceived to have a 
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more informed board and well experienced management with commensurate training 
and expertise that distinguishes their firms from the local counterparts, hence, they 
have better performance. Ufuk, Tucker and Yükseltürk (2013) observed that the extent 
of foreign investor ownership is an important determinant of the demand for financial 
information, hence firms with foreign ownership are likely to increase the level of 
disclosure and the demand for more accurate information which will lead to more 
effective monitoring.  Arouri, Hossain and Badrul Muttakin (2014) argued that foreign 
investors provide outside monitoring of managers and bring technological advances to 
the firms. They further stressed that foreign owners are more likely to have the ability 
to monitor managers, and provide them with performance-based incentives, such that 
they are more serious and avoid entrenchment (Arouri et al., 2014). Similarly, Tsegba 
et al. (2014) reported that the foreign ownership structure showed  significant 
improvement in corporate performance. Foreign ownership enhances the effectiveness 
in the board’s monitoring which in turn leads to CEO turnover in the event of poor 
performance.  
Although, most prior studies have concentrated on the relationship between foreign 
ownership and corporate performance, there is a limited number of studies that have 
examined the influence of foreign ownership on CEO succession. However, due to the 
enhanced performance and effectiveness of the boards of foreign controlled firms as 
observed by Tsegba et al. (2014), it is believed that such firms will be more inclined 
to replace their CEOs as the performance declines.  This study, therefore, hypothesises 
thus: 
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           H7 turnover: Firms with high proportion of foreign ownership are more likely to 
          change their CEOs 
           3.4.3.3 Managerial Ownership  
Managerial ownership ensures goal congruence between the managers’ interests and 
those of the shareholders. As canvassed by the agency theory, when managers own 
stakes or shares in the firms they manage, they strive more to enhance the performance 
of the firm and maximise the wealth creation for the shareholders and themselves, 
because they too are equally part of the owners. Hornstein (2013) documented that, 
the higher the level of managerial ownership other than the CEO in a firm, the lower 
the probability of CEO turnover. As such, CEOs who have gained more power through 
shares ownership are not likely to be replaced or dismissed for poor performance, this 
is equally consistent with the human capital theory which suggests that CEOs gain 
their power through share ownership.  
However, Ruan and Tian (2011) argued that, with a high level of managerial 
ownership, the CEOs become entrenched and this weaken the monitoring and 
disciplinary controls of the board, hence, they are not likely to be replaced. 
Nevertheless, at a very high degree of managerial ownership, the managers’ interests 
are aligned with those of the shareholders, hence it heightens CEO turnover (Ishak, 
2010; Ruan & Tian, 2011). This study, has therefore, suggested the following 
hypothesis: 
              H8 turnover: Firms with a high proportion of managerial ownership are less likely   
             to change their CEOs. 
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 3.4.4 Moderating Role of CEO Power 
Ronghui and Hailin (2006) defined CEO power as the potential for CEOs to leverage 
their position or ownership to pursue or advance their personal goals. CEO power 
includes; educational level, age, expertise, skill, duality, tenure and ownership. 
Nevertheless, an important source of CEO power is ownership as stated by  Cannella 
and Shen (2001). CEO ownership has been found to be associated with smaller 
increases in board independence and less board turnover (Boone et al., 2007; Combs 
et al., 2007).   
Several findings have indicated that CEO ownership does moderate board composition 
and corporate performance relationship. They specifically argued that CEO ownership 
is negatively related to CEO succession, because CEOs are also shareholders which 
could lower the agency problem owing to goal congruence (Combs et al., 2007; 
Ronghui & Hailin, 2006).  Similarly, this is in line with the human capital theory and 
social network theory which suggest that CEOs, over time, acquire their power through 
ownership (Cannella & Lubatkin,1993). 
When CEOs acquire more power, they may want to use their influence over the board 
composition in order to have a pliable board. The degree of CEO power can influence 
board action, because the CEOs possess the means of entrenching themselves and 
securing authority within the company. Furthermore, companies with an entrenched 
CEO may find it difficult to fire the CEO, which suggests that CEO power can create 
a barrier to effective monitoring (Boivie et al., 2016; Fisman et al., 2014). Fredrickson 
et al., 1988) argued that incumbent CEO power among other constructs moderate the 
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relationship between corporate performance, and corporate governance mechanisms 
on CEO succession. In the same manner, several researchers have emphasised the 
moderating role of CEO power on the relationship between corporate performance and 
corporate governance mechanisms on CEO succession (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Ishak et al., 2012). 
Similarly Combs et al. (2007), documented that the relationship between board 
composition and corporate performance is moderated by CEO power. This was further 
supported by the study of Coates and Kraakman (2010) which indicated that CEO 
ownership could interact with CEO turnover. This implies that if the CEOs are 
shareholders, there is a potential for an improved shareholder to manager goal 
congruence, thereby lowering agency costs and leading to better performance and less 
disciplinary action. Specifically, when CEOs have acquired power and control through 
shares ownership, they exert some degree of influence over the boards which makes 
the CEOs entrenched in the companies thereby decreasing the probability of 
disciplinary action against them. Therefore, CEO power leads to entrenchment which 
reduces the probability of turnover due to poor firm performance.   
 
In firms with large board size and the CEOs owning shares in the equity, the CEOs are 
not likely to be removed or replaced due to the share ownership which confers some 
power on the CEOs thereby making them entrenched and thus, they interfere with the 
decisions of the boards to remove or change them. The more the proportion of outside 
directors on the corporate board especially in firms where CEOs are part of 
shareholders, the higher the possibility of CEO turnover owing to the rigorous 
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monitoring by the outsider directors dominated board. A gender diversified board in 
firms with CEO power means that the probability of CEO turnover in such a firm will 
be low. This means that, the more female directors on the board the better the 
performance of the firm even when the CEO has a stake in the ownership of the firm 
and the less likely it will be for the CEO to be replaced. On the board members’ 
religiosity, because of the proportion of Muslim board members where a CEO is part 
of the owners of the firm, the CEO is not likely to be replaced. 
CEO power weakens the monitoring role of the blockholders and entrenches the CEOs 
which ultimately reduces the probability of turnover. This is due to the CEO power’s 
impact on the decisions of the board to change the CEO. The more the percentage of 
the foreign ownership in companies in which the CEOs have stake in the shares, the 
higher the probability of CEO turnover because the foreign investors will be more 
determined and rigorous in monitoring to safeguard their wealth. In a managerial 
ownership-controlled firms where the CEOs have gained power through shares 
ownership, the probability of the CEOs being replaced or changed is low. As a result, 
it is expected that CEO ownership can moderate the relationship between corporate 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO turnover. Thus, the 
following hypotheses are presented: 
H9 turnover: There is a significant relationship between CEO power and CEO 
 turnover.  
H10 turnover: CEO power strengthens the negative relationship between corporate      
 performance and CEO turnover. 
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H11 turnover: CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between corporate
 board size and CEO turnover. 
H12 turnover: CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between board 
 composition and CEO turnover. 
            H13 turnover: CEO power strengthens the negative relationship between board 
 members’ gender diversity and CEO turnover. 
            H14 turnover: CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between board 
 members’ religiosity and CEO turnover. 
H15 turnover: CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between blockholder 
 ownership and CEO turnover. 
H16 turnover: CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between foreign 
 ownership and CEO turnover. 
            H17 turnover: CEO power strengthens the negative relationship between 
 managerial ownership and CEO turnover.  
 
3.5 Hypotheses Development for the CEO Selection Choice  
Based on the research framework shown in Figure 3.2, this section discusses the 
hypotheses that assisted in achieving the research objectives. The hypotheses were all 
developed in line with the main theory, which is the agency theory together with other 
complementary theories such as, the resource dependency theory, human capital 
theory, and social network theory to investigate the influence of corporate 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO selection in the Nigerian 
PLCs.  
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3.5.1 Corporate Performance (CP) and CEO Selection Choice 
          As the turnover takes place, a vacancy is created which needs to be filled by a successor 
to replace the ousted CEO. Scholars have suggested that poor firm performance affects 
the origin of the successor or the new CEO. While some researchers suggest that in the 
event of a turnover following poor performance, the board of directors are more likely 
to hire an outsider as a replacement in order to turn around the strategies and improve 
the firm’s performance (Bereskin & Hsu, 2011; Ishak et al., 2012, and Ishak et al., 
2013). In contrast, some studies like Gangloff et al. (2014) and  Ishak et al. (2012) 
suggested that in the event of poor performance, an internal successor is more preferred 
to replace the ousted CEO especially in large corporations due to the size and structure 
as well as the difficulties in altering the strategies of the companies and the strong 
influence of some vested interests.  Despite these apparent conflicting findings, this 
study has aligned with the adaptive view which posits that outsider successors are more 
preferable to the owners of the firms as replacements in the event of poor performance. 
The selection of an outsider is believed to be able to turn the fortune of the company 
around and improve its performance. Hence, in line with the preceding arguments, the 
study hypothesises that: 
H1 selection: Firms are more likely to choose external candidates as new CEOs in
            the events of   poor performance. 
3.5.2 Board Structure and CEO Selection Choice  
Furthermore, decision pertaining to the selection or turnover of the CEO are a few of 
the corporate decisions where boards play a significant role. Jenter and Kanaan (2008) 
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indicated that the decision to retain or dismiss a CEO after a bad stock price or 
accounting performance is one of the most important decisions made by corporate 
boards on behalf of the shareholders as suggested by the agency theory. Therefore, the 
board needs well-disposed and properly motivated directors to be effective. In contrast, 
Dimopoulos and Wagne (2012) found that the quality of the governance did not 
contribute to the CEO succession decision for a sample of UK and German companies. 
In carrying out these monitoring and advisory roles, the agency problem is created 
because of the separation of ownership from the control of the corporation (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). How well and effective the board of directors perform these vital 
functions greatly determines the quality and effectiveness of the boards in the 
corporate decision making (Bates et al., 2015).  
However, Baysinger and Butler (2014) argued that the economic theory and company 
laws across the countries have not paid adequate attention to the issues concerning the 
size, composition in terms of ratio of insiders to outsiders, independent to non-
independent directors, number and functions of committees and other board attributes 
even among similar corporations. Thus, these decisions to hire and fire a CEO are 
influenced by the numerous characteristics and attributes of the board, such as size, 
composition, nominating committee and religiosity.  
           3.5.2.1 Board Size 
However, in the event of a selection, an outsider successor will be selected due to the 
size of the board. The large board size of the firm enables it to gather resourceful and 
qualitative individuals on its board, consistent with the resource dependence theory, 
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this robust size of the board gives it an advantage in harnessing capable and competent 
CEO candidates from the external environment.  
Moreover, owing to the separation of the ownership of the firm from the management, 
agency problems are created. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), for the 
effective monitoring of the management large board size is more preferable because it 
harbours more credible personalities with better ideas of more suitable CEO candidates 
to stir the affairs of the corporation towards maximisation of the shareholders’ fund. 
Similarly, a larger board size enables the board to link the firm to its external 
environment and benefit from the vital resources from the external environment (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989). The most vital of such resources is the human resource, hence this is 
consistent with the resource dependence theory, in that, the larger the board size, the 
more the likelihood of selecting a candidate from the external environment as a 
replacement. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between board size and CEO 
selection choice. Hence, the study hypothesises that: 
H2 selection: Firms with larger board size are more likely to select outsiders as their 
           CEOs. 
           3.5.2.2 Board Composition 
            Meanwhile, Ishak, et.al. (2012) reported that inside directors are inclined to support 
the appointment of insiders and are opposed to outside candidates in line with the 
agency theory predictions. This is premised on the assumption that an internal CEO 
candidate will add value to the firm because the new CEO, being an insider, is already 
involved in formulating and implementing the current policies of the firm. Similarly, 
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the accessibility and affordability of the relevant information to the outside directors 
enhances the performance of the firm; it equally improves the effectiveness of the 
board in the discharge of its monitoring and supervisory roles over the management. 
Hence, outside directors are more likely to select an external candidate as replacement 
for the CEO in the event of turnover (Duchin et al., 2010). 
Therefore, when there is a higher proportion of outside directors on the board, the 
board is said to be more independent since there will be less potential domination by 
the management. Hence, outside directors should be better in CEO monitoring due to 
two major reasons; first, outside directors have incentives to show their expertise in 
decision making (Bekiris, 2013). Thus, they are more prone to replace the 
nonperforming CEO. Second, with the inside directors’ careers tied to the CEO’s, the 
inside directors are mostly unable or unwilling to replace the CEO, while outside 
directors can make the decision independently and have self-interest in the 
performance of the company and, subsequently, appoint an outsider as the successor. 
Similarly, Zahra and Pearce (1989) argued that outsider directors are crucial in 
securing essential resources for the firms in line with the resource dependence theory 
and, therefore, in the event of selecting a new CEO, the outsiders, because of their link 
with the external environment are more likely to select or hire an external candidate. 
Hence, this study hypothesises that:   
 H3 selection: Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors on the board are 
   more likely to select outsiders as their new CEOs. 
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3.5.2.3 Board Members’ Gender Diversity 
            Furthermore, having women as board members can enhance firm performance and 
create efficient and effective monitoring by the board, as argued by Dezsö and Ross 
(2012) and  Alves et al. (2015). The increase in performance will in turn attracts 
outsider candidates wishing to join the companies in order to benefit from the 
improved fortune of the firms. Meanwhile, the resource dependence theory by Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) suggests that, the success and the survival of a firm depends on 
its access to the resources available from its external environment. The board of 
directors is the major link between the company and its external environment in 
obtaining the resources required for the firm’s success and survival (Krigman & 
Rivolta, 2016). These crucial resources can be improved through an increase in both 
the size and board diversity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The most important resources 
to a firm is the human capital and having women as directors has a potential to link the 
firm with different constituencies and being more committed than men, they are more 
likely to select or hire external candidates as CEOs for the firms (Jiang, Kang , & Zhu, 
2018). Thus, the firms are more inclined to hire external replacements. Therefore, the 
hypothesis of this study posits that:  
            H4 selection: Firms with a high proportion of female board members are more likely 
           to select external candidates as their CEOs. 
           3.5.2.4 Board Members’ Religiosity 
            The social norm theory predicts that individuals are influenced by social norms, and 
this impacts on corporate individuals’ (CEOs, boards of directors, shareholders)’ 
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decision making related to corporate governance (Kim & Daniel, 2016). Board of 
directors are not likely to select as a CEO a candidate with a religious and ethnic 
background who might display leadership styles that are basically different from what 
the directors are familiar with (Larcker et al., 2014).  
            However, in taking final decision on the choice of the CEO the board members are 
more comfortable in selecting a CEO whose religious and behavioral qualities are 
more closely identical with the board’s attributes of CEO leadership stereotypes 
(Larcker et al., 2014). Therefore, in the event of selecting a successor, it is expected 
that, consistent with the social network theory, religious membership will create bonds 
and connections between the board members. Hence, they are more likely to appoint 
an insider. Thus, this study hypothesises that: 
H5 selection: Firms with a higher proportion of Muslim directors on the board are 
             less likely to appoint outsiders as their CEOs.  
3.5.2.5 Board Nominating Committee Independence 
As is typical of all boards, most corporate boards execute their tasks through 
committees created by the board of directors. It makes the board more effective and 
efficient in discharging its responsibilities. A nominating committee is one of such 
cardinal committees saddled with the responsibilities to find, evaluate and suggest 
qualified and competent candidates to the board for appointment as directors and 
CEOs.  Hence, the role of the nominating committee as well as its composition is 
crucial in determining the future direction of the firm. Survival of the companies 
mostly depends on the availability of and accessibility to the vital resources from its 
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external environment as suggested by the resource dependence theory (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978). Furthermore, the board nominating committee is important because it 
is shouldered with the most crucial responsibility of selecting a new CEO for the firm.  
Through the nominating committee , the board is able to nominate the CEO and make 
him or her act in the best interest of the shareholders as envisaged by the agency theory 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The future direction and corporate survival of the firm 
depends on how effective the committee carries out this task.   
For instance, Guo and Masulis (2015) argue that, the forced CEO turnover’s sensitivity 
to firm performance increases as the nominating committee becomes more 
independent. While, insider dominated boards in all the firms lack independent 
nominating committee. Hence, with a functional nominating committee in place 
dominated by outsider board members, external candidates are easily recruited as 
replacements. Therefore, this study has put forward the following hypothesis: 
             H6 selection: Firms with a high proportion of outsiders on the board nominating 
   committee are more likely to select outsider CEOs. 
3.5.3 Ownership Structure and CEO Selection Choice 
The types of controlling owner may likely affect the CEO selection choice. Hence, this 
study hypothesises for the following categories of ownership structures; bolckholders, 
foreign and managerial ownership in line with the agency theory. 
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3.5.3.1 Blockholders Ownership  
In the event of the selection of a successor, an outside candidate will be more likely to 
be selected by firms with blockholder ownership, because of the need for changes in 
policies and strategies to improve performance. As the new CEOs are not part of the 
existing policies and strategies, therefore, they will be in better position to introduce 
new changes to improve the fortune of the corporations (Bates et al., 2015; 
Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Kaplan & Minton, 2008). Moreover, blockholder 
ownership as argued by Agrawal and Nasser (2012) enhances effective monitoring of 
the CEO and, as such, it mitigates the agency problem and reduces the possibility of 
management entrenchment in line with the postulation of agency theorists (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), hence, firms with blockholder ownership are independent of the 
management and, as such, can make independent choice in selecting an outsider 
candidate. This is also consistent with Ishak et al. (2012) who studied a sample of 
Malaysian firms and found that, blockholders controlled firms were more likely to 
select an outsider candidate as the successor in the event of poor performance. Hence, 
this study hypothesised that: 
H7 selection: Firms with a high proportion of blockholders are more likely to select 
            outsider successors as their CEOs. 
           3.5.3.2 Foreign Ownership 
While on the selection of a new CEO, it is generally agreed, especially in developing 
economies, that foreign ownership, has a positive effect on the firm performance, 
which in turn, affect succession. As such, foreign ownership with its positive effect on 
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firm performance, and the influx of FDI also brings about some certain firm specific 
assets such as managerial ability and corporate governance techniques to the firms 
(Tsegba et al., 2014). Thus, foreign owned firms will have more link and access to the 
scarce resources from the external environment as suggested by the resource 
dependence theory. Therefore, in the event of selecting a CEO, the foreign owned firm 
will be more inclined to select an external CEO who has the most suitable competences 
and capabilities to satisfy the interest of the shareholders, consistent with the 
postulation of the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, this study 
hypothesises that:  
             H8 selection: Firms with a high proportion of foreign ownership are more likely to 
             select outside successors as their CEOs. 
            3.5.3.3 Managerial Ownership  
As for the selection of a successor in the event of a turnover, the managers, through 
the power gained by their share ownership, they equally gain control over the firms 
and as such are able to influence the decisions regarding the appointment of their 
successor which will most likely be an insider in order to preserve their interests and 
control over the firm (Ishak, 2010; Ruan & Tian, 2011). The agency theory opines that 
managerial ownership ensures goal congruence between the managers’ interests and 
those of the shareholders. It stipulates that when managers own stakes or shares in the 
firms they manage, they strive more to improve the performance of the companies and 
maximise wealth creation for the shareholders and themselves, because they are 
equally part of the owners. Managers who own shares in a firm prefer an internal 
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successor in order to avoid a delay in the succession which could result from the long 
wait to search for a replacement from an external source (CEO labour market). 
Because a delay in the succession, as observed by Rivolta (2018) leads to lower 
performance. 
 As established by previous empirical findings, CEO succession brings about 
disruption in the organisational policy and strategies. It could also lead to both short-
run and long-run losses in the financial fortune of the firm (Foreman & Soebbing, 
2015; Krigman & Rivolta, 2016). However, changes in the CEO position are 
inevitable, as such stakeholders especially managers with ownership in the firm 
(managerial ownership) are inclined to maintain a high degree of CEO continuity to 
safeguard their interests. Managerial ownership supports promoting an insider to the 
position of CEO, this enables the predecessors to remain involved in major decisions 
and pass on their value and strategies to their successors (Zeitoun & Pamini, 2017). 
Hence, managerial ownership is more inclined to appoint an insider as a successor to 
protect their interests in the firm.   This study, therefore, has suggested the following 
hypothesis: 
H9 selection: Firms with a high proportion of managerial ownership are less likely    
                      to select outside successors as their CEOs. 
 
3.5.4 Summary of the Hypotheses 
This section presents the hypotheses that were tested with regards to CEO turnover 
and CEO selection as well as the theories upon which each respective hypothesis was 
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driven. Table 3.1a contains the list of the hypotheses for the CEO turnover while Table 
3.1b presents the tested hypotheses for the CEO selection choice. 
 
Table 3.1a:  
Summary of the Hypotheses for CEO Turnover 
Label Hypothesis Direction  Theory  
H1 turnover  Firms are more likely to change their CEOs in the event of poor 
performance. 
Negative  Agency 
H2 turnover Firms with larger board size are more likely to change their CEOs  positive  Agency  
H3 turnover Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors on the board are 
more likely to change their CEOs. 
Positive   Agency & 
RD 
H4 turnover Firms with a high proportion of female board members are less likely 
to change their CEOs. 
Negative   Agency & 
RD 
H5 turnover Firms with a higher proportion of Muslim directors on the board are 
more likely to change their CEOs 
Positive   Agency & 
SNT 
H6 turnover Firms with a high proportion of blockholders are more likely to 
change their CEOs 
Positive   Agency  
H7 turnover Firms with a high proportion of foreign ownership are more likely to 
change their CEOs. 
Positive   Agency 
H8 turnover Firms with a high proportion of managerial ownership are less likely 
to change their CEOs. 
Negative  Agency 





CEO power strengthens the negative relationship between corporate 
performance and CEO turnover. 




CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between board size 
and CEO turnover. 
Agency & RD 





CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between board 
composition and CEO turnover. 
Agency & RD 
H13 
turnover 
CEO power strengthens the negative relationship between board 
member gender and CEO turnover. 
Agency & RD 
H14 
turnover 
CEO power strengthens the positive the relationship between board 
religious belief and CEO turnover.  
Agency & Social 
network theory  
H15 
turnover 
CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between blockholder 
ownership and CEO turnover. 




CEO power strengthens the positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and CEO turnover. 




CEO power strengthens the negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and CEO turnover. 
                                   
Agency  
 
Table 3.1b:  
Summary of the Hypotheses for CEO Selection Choice 
Label Hypothesis Direction  Theory 
H1 selection Firms are more likely to choose external candidates as new CEOs in 
the event of   poor performance 
Negative  Agency 
H2 selection Firms with larger board size are more likely to select outsiders as their 
CEOs. 
Positive  Agency & 
RD 
H3 selection  Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors on the board are 
more likely to select outsiders as their new CEOs. 
Positive  Agency & 
RD 
H4 selection Firms with a high proportion of female board members are more likely 
to select external candidates as their new CEOs 
Positive  Agency & 
RD 
H5 selection Firms with a higher proportion of Muslim directors on the board are 
less likely to appoint outsiders as their CEOs  
Negative  Agency & 
SNT 
H6 selection  Firms with a high proportion of outsiders on the board nominating 
committee are more likely to select outsider CEOs. 
Positive  Agency  
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H7 selection Firms with a high proportion of blockholders are more likely to select 
outsider successor as their CEOs 
Positive  Agency 
H8 selection Firms with a high proportion of foreign ownership are more likely to 
select outsider successor as their CEOs. 
Positive  Agency   
H9 selection Firms with a high proportion of managerial ownership are less likely 
to select outsider successors as their CEOs 
Negative   Agency 
3.6 Data and Research Methodology 
The population of this study is all of the listed non-financial companies in the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) during the period of 2011 to 2015. The year 2011 was 
considered in order to capture the effect of the review of the NCCG 2011 and 2015 
was the latest year for which the data could be captured. Furthermore, 2010 was used 
as the base year to find the CEO turnover in the first year of the study.  The total of all 
of the listed companies was 221 based on NSE Fact book 2010/2012. Table 3.2 shows 
the list of listed firms in Nigeria.    
 Table 3.2: 
 Sector by Sector Number of Listed Firms by NSE  
S/N Sectors         NSE Quoted 
1. Agriculture             5 
2. Alternative Securities Markets (ASeM) 10 
3. Conglomerates 6 
4. Construction/Real Estate 10 
5. Consumer Goods 27 
6. Financial Services 56 
7. Healthcare 10 
8. Industrial Goods 28 
9. Information, Communications & Telecoms 11 
10. Mandatory Quotations 22 
11. Natural Resources 6 
12. Oil & Gas 10 
13. Services 20 
Grand Total  221 
          Source:  NSE Factbook 2010/2011. 
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There were about 13 sectors/industries listed in the Nigerian economy as of the 
2010/2011 financial year.  These could be broadly divided into financial and 
nonfinancial industries.  While the financial services industries had the highest number 
of listed firms (56), the agricultural sector had the least (5).  On average, there were 
about 17 firms in each of the 13 industries that constituted the economy that formed 
the total of 221 firms.  For a firm to be fully considered as part of the population the 
following conditions must be met.   
a. The firm must have a recognized CEO/MD. This study has defined the top 
management as a CEO or Managing Director (MD), both terms are often used 
interchangeably, and this is a mere adoption of Ishak’s 2010 definition which is in line 
with the previous opinion of others like Maury (2006). 
b. The CEO must have served for at least one year within the period covered by the 
study ( Liu, 2014; Puffer & Weintrop, 2015). 
c. There must be available records on the CEOs, succession, corporate governance 
mechanisms and performance (Yun Liu, 2014). 
3.6.1 Methods of Analysing the CEO Succession 
The dependent variable of this research is CEO succession defined in terms of CEO 
turnover and CEO selection.  Structuring a method of identifying CEO turnover and 
CEO selection is the first step in measuring and analysing CEO succession (Ishak, 
2010).   
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            3.6.1.1 CEO Turnover 
Identifying CEO turnover involves two stages.  In the first stage the base year needed 
to be determined. The names of the CEOs for all 221 listed companies based on the 
NSE factbook 2010 /2011 were gathered. However, due to specific regulation of the 
financial sector, the sector comprising 56 companies was excluded from the 
population. The final sample of this study was 165 companies. Companies listed in 
2015 were excluded from the list. CEO turnover was measured using a dummy, “1” 
for turnover and “0” for no turnover. 
The next step was to compare the names of the CEOs in the base year (2010) to the 
names of CEOs in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 changes in the names of CEOs 
were considered CEO turnovers.  These changes in the names of the CEOs were then 
compared with announcements made by the “company under the section of corporate 
disclosure/ issuer announcements ” in the NSE (Ishak, 2010). The main reason of 
making such a comparison was to verify the CEO changes. 
            3.6.1.2 CEO Selection Choice 
CEO selection centres on the choice of a new CEO for the company. The successors 
were known from the annual reports under “Director’s Report/Profile”.  The new 
CEOs could either be from within or outside the organisation.  The full background of 
a successor including name, former position, and brief biography will be disclosed 
under the director’s profile. An inside successor is one who is promoted from within 
the ranks of a firm while an outside successor is one who is appointed from an outside 
organization. The re-designation of other directors’ positions to either CEO or MD is 
    
 
136
also inside succession. Ishak (2010) observed that the successor had to have spent at 
least one year in the company or firm for the CEO turnover to be considered an insider.   
3.6.2 Analysing CEO Turnover and the Selection Choice Analysis 
            Logistic regression was used to analyse the CEO turnover and CEO selection.  Pallant 
(2007) observed that logistic regression is an analytical tool used in simultaneously 
investigating the effects of several independent variables on a single dependent 
variable.  This is an appropriate statistical technique when the dependent variable is 
nominal. Most importantly, logistic regression was applied due to two reasons as 
suggested by Pallant (2007): 
a. When there are no problems of normality and constant variance among the              
variables. 
b. The logistic regression is a straightforward statistical analysis. The results of the 
logistic regression are more robust and incorporate metric and nonnumeric variables 
and nonlinear effects.   
Below are the assumptions for the logistic regression as discussed in Pallant (2007). 
1. A linear relationship between the logit of the independent variables and dependent   
      variables although, it does not assume a liner relationship between the actual  
       dependent  and independent variables. 
2. Large sample required as reliability of the estimation declines with few cases. 
3. Independent variables are not linear functions of each other.  
4. Normal distribution is not necessary or assumed for the dependent variable. 
5. Homoscedasticity is not necessary for each level of the independent variables. 
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6. Normally distributed description of errors are not assumed.  
7. The independent variables need not be interval level. 
3.6.3 Research Model Specification  
Based on the discussion in previous chapters, the following CEO’s Succession models 
were formulated for this study: 
           MODEL1: 
CEOTURNOVER=β0+β1PERFMit+β2BSIZEit+β3BCOMPit+β4BGNDRit+β5BRLGNit+ 
β6BHOWNit+β7FROWNit+β8MGOWNit+β9CEOPWR+β10FSIZEit+β11DVRSTYit+β12LEV
RGEit+β13FAGEit+ ɛit  






EVRGEit+ β21FAGEit ɛit 
 






CEOTURNOVER CEO turnover 
CEOSELECTION   CEO selection choice 
PERFM Return on assets and Tobin’s Q                                 
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BSIZE   Board size 
BCOMP Board composition 
BNCID Board nominating committee independence  
BGNDR Board member gender diversity 
BRLGN   Board member religiosity  
BHOWN   Blockholder ownership 
FROWN Foreign ownership 
MGOWN Managerial ownership 
CEOPWR CEO power 
FSIZE Firm size 
FAGE Firm age 
LEVRGE Leverage 
DVRSTY Firm diversity 
3.6.4 Measurement of the Independent Variables 
The basic objective of this study was to examine the influence of corporate 
performance, board structure and ownership structure on CEO succession.  Corporate 
performance was represented by two main attributes; which were the ROA, and 
Tobin’s Q.  Board structure was represented by the attributes of board size, board 
composition, board nominating committee independence, board gender diversity and 
board members’ religiosity.  Ownership structure was made up of the attributes like 
blockholder ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and managerial 
ownership.  There were also four control variables used for the research and they 





Measurement of Research Variables and Main Sources of Data  
S/N Variables Label Descriptive Measurement Main Sources Reference 
1 CEO Turnover CEOTURNOVER Dummies: 1 = Turnover; 0 = No turnover  Annual report Rachpradit et al.( 2012); Ishak et al. (2010) 
2 
CEO Selection CEOSELECTION 
Dummies: 1 = Outsider the company  
0 = Insider the company  
Annual report Rachpradit et al.( 2012); Ishak et al. (2010) 
3 
 Performance PERFM 
ROA is profit before interest & tax / Book 
value of total assets   
Data stream Ishak et al. (2012) 
Tobin’s Q is measured as market value of 
equity + debt capital / Book value of total 
asset.  
Data stream  
(Abdullah, 2014; Zhang, Wierschem, & 
Mediavilla, 2016). 
4 
Board Size  BSIZE Total number of board members  
Annual 
Reports  













Proportion of non-executive members in 
the nominating committee  
Annual 
Reports 
Guo and Masulis (2015) and Ishak (2010). 
7 
Board Gender BGNDR 












Ali and Azmi ( 2016) 
9 Block holder 
Ownership 
BHOWN 
Individuals or institutions with 5% or 
more interest in the company  
Annual 
Reports  
Acero and Alcalde (2014) 







The percentage of shares directly or 
indirectly owned by foreigners to the total 
shares in the company. 
Annual 
Reports  





The percentage of shares directly or 
indirectly owned by executive directors 




Ishak (2010) Tsegba et al. (2014) 
12 
CEO Power CEOPWR 
Proportion of shares owned by the CEO to 
the total shares of the company 
Annual 
Reports 
Combs et al. (2007). 
13 
Firm Size  FSIZE 
Natural log of the book value of total 
assets  
Data Stream Ishak et al. (2012) 
14 
Diversity DVRSTY 
A firm with more than one business 
segment. 
Data Stream Ishak et al. (2012) 
15 Leverage  LEVRGE Total debt / book value of total assets  Data Stream Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012) 
16 
 Firm Age FAGE 








3.7 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter presents the discussions on the methodology adopted for this study. It 
describes the research framework followed by the research design; and the hypotheses 
development for the corporate performance and the corporate governance mechanisms on 
the CEO succession. Specifically, the moderating effect of CEO power on the corporate 
performance and corporate governance mechanism to CEO turnover in the Nigerian PLCs 
has also been provided. The population of the study was discussed especially as the entire 
listed non-financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2011 to 2015 
was the focus, and the models for the regressions were also specified. The chapter 
















CHAPTER FOUR  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS ON CEO TURNOVER 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analyses and discussions on the findings of the study as regards 
the CEO turnover in the public listed non- financial companies on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange from the period of 2011 to 2015. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 4.2 presents the initial dataset and cleaning of the dataset. Section 4.3 describes 
the method for selecting the matching companies. This is closely followed by Section 4.4 
which presents the description of the summary statistics of the sample. Section 4.5 
presents the discussions on the univariate analysis. The next section presents and discusses 
the results of the multivariate analysis of the study. Section 4.7 discusses the results of the 
sensitivity test for robustness using alternative proxies for some variables. While the 
summary of the results of the hypotheses is contained in Section 4.8, and Section 4.9 
summarises the chapter.   
4.2 Initial Dataset and Cleaning of the Dataset 
            As discussed in the previous chapter, the Nigerian stock exchange classified the listed 
companies into thirteen sectors or industries. These sectors were further categorised into 
two broad categories; which are, the financial services sector and the non- financial sector. 
The non- financial sector which is the focus of this study is comprised of 10 sectors with 
a total of 128 companies as presented in Table 4.1. The sectors are; Agriculture, 




Communication Technology, Industrial Goods, Natural Resources, Oil and Gas, and 
Services.  
      Table 4.1: 
      List of the Non-financial Sector of the Nigerian Public Listed companies 
 
 
Meanwhile, due to a lack of complete data for some firms which did not have complete 
data on some key variables like, ownership structure and board characteristic information 
for some years and the non-availability of data for some of the companies, for example, 
some firms did not have audited annual reports for some years, these firms were excluded. 
The total population, therefore, dropped to 103 companies which stood as the sample size 
for the study. Overall, there were 72 CEO turnovers in the non-financial sector of the 
public listed companies on the NSE between 2011 to 2015 as shown in Table 4.1. Thus, 
the 72 CEO turnover companies were matched with another 72 non-turnover companies 
making a total of 144, forming the final sample size for this study.  
S/N Sector Company Turnover 
1 Agriculture 5 2 
2 Conglomerates 6 5 
3 Construction/ Real Estate 10 5 
4 Consumer Goods 28 22 
5 Healthcare 10 6 
6 Information Communication Technology 10 0 
7 Industrial Goods 24 16 
8 Natural Resources 5 3 
9 Oil and Gas 10 9 
10 Services 20 4 




4.3 Methods for Selecting Matching Companies  
A total of 72 CEO turnover events were recorded across the companies within the non-
financial sector. A matching methodology was adopted to match the 72 turnover 
companies with 72 non-turnover companies in order to estimate the regression model for 
the CEO turnover. There are two main methods usually adopted by researchers, for 
example, Abidin (2006); Fan et al., (2007) and Ishak (2010), to compare between turnover 
and non-turnover companies. These are the (i) selection of all companies that have not 
changed the CEOs and (ii) taking a sub-sample of the companies that have not changed 
their CEOs based on certain criteria that matched with the turnover companies, such as, 
size of the assets, year, and industry.  
However, due to the peculiarities of the sample of this study, the matching companies 
were selected based on asset size using a 50 percent upper and lower limit, which is 
consistent with previous researchers like Md Taib (1996) and Ishak (2010).  It was not 
possible to select the matching companies based on industry because some of the 
industries had turnovers in virtually all the companies, for example, the Oil and Gas, 
Consumer Goods, and Conglomerates industries. As such, no company or very few 
companies were left in the category of non-turnover companies for a particular industry 
for the purpose of matching, therefore, the selection of matching companies was based on 
the size of the firm within the range of 50 percent upper and lower of asset size. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Selection 
All of the non-financial companies listed on the NSE that had changed their CEOs from 




After the necessary screening, 72 CEO turnover companies were identified to be included 
in the analysis. Subsequently, the same number of companies that had not changed their 
CEOs were matched with those of the CEO turnovers to arrive a at total of 144 as the final 
sample for the study. Thus, the sample was classified into three main groups which are, 
turnover, no turnover and full samples. As indicated in panel A of Table 4.2, the selection 
of the matching companies from the non-turnover companies that matched the turnover 
companies based on year was 100 percent. Table 4.2 also revealed that there were more 
turnovers in the years 2011 and 2015 with sixteen changes in each of the years. This 
implied that, the review in the code of corporate governance in Nigeria in the year 2011 













(n = 72) 
NO TURNOVER 
(n = 72) 
FULL SAMPLE 
(n = 144) 
PANEL A  Year:       
  2011 16 16 32 
  2012 14 14 28 
  2013 11 11 22 
  2014 15 15 30 
  2015 16 16 32 
PANEL B Sector:    
  Agriculture 2 3 5 
  Conglomerates 5 5 10 
  Construction/ Real Estate 5 4 9 
  Consumer Goods 22 9 31 
  Healthcare 6 4 10 
  Information & Communication Technology 0 10 10 
  Industrial Goods 16 9 25 
  Natural Resources 3 1 4 
  Oil and Gas 9 8 17 
  Services 4 19 23 
PANEL C Performance:    
  High performance (+ ROA) 53 63 116 
  Low performance (- ROA) 19 9 28 
 Tobin’s Q (Above 1.00) 49 35 84 
 Tobin’s Q (Below 1.00) 23 37 60 
PANEL D Ownership Structure:    
  Blockholders 66 72 138 
  Foreign  46 38 84 
  Managerial 65 65 130 
  CEO Ownership 17 45 62 
PANEL E Firm Characteristics:    
  Firm Size (Above > 49.13 million naira) 22 15 37 
  Firm Size (Below < 49.13 million naira) 50 57 107 
  Firm Diversity (> 2 segments) 39 29 68 
  Firm Diversity (1business segment) 33 43 76 
  Leverage (> average 0.69) 28 22 50 
  Leverage (< average 0.69) 44 50 94 
  Firm Age (> average 40 years) 40 36 76 




In Panel B of Table 4.2, the matching based on industry was not 100 percent similar 
because, in some sectors like conglomerates and Oil & Gas, virtually, all the firms in these 
sectors changed their CEOs, hence, no companies were left within the sector for matching 
purposes. For example, nine out of the ten companies in the Oil and Gas sector 
representing 90% of the firms in the industry had changed their CEOs, the same applied 
to the Conglomerates sector, where five out of the six companies representing 83% had 
turnovers. There was also an industry that had not experienced any changes in their CEOs 
all through the period of the study, for instance the Information and Communication 
Technology industry. The lack of turnover in the Information and Communication 
Technology could have been due to the complex, highly technical and innovative nature 
of the industry and, also, the companies within this industry were essentially young and 
evolving. These scenarios as highlighted coupled with the difficulties in matching the 
companies’ sizes, made it impossible to achieve a 100 percent identical matching of the 
companies.  
Furthermore, both the Consumer Goods and Industrial Goods sectors had the highest rate 
of CEO turnover. the Consumer Goods had 22 incidences of turnover out of 28 firms, this 
figure represented 79% of the companies in the sector. Similarly, Industrial Goods had 16 
cases out of a total of 24 firms in the sector, representing 67% of the companies. These 
high rates of turnover in these sectors (Consumer Goods and Industrial Goods) may have 
been due to the availability of CEO candidates to easily replace the ousted CEOs in the 
event of poor performance. In addition, the homogeneous nature of the companies in these 




competent replacement might not have been difficult owing to the homogeneity of the 
companies. 
With regards to performance, Panel C of Table 4.2 depicted that the majority of the firms 
were healthy in terms of performance, with 81 percent or 116 of the sample companies 
having a positive ROA for the period of the study. The majority of these firms were from 
the non-turnover companies constituting 54% while number of firms that had changed 
their CEOs were 53 out of 116 which was equivalent to 46% of the total companies. 
However, comparing the turnovers to the non-turnover samples, it revealed that 19 out of 
28 representing 68% of the firms with a negative ROA were from the turnover companies. 
This result implied that poor firm performance led to the CEO turnover. This finding is 
consistent with the established empirical findings of previous researchers like (Conyon & 
He, 2014; Ishak, 2010). For the market-based performance, the majority of the firms had 
high Tobin’s Q with 84 constituting 58% of the full sample and 58% of the turnover 
sample having high Tobin’s Q whilst 42% of the non-turnover companies had high 
Tobin’s Q. 
As for the ownership structure, Panel D of Table 4.2 revealed that 138 companies were 
categorised as blockholders with 66 and 72 for turnover and non-turnover companies, 
respectively. Only six companies from the turnover companies were non-blockholders. 
Similarly, a total of 84 companies have foreign ownership with 46 of them representing 
55 percent belonging to the turnover companies. This result implied that the companies 
with foreign ownership were more inclined to change their CEOs. For the managerial 




category of the turnover and the non-turnover companies having 65. Only 11 firms had no 
managerial ownership.  On the other hand,62 firms out of the sample companies had CEO 
ownership, while 45 of this representing 73% belonged to matching companies from the 
no turnover sample, only a paltry 17 representing 27 percent were from the turnover 
companies. This result suggests that, firms in which the CEOs had ownership in the shares 
of the companies were less likely to replace their CEOs. This may have been due to the 
fact that shares ownership conferred some degree of power and control over the CEOs and 
thereby made them entrenched in the management of the companies and, therefore, they 
were not susceptible to dismissal in the event of poor performance. 
Panel E of Table 4.2 displayed the control variables of the study which were about the 
firm characteristics of the sample. Table 4.2 revealed that the majority of the turnover 
companies had large sizes as 22 out of the total of 37 firms from the turnover companies 
were above the average size. Furthermore, 39 out of 68 representing 57.35% of the total 
samples had more than two segments of business, while the companies that were highly 
leveraged tended to replace their CEOs as indicated in Table 4.2. Out of 50 highly 
leveraged companies from the full sample, 28 of them representing 56% are from the 
turnover companies. Similarly, the majority of the companies that had changed their CEOs 
were regarded as old companies having an average age of 40 years, with 53% from the 
turnover companies representing 40 out of 76, for the full sample.   
4.5 Univariate Analysis 
Different types of univariate tests were conducted, and the continuous measures like the 




the descriptive features and characteristics of the sample. In addition, the differences in 
the means for the turnover and matching companies (no turnover) sample were conducted 
using the match paired t-test for the assumption of normal distribution, while the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was conducted to test the sensitivity of the results for the non-parametric 
which did not require assumption of normality. Subsequently, the logistic regression was 
conducted for all the independent variables separately.  
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics; for the fourteen independent variables were 
considered in this study. Two alternative proxies were used for corporate performance, 
the ROA for the accounting-based performance and Tobin’s Q for the market-based 
performance. The mean for the ROA for the full sample was 0.027 and that of the 
matching companies was 0.049, both were higher than that of the turnover firms which 
was very low at 0.004. However, there was no significant difference between the medians 
of all the categories. The mean of Tobin’s Q for the turnover firms was 2.230 which was 
21% and 41% higher than the mean for the full sample and the matching firms 
respectively. The minimum value of the ROA for the full sample was -0.933 and 0.388 
was the maximum value of the ROA. As for Tobin’s Q the minimum and maximum value 
were 0.022 and 47.953 respectively for the full sample.  
The mean of the board size for all the categories of the firms was nine members on the 
board. The maximum number of members was seventeen while the minimum number of 
members on the board was four. This result is consistent with the finding of Sanda et al. 
(2010), which reported an optimal board size of ten and is similar to that of the Malaysian 




percentages of the non-executive directors on the board for all the categories of the firms. 
The minimum percentage for the board composition was 13% and the maximum was 93%. 
For the full sample the percentage was 73%, for the turnover sample the percentage was 
72% while for the matching sample it was74%. This finding implies that more than half 
of the board members for all the samples were made up of non-executive directors 
(outside) and that the firms in Nigeria had complied with the regulation of the SEC codes 
that requires that one third of the board members should be composed of outside directors. 
Meanwhile, the mean of board members’ gender was 10.8%, the minimum was 0% and 
the maximum was 80% for the full sample, while for the turnover companies it was 8.3% 
and for the matching firms it was a bit higher at 13.4%. Overall, this result indicates a low 
representation of female directors on the board, in fact, some firms did not even have any 
female on their boards as the minimum score was zero percent indicating no female 
director on the board. Similarly, the mean of board members’ religiosity was 20.2%, and 
the minimum was 0%  for the turnover sample, it was 21.3% with the minimum of 0% 
and the maximum of 80% for the full sample while that of the matching firms was 22.4%. 
this result shows that the proportion of Muslim directors on the corporate boards of 
Nigerian listed public companies was low and there were some firms that did not even 
have any Muslim on the board as the minimum score indicated zero.  
There was no difference in the mean of blockholder ownership in all the categories of the 
sample. For the full sample, the mean was 54.8%, minimum 0%, and maximum 98% while 
the turnover and the matching companies had averages of 54.9% and 54.6% respectively. 




than that of matching firms at 23.9% and the full sample was 27’% and the minimum and 
maximum were 0% and 91% respectively. This result suggests that firms with foreign 
shareholders were more likely to change their CEOs. As for managerial ownership, the 
minimum and maximum were 0% and 85% for the full sample. There was no much 
difference in the means of the turnover sample at 10.9%, full sample at 11.9% and 12.9% 
for the matching companies. However, there was a significant difference between the 
means of CEO ownership for the turnover and matching firms. The CEOs in the turnover 
sample held fewer shares (1%) compared to their counterparts in the matching firms which 
was 9.3% while the minimum and maximum were 0% and 64% respectively. This result 
shows that CEOs who owned less shares in the companies were more susceptible to be 
removed while those that owned more shares in the firm were not likely to be changed or 
replaced. This was because they had acquired power through their shares ownership which 
enabled them to influence the decisions of the board, especially as it related to issues of 
turnover. 
The mean for the firm size was higher in the turnover firms than the matching companies, 
this implies that the majority of the turnover firms were large-sized companies. Similarly, 
for the ratio of total debt to total assets, the minimum was 2% and the maximum was 
134%. The mean was 80% for turnover sample while that of the matching sample was 
lower at 58% and 69% for the full sample. The result indicates that, the firms were more 
likely to change their CEOs when the firm’s debt burden and obligations were high. There 
was no difference in the firm age for all the categories of the samples as the minimum age 




of the firms was 40 years. A comparison between the turnover sample and the matching 
sample using both the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed that, only 
the accountings-based performance (ROA) had a significant difference as the p-value of 
the mean was significant at 1%. This was because, Nigeria being a developing market, 
only the accounting-based performance was informative to the shareholders and was being 




*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level 
ROA = Return on Asset, TOBINSQ = Tobin’s Q, BSIZE = Board size, BCOMP = Board composition, BGNDR = Board member’s Gender,  
BRLGN = Board member’s Religiosity, BHOWN = Blockholder ownership, FROWN = Foreign ownership, MGOWN = Managerial ownership, 
CEOPWR = CEO Power, FSIZE = Firm size, LFSIZE = Log of firm size, LEVRGE = Firm leverage, FAGE = Firm age. 












Variables Full sample (N= 144 Companies) 
CEO Turnover 
Companies (N=72) 
Matching Companies (N 
=72)  CEO Turnover vs Matched Companies 
                        Paired t-test 
Wilcoxon signed 
rank test 
  Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
Dev Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev t-test p-value z-test p-value 
ROA 0.027 0.038 -0.933 0.388 0.127 0.004 0.035 0.151 0.049 0.041 0.094 2.162 0.016** 1.648 0.099* 
TOBINSQ 1.769 1.076 0.022 47.953 4.075 2.230 1.156 5.638 1.307 0.990 1.110 -1.362 0.912 -2.122 0.034** 
BSIZE 8.701 9.000 4.000 17.000 2.421 8.778 9.000 2.369 8.625 8.000 2.486 -0.378 0.647 -0.540 0.589 
BCOMP 0.733 0.789 0.125 0.933 0.174 0.724 0.800 0.200 0.741 0.778 0.144 0.596 0.276 -0.308 0.758 
BGNDR 0.108 0.100 0.000 0.800 0.131 0.083 0.038 0.100 0.134 0.111 0.153 2.361 0.010*** 2.262 0.024** 
BRLGN 0.213 0.167 0.000 0.800 0.192 0.202 0.143 0.190 0.224 0.174 0.195 0.693 0.245 1.096 0.273 
BHOWN 54.781 59.795 0.000 98.250 24.718 54.946 58.820 26.283 54.617 60.000 23.232 -0.080 0.532 -0.416 0.678 
FROWN 27.364 14.055 0.000 91.360 29.306 30.808 23.870 29.631 23.920 9.705 28.771 -1.415 0.920 -1.331 0.183 
MGOWN 11.945 1.755 0.000 85.000 19.633 10.916 0.930 19.192 12.975 2.590 20.146 0.628 0.266 1.497 0.134 
CEOPWR 5.180 0.000 0.000 63.600 13.081 1.020 0.000 4.232 9.341 0.120 17.077 4.013 0.000*** 5.101 0.000*** 
FSIZE 
(million) 49.100 11.400 0.094 1,110 123 70.1 3.700 164 28.100 8.803 50.700 -2.072 0.980 -1.594 0.111 
LFSIZE  16..297 16.246   11.450 20.828   1.754 16.537   16.429 1.881   16.057 15.991  1.594  -1.652 0.950 -1.594 0.111 
LEVRGE 0.688 0.573 0.022 13.451 1.103 0.797 0.609 1.533 0.580 0.542 0.275 -1.181 0.880 -1.520 0.128 




Furthermore, comparing the medians of the two measures of performance; the return on 
assets and Tobin’s Q, the Wilcoxon test indicated significant difference at 10% and 5% 
respectively. As for the board structure variables, there was no significant difference in 
board size, board composition, and board member religiosity for both the turnover and 
matching firms. Only board member gender displayed a significant difference as both the 
paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test were significant at 1% and 5% level 
respectively. Similarly, blockholder ownership, foreign ownership and managerial 
ownership revealed no significant difference in both the turnover and matching firms. 
However, CEO ownership showed significant differences in the mean and median of the 
two categories, because both the paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test had their p-
values significant at the one percent level. For the control variables; firm size, firm 
diversity, leverage and firm age, there were no significant differences in the means or the 
medians in both the turnover and matching firms. That was because in the Nigerian 
corporate landscape, the turnover companies and non-turnover companies exhibited 
similar features as the control variables in both instances and had the same influences on 
the CEO turnover. 
Lastly, the logistic regression was conducted individually for all the independent variables 
to ascertain whether the independent variables had any influence on the dependent 
variable (CEO turnover). The results as displayed in Table 4.4 connote that the corporate 
performance measured by the ROA was negatively significant at the 5% level. This result 




change their CEOs increased. In other words, declining or poor corporate performance led 
to the CEO turnover.  
Likewise, board members’ gender was negatively significant at the 5% level, indicating 
that firms with more females on their board were less likely to change or remove their 
CEOs as the performance of the firms was expected to be good owing to the effective 
monitoring and accountability brought into the firms by the female directors.  Similarly, 
CEO ownership had a significant negative influence on the CEO turnover, suggesting that 
when CEOs owned shares in the companies, they were not likely to be removed in the 
events of poor performance.  
For the control variables, only firm diversification showed a significant relationship with 
CEO turnover. The positive sign explained that the firms with multiple segments tended 
to change their CEOs. The rest of the variables were not significant, but all the significant 
variables had the same direction as with the predicted sign. Therefore, the subsequent 


















95% C.I for 
expected  
Lower Upper 
ROA  - -3.610 1.783 -2.020 0.043** -7.104 -0.116 
TOBINSQ  - 0.190 0.148 1.280 0.201 -0.101 0.480 
BSIZE  - 0.026 0.069 0.380 0.704 -0.109 0.162 
BCOMP  + -0.580 0.969 -0.600 0.550 -2.478 1.319 
BGNDR  - -3.418 1.537 -2.220 0.026** -6.430 -0.407 
BRLGN  + -0.608 0.875 -0.700 0.487 -2.322 1.106 
BHOWN  + 0.001 0.007 0.080 0.936 -0.013 0.014 
FROWN  + 0.008 0.006 1.410 0.159 -0.003 0.019 
MGOWN  - -0.005 0.009 -0.630 0.529 -0.022 0.011 
CEOPWR  - -0.087 0.031 -2.840 0.005*** -0.147 -0.027 
LFSIZE   0.160 0.098 1.630 0.103 -0.032 0.352 
LEVRGE   0.563 0.627 0.900 0.369 -0.665 1.792 
DVRSTY   0.561 0.337 1.660 0.096* -0.100 1.222 
FAGE   0.002 0.008 0.190 0.853 -0.015 0.018 
  *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level 
4.6 Multivariate Analysis 
This section presents the multivariate analysis used in this study to determine the 
relationships that existed between corporate performance, board structure, ownership 
structure, and the CEO turnover as well as the moderating effect of CEO power. It 
discusses the reports of the correlation analysis, test for multicollinearity, and logistic 
regression analysis. 
4.6.1 Correlation Analysis 
The Pearson product-moment correlation was adopted in this study to investigate the 
relationships between the variables, this is consistent with the suggestions of Pallant 




contained in this study. In line with the guidelines on interpretation by Pallant (2007), 
which suggests that a correlation above +/-0.50 was strong, +/-0.30 to +/-0.49 meant a 
moderate relation and +/-0.10 to +/-0.29 indicated a weak relationship. Table 4.5 presents 
the correlation results for all the variables of this study. The results were based on the full 
sample of 144 companies consisting of 72 companies for each of the turnover sample and 
the matching sample respectively. It covered all the listed non- financial public companies 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange between 2011 to 2015.  
As displayed in Table 4.5, the correlation coefficient between leverage and Tobin’s Q was 
0.934, and the relationship was statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 
This was indicative of a very strong correlation which could lead to multicollinearity 
because it was more than the 90% threshold suggested by the scholars. To solve this 
problem, respecification of the variable, which is one of the remedies of multicollinearity 
was adopted as suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003). Thus, the log of 
Tobin’s Q was obtained which was, subsequently, used to obtain the correlation value of 
0.47. This was followed by the correlation between leverage and the return on assets. As 
reflected in Table 4.5, the coefficient of the correlation between these variables was -0.67, 
and the relationship was negatively and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance. This implies that a strong correlation existed between these two variables. 
Similarly, Tobin’s Q was negatively correlated with the ROA, the correlation coefficient 
was -0.55 and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. This means that there 




As for the level of association between foreign ownership and blockholder ownership, a 
moderate correlation of 0.45 was observed, which was statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance. The correlation coefficient between CEO power and CEO turnover 
was moderate and statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.32 at the 1% level of 
significance. This means that CEO power was negatively correlated with CEO turnover. 
Moreover, a moderately significant correlation existed between firm size and board size. 
The correlation coefficient was 0.40 which was also discovered to be statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. In the same vein, firm diversity was mildly 
correlated with firm size with a correlation coefficient of 0.31 and was statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. Firm age had a moderate correlation with 
foreign ownership with a coefficient of 0.35 and was statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance. While with CEO power, firm age exhibited a moderate but negative 
correlation of -0.31 and was statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.  
However, some of the variables were found to be weakly correlated as their values ranged 
between +/-0.20 to +/-0.28. For instance, the value of board members’ religiosity and 
board member’s gender was 0.23; CEO power and foreign ownership was 0.26; firm size 
with return on asset was 0.25; firm size with Tobin’s Q was -0.20; firm size with board 
composition, and board members’ religiosity were 0.30 and 0.25 respectively. Similarly, 
firm size is weakly correlated with foreign ownership, managerial ownership and CEO 
power at 0.24, -0.28 and -0.24 respectively. While firm leverage had 0.22 correlation 
coefficient with firm size. All these weakly correlated relationships were statistically 




The dependent variable, CEO turnover was negatively correlated with the accounting 
performance as the coefficient of the correlation of the ROA was -0.18 and was 
statistically significant at 10%. Although, it was weakly correlated, this relationship 
implies that a decrease in the accounting performance of the firms increased the 
probability of CEO turnover. This is consistent with the previous studies like Conyon and 
He (2012); Fatima, Goergen and Mira (2013); and Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012). 
Similarly, board member gender was negatively correlated with CEO turnover and the 
correlation coefficient was -0.19 significant at the 5% level.  This result suggests that a 
decrease in the number of female directors on the board increased the probability of CEO 
turnover. This situation might have been due to the declining of the firm performance due 
to the low presence of females on the board, because female directors are associated with 
good and efficient performance.  
Furthermore, CEO power was moderately correlated with CEO turnover. The correlation 
coefficient was -0.32 with the 1% significance level. This negative correlation between 
CEO power and turnover connotes that the CEO turnover decreased with an increase in 
the share ownership by the CEOs. In other words, the greater the share ownership in the 
firm by the CEOs, the less the likelihood of changing the CEOs. However, firm diversity 
had a positive correlation with CEO turnover. The correlation coefficient was 0.14 and 
was significant at the 10% level. This result indicates that firms with two or more business 
segments were more proned to dismiss their CEOs.  This could have been due to the 
complexities in managing the operations of the firms and the burden of meeting the diverse 






           Variables TURNOVER ROA TOBINSQ BSIZE BCOMP BGNDR BRLGN BHOWN FROWN MGOWN CEOPWR LFSIZE DVRSTY LEVRGE FAGE 
                
CEOTURNOVER 1.000               
ROA -0.179* 1.000              
TOBINSQ 0.114 -0.553*** 1.000             
BSIZE 0.032 0.000 -0.028 1.000            
BCOMP -0.050 -0.039 -0.086 0.054 1.000           
BGNDR -0.194** 0.117 -0.066 0.119 -0.033 1.000          
BRLGN -0.058 0.103 -0.147* 0.070 0.105 0.229*** 1.000         
BHOWN 0.007 0.039 0.037 0.071 -0.043 0.048 0.004 1.000        
FROWN 0.118 0.091 0.020 0.166** -0.010 0.083 0.016 0.452*** 1.000       
MGOWN -0.053 -0.047 -0.061 -0.121 0.083 0.046 -0.121 0.148* -0.153* 1.000      
CEOPWR -0.319*** -0.024 -0.056 -0.035 0.065 -0.025 -0.137 0.002 -0.255*** 0.067 1.000     
LFSIZE 0.137 0.247*** -0.200** 0.400*** -0.298*** 0.124 0.253*** 0.075 0.243*** -0.279*** -0.240*** 1.000    
DVRSTY 0.139* 0.102 -0.042 -0.039 -0.186** 0.029 -0.104 0.152 0.203 -0.155 -0.040 0.307*** 1.000   
LEVRGE 0.099 -0.668*** 0.934*** -0.027 -0.047 -0.092 -0.092 -0.010 -0.012 -0.064 -0.066 -0.224*** -0.051 1.000  
FAGE 0.016 0.125 -0.028 -0.028 0.080 0.041 -0.024 -0.031 0.345*** -0.197** -0.305*** 0.074 0.089 -0.017 1.000 




4.6.2 Multicollinearity Test 
The collinearity diagnostic test was conducted to determine the existence of 
intercorrelation between the independent variables. Multicollinearity is deemed to exist if 
the tolerance level is less than 0.01 and the variance inflation factor is greater than 10 
(Pallant, 2007). Table 4.6 shows that there was no multicollinearity existing among the 
variables in this study, as all the tolerance values were respectively greater than 0.01 and 
the VIF was less than 10. Tobin’s Q which has a very high VIF was remedied by 
respecification of the variable in line with the suggestion of Cohen et al. (2003). 
Consequently, the VIF for the new Tobin’s Q dropped from 8.45 to 1.79. 
Table 4.6: 
Multicollinearity Test: Tolerance Value and VIF 





ROA 0.520 1.920 
TOBINSQ 0.118 8.450 
LTOBINSQ 0.560 1.790 
BSIZE 0.733 1.360 
BCOMP 0.796 1.260 
BGNDR 0.905 1.100 
BRLGN 0.791 1.260 
BHOWN 0.702 1.430 
FROWN 0.593 1.690 
MGOWN 0.797 1.260 
CEOPWR 0.799 1.250 
LFSIZE 0.495 2.020 
LEVRGE 0.513 1.950 
DVRSTY 0.797 1.250 






4.6.3 Corporate Performance and CEO Turnover 
The study measured corporate performance using both the accounting and market-based 
performances. The accounting measure was proxied by the ROA, while market measure 
was proxied by Tobin’s Q. This study hypothesised that poor corporate performance 
results in CEO turnover. Thus, it was expected that a significant negative relationship 
would exist between CEO turnover and firm performance. The result from the finding as 
indicated in Table 4.7 shows that firm performance proxied by the ROA was statistically 
and negatively associated with CEO turnover at the 5% level of significance. This finding 
indicates that the threat of turnover due to deficient performance is credible and that firm 
performance is normally used as a yardstick to measure the quality and success of the 
management. Hence, poor performance causes CEO turnover. When a CEO is performing 
poorly, the board dismisses the poorly performing CEO in line with the assumption of the 
agency theory which suggests that the threat of dismissal makes the CEOs align their 
interests with those of the shareholders. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
previous researchers like Rachpradit et al. (2012), Dikoli (2012) and Conyon and He 
(2012), which revealed that the likelihood of CEO turnover increases as the firm 
performance declines or decreases.  
Furthermore, the study revealed that the accounting-based performance (ROA) was 
significant when compared to the market-based (Tobin’s Q) as displayed. This is 
supported by the previous empirical findings by Ishak and Abdul Latif (2013); Choi 
(2015) and Cook (2015) which reported negative relationship between corporate 




market-based performance because of its demerits, such as, the discount in stock price and 
illiquidity of the stock market, especially, the developing markets like Nigeria.  Therefore, 
the finding of this study supported the hypothesis that, firms are more likely to change 
their CEOs in the event of poor performance. The CEOs are targeted for removal or 
dismissal because of the inference of the shareholders that the CEOs are not capable of 
creating wealth for the shareholders or improving the prospects and fortunes of the firms. 
Furthermore, accounting based performance such as return on assets (ROA) surpass 
market-based performance by revealing more information about the management’s 
actions than what Tobin’s Q alone does (Conyon & He, 2012). In addition, stock prices 
set in emerging markets may contain incomplete or inaccurate information about the top 
management’s performance (Lel & Miller, 2015; Rachpradit et al., 2012). Besides that, 
we cannot control the variable as market-based performance is measured based on the 
external environment. In view of the evidence, this study has stuck with the accounting-
based performance (ROA) in the subsequent discussions on the board structure and 






Logistic Regression (Direct Model) 
CEO Turnover="1" Predicted sign Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
Z Statistic p- value 
ROA - -4.946 2.315 -2.14 0.033** 
BSIZE + -0.009 0.090 -0.1 0.924 
BCOMP + 0.335 1.169 0.29 0.774 
BGNDR - -3.826 1.883 -2.03 0.042** 
BRLGN + -0.893 1.119 -0.8 0.425 
BHOWN + -0.005 0.009 -0.61 0.544 
FROWN + 0.007 0.008 0.83 0.408 
MGOWN - 0.001 0.011 0.13 0.897 
CEOPWR - -0.094 0.036 -2.61 0.009*** 
LFSIZE   0.156 0.150 1.04 0.298 
LEVRGE   0.528 0.437 1.21 0.227 
DVRSTY   -0.114 0.424 -0.27 0.788 
FAGE   -0.013 0.011 -1.14 0.253 
Constant -1.234 2.684 -0.46 0.646 
Chi-square   37.34*** (df=13)   
Pseudo R2    0.1871    
McFadden's R2   0.187    
Hosmer-Lemeshow   8.4    
Correctly classified: Overall  68.75%     
       *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level.  
 
Below in Table 4.7b is the result of the regression for the market-based performance 
(Tobin’s Q, the alternate proxy for the corporate performance considered in this study. 

























TOBINSQ  - 0.171 0.169 1.020 0.309 
BSIZE - 0.003 0.089 0.040 0.97 
BCOMP + 0.479 1.174 0.410 0.683 
BGNDR - -3.969 1.812 -2.190 0.028** 
BRLGN + -0.783 1.110 -0.710 0.48 
BHOWN + -0.008 0.009 -0.880 0.377 
FROWN + 0.006 0.008 0.750 0.455 
MGOWN - 0.003 0.010 0.290 0.768 
CEOPWR - -0.091 0.035 -2.580 0.010*** 
LFSIZE  0.120 0.149 1.040 0.298 
LEVRGE  0.173 0.738 0.230 0.815 
DVRSTY  0.482 0.425 1.130 0.257 
Constant  -0.016 0.011 -1.430 0.153 
Chi-square   33.21*** (df=13) 
Pseudo R2                     0.1663  
McFadden's R2                  0.166  
Hosmer-Lemeshow               9.7  
Correctly classified: Overall  65.97%   
    *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level.  
4.6.4 Board Structure and CEO Turnover 
Corporate boards play important roles in the decisions pertaining to the turnover of the 
CEOs. Jenter and Kanaan (2008) indicate that the decision to retain or dismiss a CEO after 
bad stock price or accounting performance is one of the most important decisions made 
by corporate boards. Therefore, the board needs well-disposed and properly motivated 
directors to be effective. How well and effective the board of directors perform these vital 
functions greatly determines the quality and effectiveness of the board in its corporate 




However, Baysinger and Butler (2014) argued that the economic theory and company 
laws across the countries have not paid adequate attention to the issues concerning the 
size, composition in terms of ratio of insiders to outsiders, independent to non-independent 
directors, number and functions of committees or other board attributes even among 
similar corporations. Thus, this study has expected to find that the decisions to hire and 
fire a CEO are influenced by the numerous characteristics and attributes of the board such 
as size, composition, gender and religiosity 
4.6.4.1 Board Size and CEO Turnover 
The study hypothesised that, firms with a larger board size are more likely to replace their 
CEOs. However, the study did not support the postulation that a larger board size increases 
the probability of the CEO turnover. Although, the coefficient of board size was negative, 
it was not significant. Hence, a larger board size was not influential in determining the 
CEO turnover in the Nigerian firms. This finding from Nigeria gives credence to the 
popular conventional wisdom in corporate governance literature that smaller boards are 
better boards (Rachpradit et al., 2012). This finding also agrees with the argument of Cook 
(2015) and Bekiris (2013) that a smaller board size enhances the ability of the board to 
monitor the CEO, hence, it is more likely to change the CEO. Moreover, a large board 
size has an adverse effect on the quality of the monitoring of the board (Dimopoulos & 
Wagner, 2012). Furthermore, the negative and insignificant coefficient could have been 
because, the Nigerian corporate landscape is characterized by essentially large board size 
as the mean of the board size as presented in Table 4.3 was nine and the maximum board 




structure as reported by Ishak (2010) and 10 in China as documented by Conyon and He 
(2012). This large board size as in the case of Nigerian corporate landscape has les to the 
free-rider effect which has weakened the effectiveness of the board. 
4.6.4.2 Board Composition and CEO Turnover 
Hypothesis 3a postulates that there would be a positively significant relationship between 
the proportion of outside directors on the board and CEO turnover. Prior empirical 
findings like Dmopoulos and Wagner (2012) reported that companies with a higher 
proportion of outsiders on the board have a higher probability of CEO turnover than 
companies with insider dominated board. They argued that, outside directors’ diversity, 
knowledge, and expertise enable them to offer more effective monitoring of CEOs’ 
activities, thus, they are more likely to dismiss the underperforming CEOs.  
However, this study found an insignificant relationship between board composition and 
the likelihood of CEO turnover, although the coefficient as shown in Table 4.7 was 
positive. Therefore, this result indicates that a higher proportion of non-executive (outside 
director) on the board had no influence in the dismissal of a poorly performing CEO. 
Although, the finding did not support the hypothesis; it is consistent with that of 
Rachpradit et al. (2012) and Hsu and Wu (2014) that the sensitivity of CEO turnover is 
higher with board with fewer outside directors, this is due to the problem of free-riders 
associated with outsider dominated boards. Similarly, Sanda et al. (2010) found no 
significant relationship between the two variables in the Nigerian PLCs. This opposite 
situation in the Nigerian corporate landscape may have been due to the CEO or 




members incapable of exercising the monitoring required of them. Moreover, the CEOs 
had both direct and indirect influences on the appointment and renewal of the contracts of 
the board members, this also made them to compromise their independence (Sanda et al., 
2010), hence, they were unable to discipline the CEOs in the events of poor performance. 
4.6.4.3 Board Members’ Gender Diversity and CEO Turnover 
As anticipated, board members gender diversity showed a negative significant relationship 
with CEO turnover. The result of the regression shows that board members’ gender 
diversity was significant at the 5% level with a negative coefficient, indicating that the 
more female directors on the board of a firm the less the probability of CEO turnover. 
This finding supported the hypothesis which states that firms with a high proportion of 
female board members are less likely to replace their CEOs. The result of this study is in 
conformity and consistent with the previous empirical findings reported by researchers 
like Dezso and Ross (2012), Alves et al. (2015) and Adams et al. (2015) that, gender 
diversity enhances the effectiveness of the board of directors and adds value to the 
company. It equally improves the performance of the firm (Ku Ismail & Abdul Manaf, 
2016) which, in turn, reduces the probability of dismissing the CEO because, there will 
be no need for turnover as the firm’s performance is good and enhanced. 
4.6.4.4 Board Members’ Religiosity and CEO Turnover  
Hypothesis 5a predicts a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of 
the Muslims on the board of directors of the company and CEO turnover. From the result 




hypothesis was not supported. Therefore, board religiosity does not play a significant role 
in the decision to change or replace the CEO. This is contrary to the findings of previous 
empirical studies by Grallon et al. (2009); Volonte (2015) and Kim and Daniel (2016) 
that, religions have strong influence on corporate governance practices and that the 
corporate governance mechanisms of firms are determined by the religious group the 
board of directors adopt. Although, the result did not support the hypothesis, which is 
surprising, a probable reason might have been because, from the result of the descriptive 
statistics in Table 4.3, the means of the Muslim proportion on the board was 20 percent, 
which when compared to the population of the non-Muslims at 80%, it was considered 
small and may not have had any impact on the decision made by the board.  
4.6.5 Ownership Structure and CEO Turnover 
Ownership structure is another important determinant of CEO turnover (Liu, Wang, Zhao 
& Ahlstorm, 2013), as different classes of ownership structure could exhibit different 
impact on the CEO turnover. There are different categories of ownership structure in the 
corporate landscape, such as blockholder ownership, CEO ownership, foreign ownership, 
and managerial ownership. The basic argument in the study of CEO turnover is that 
regardless of the size and nature of the economy, each of the aforementioned categories 





4.6.5.1 Blockholder Ownership and CEO Turnover. 
This study predicted a positive significant relationship between blockholder ownership 
and CEO turnover. It suggests that the more the blockholder ownership in a firm, the more 
the likelihood of CEO turnover. However, the result of the regression shows that the 
coefficient of blockholder ownership was negative and the p-value was not significant as 
shown in Table 4.7 It implies that blockholder ownership has no influence on the CEO 
turnover. This result is similar to the individual univariate regression as displayed in Table 
4.4. In addition, the test of significance difference also revealed that there was no 
significant difference between the companies that replaced their CEOs and the companies 
that did not replace their CEOs. This finding is contrary to Agrawal and Nasser (2012), 
Acero and Alcalde (2014) and Bates et al (2015). They argued that blockholder ownership 
increased the independence of the board which, in turn, enhanced the monitoring 
effectiveness of the firm thereby leading to high CEO turnover probability. The possible 
reason for the contrary result could have been due to the fact that most of the sample 
companies had concentrated ownership structure by blockholders and foreign ownership.  
4.6.5.2 Foreign Ownership and CEO Turnover 
Hypothesis 7a proposes that foreign ownership enhances the effective monitoring of the 
CEO by the board and is inclined to replace the CEO in the event of declining 
performance. Thus, the study hypothesised that there would be a positive significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and CEO turnover. However, the hypothesis was 
not supported as the p-value of foreign ownership from Table 4.7 was not significant even 




play any significant role in the dismissal of CEOs. This result contradicts the previous 
position of other scholars like Boive et al. (2016) who reported that foreign ownership 
strengthens board independence which, in turn, improves the monitoring ability of the 
firms thereby increasing the CEO turnover sensitivity. However, the finding can be 
aligned with the position of a previous empirical study on sub-Saharan African countries 
by Munisi, Hermes and Randoy (2014) that, foreign ownership is negatively related to 
board size, suggesting that firms with foreign ownership are characterised with small 
board sizes which enhances the effectiveness of the board in monitoring and hence, 
increases the performance which, in turn, lowers the probability of CEO turnover. This 
finding is similar to Ezeoha and Okafor (2013) which explain that foreign ownership 
brings about a better corporate governance and modern management practices to the firms 
and improves the performance and, thereby, reduces the probability of CEO dismissal. 
4.6.5.3 Managerial Ownership and CEO Turnover 
The hypothesis on managerial ownership to CEO turnover proposes that a higher level of 
managerial ownership leads to CEO entrenchment and weakens the monitoring and 
disciplinary controls of the board, hence lowering the likelihood of CEO turnover. Thus, 
the study predicted a negative association between managerial ownership and CEO 
turnover. However, the result of the regression did not support the hypothesis. This finding 
contrasts with the previous empirical studies reported by Hornstein (2013) that, the higher 
the level of managerial ownership in a firm, the lower the probability of CEO turnover. A 
similar finding was documented by Ruan and Tian (2011) that, at a higher level of 




the events of poor performance. The difference in the outcome of this study with the 
previous studies might have been due to the low proportion of managerial ownership in 
the Nigerian corporate market which is dominated by a high concentration of blockholders 
and foreign ownership (Sanda et al., 2010; Tsegba et al., 2014). 
4.6.6 The Moderating Role of CEO Power on Corporate Performance, Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms, and CEO Turnover 
Prior researchers found that granting CEOs stakes in the form of shares ownership in the 
companies ensured goal congruence and the alignment of their interests with those of the 
owners of the firm. This action lowers the agency costs and leads to better performance 
and less disciplinary action against the CEO. Hence, this study hypothesised that there 
would be a negative and significant relationship between CEO ownership and CEO 
turnover. That means, the higher the CEO ownership in a firm the lower the probability 
of CEO replacement. The finding of this study supported the hypothesis as the regression 
result in Table 4.7 showed that CEO power had a negative coefficient and significance at 
the 1 percent level. This finding is consistent with the previous studies like Ronghui and 
Hailin (2016) who documented a negative relationship between CEO ownership and CEO 
succession. This is also the same position of Xie (2014) and Coates and Kraakman (2010), 
indicating that CEO ownership leads to CEO entrenchment which makes it difficult for 




4.6.6.1 CEO Power, Corporate Performance and CEO Turnover 
As a sequel to the argument canvassed in chapter three which predicted that CEO power 
moderates the relationship between corporate performance and CEO turnover, the logistic 
regression results as presented in Table 4.8 were expected to align with the proposed 
hypothesis. The result as displayed in Table 4.7 for the direct model for the relationship 
between corporate performance and CEO turnover revealed a negative relationship 
significant at the 5% level. With the introduction of CEO power as a moderator in the 
interacted model presented in Table 4.9, the result changed. The firm performance became 
insignificant even though the coefficient remained negative.  This result shows a 
significant moderating influence of the CEO power on the significant negative 
relationship between the corporate performance and CEO turnover. This implies that CEO 
power neutralised the influence of firm performance on CEO turnover in the Nigerian 
Plcs.  
This finding agrees with the argument that CEOs acquire power and control through 
shares ownership. This ownership confers on them some degree of influence over the 
boards which makes the CEOs entrenched in the companies, thereby reducing the 
probability of disciplinary action against them by way of dismissal. Therefore, CEO power 
leads to entrenchment which reduces the probability of turnover due to declining 
performance.  This is consistent with the empirical findings by researchers like Xie (2014) 
and Coates and Kraakman (2010) that CEO ownership leads to CEO entrenchment which 




4.6.6.2 CEO Power, Board Size, and CEO Turnover 
            The study has proposed that firms with large board size are more likely to change their 
CEOs. The result in the direct model shown in Table 4.7 revealed an insignificant 
relationship between larger board size and CEO turnover. However, when the CEO power 
measured by CEO ownership was used to moderate the relationship between board size 
and CEO turnover as contained in Table 4.8, the relationship became significant with the 
coefficient of the p-value at the 10% significance level. This finding shows a significant 
moderating role of CEO power on the relationship between board size and CEO turnover. 
This means that CEO power in a firm with a large board size reduces the probability of 
CEO turnover. In other words, in a firm with a large board size where the CEO owns 
shares in the equity, the CEO is not likely to be removed or replaced because the share 
ownership confers some power on the CEO which makes him entrenched and thus, 
interferes with the decision of the board to remove or change him. This result is in line 
with the opinion of Dimopoulos and Wagner (2012) that a large board size has an adverse 
effect on the quality of monitoring by the boards.  
In addition, this finding suggests that CEO power leads to CEO entrenchment which 
makes it difficult for the board or limits the board’s decision to replace the CEO for 
underperforming (Xie, 2014).  Similarly, for firms with larger board size and CEO 
ownership the probability of CEO turnover would be low, this is consistent with the 
finding of Ronghui and Hailin (2016) that documented a negatively significant 




4.6.6.3 CEO Power, Board Composition, and CEO Turnover 
The result in Table 4.7 of the direct relationship between board composition and CEO 
turnover reveals an insignificant positive relationship. However, with the introduction of 
CEO power as a moderator in the interacted model as displayed in Table 4.8, the result 
became positively significant at the 5% level. The finding shows a significant moderating 
role of CEO power on the positive relationship between board composition and CEO 
turnover. This result implies that the more the proportion of outside directors on the board 
of the firm where CEOs own shares, the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover. This 
finding supported the hypothesis. This result is consistent with the finding of Firth, Fung 
and Rui (2007) that turnover to performance sensitivity was higher with a larger 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board. This is also like the finding reported 
by Rachpradit et al. (2012) who focused on non-financial firms in Thailand, that the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance was higher with a lower degree of board 
independence. This is probably because, CEO power weakens the independence of outside 
directors, since the CEOs get involved directly or indirectly in the appointment and 
renewal of contracts of the outside directors (Sanda et al., 2010).   
4.6.6.4 CEO Power, Board Members’ Gender Diversity, and CEO Turnover 
The direct model in Table 4.7 revealed a negatively significant relationship between board 
members’ gender diversity and CEO power with the p-value significant at 5%. With the 
introduction of CEO power as a moderating variable as highlighted in Table 4.8, the result 
remained the same.  The finding indicates a significant moderating influence of CEO 




turnover. Thus, the result suggests that the more the proportion of female directors on the 
board of the firm, where the CEO owns shares in the equity of the firm, the lower the 
probability of CEO turnover. This means that, the more female directors on the board, the 
better the performance of the firm, even when the CEO has a stake in the ownership of 
the firm and the less likely it is for the CEO to be replaced. 
This is consistent with the findings of the previous researchers like Nguyen et al. (2014) 
and Adams, Nowland and Grey (2011) that female directors have superior monitoring 
abilities, enhanced managerial accountability and CEO responsibilities. Therefore, CEO 
power does not necessarily lead to CEO entrenchment in the presence of female directors. 
Similar findings were also reported by Alves et al. (2015) that, a more gender diversified 
board enhances the boards’ efficiency and independence, which limits CEO entrancement. 
Hence, a more gender diversified board enhances performance and efficient monitoring, 
as such, it is less likely to replace the CEO because the performance is good, and the 











Logistic Regression (Moderated Model) 
Turnover="1" Predicted sign Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
z-score p- value 
ROA - -6.150 2.772 -2.22 0.027** 
BSIZE + 0.090 0.105 0.85 0.394 
BCOMP + -0.746 1.339 -0.56 0.577 
BGNDR + -2.776 1.972 -1.41 0.159 
BRLGN - -0.513 1.215 -0.42 0.673 
BHOWN + -0.009 0.010 -0.87 0.384 
FROWN + 0.001 0.009 0.1 0.917 
MGOWN - -0.007 0.013 -0.52 0.602 
CEOPWR   3.696 3.448 1.07 0.284 
CEOROA   -5.012 3.592 -1.4 0.163 
CEOBSIZE   -0.789 0.445 -1.77 0.076* 
CEOBCOMP   8.616 3.865 2.23 0.026** 
CEOBGNDR   -17.458 9.070 -1.92 0.054* 
CEOBRLGN   -1.965 1.919 -1.02 0.306 
CEOBHOWN   -0.143 0.069 -2.06 0.040** 
CEOFROWN   0.083 0.048 1.73 0.084* 
CEOMGOWN   0.081 0.049 1.66 0.096* 
LFSIZE   0.018 0.171 0.11 0.915 
LEVRGE   0.792 0.508 1.56 0.119 
DVRSTY   -0.282 0.454 -0.62 0.535 
FAGE   -0.021 0.013 -1.65 0.099* 
Constant 1.815 3.051 0.59 0.552 
Chi-square   61.1***(df=21)   
Pseudo R2    0.3061    
McFadden's R2   0.306    
Hosmer-Lemeshow   6.62    
Correctly classified: Overall  72.92%     
      *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level  
 
4.6.6.5 CEO Power, Board Members’ Religiosity, and CEO Turnover 
From the model of the direct relationship between board members’ religiosity and CEO 




introduction of CEO power as a moderator in the interacted model as shown in Table 4.8, 
the result did not change. This finding shows an insignificant moderating role of CEO 
power on the negative relationship between board members’ religiosity and CEO turnover. 
This means that the CEO power’s role did not improve the relationship between board 
members’ religiosity and CEO turnover in the Nigerian PLCs. The result indicates that, 
the proportion of Muslim board members, where a CEO is part of the ownership of the 
firm has no role in the decision to replace or dismiss the CEO. This finding did not support 
the hypothesis. This contrary finding could have been due to the low percentage of  
Muslim members on the board as indicated in the descriptive statistics in Table 4.6, as 
only 20% of the board members were Muslim. This number was too meager and 
insignificant for them to make any meaningful impact in the decision to replace the CEOs 
in the event of poor firm performance.  
4.6.6.6 CEO Power, Blockholder Ownership, and CEO Turnover 
The result of the direct model as shown in Table 4,7 revealed an insignificant negative 
relation between blockholder ownership and CEO turnover. However, with the 
introduction of CEO power as a moderator in the model reflected in Table 4.8, the result 
became significant with the p-value at the 5% significance level. This finding shows a 
significant influence of the moderating role of CEO power on the relationship between 
blockholder ownership and CEO turnover. This finding is inconsistent with the previous 
empirical results reported by Agrawal and Nasser (2012), Bates et al. (2015), Dimopoulos 
and Wagner (2012), and Kaplan and Minton (2006), that the more blockholder ownership 




coefficient after introducing CEO power as the moderator suggests that the ownership of 
shares by the CEOs weakens the role of blockholders and entrenches the CEOs which 
reduces the likelihood of turnover due to the CEO power’s impact on the decisions of the 
board on CEO dismissal.   
4.6.6.7 CEO Power, Foreign Ownership, and CEO Turnover 
            The direct relationship between foreign ownership and CEO turnover as indicated in Table 
4.7 was revealed to be an insignificant positive relationship. However, as CEO power was 
introduced to the model as a moderator, the relationship became positively significant with 
the p-value significance at the 10% level as displayed in the logistic regression result in 
Table 4.8. This result implied that the more the percentage of the foreign ownership in a 
firm where CEOs have stakes in the shares, the more the likelihood of CEO turnover. This 
result shows that CEO power moderated the relationship between foreign ownership and 
CEO turnover in the Nigerian corporate market. Thus, it conformed with the findings of 
Tsegba et al. (2014) and He et al. (2014) that foreign ownership dominated firms are more 
effective in monitoring and upholding better corporate governance practices, hence the 
board is inclined to remove a poorly performing CEO. This is also consistent with Bovie 
et al. (2016) who reported that foreign ownership strengthens board independence which, 
in turn, improves the monitoring ability of the board and thereby increases the probability 




4.6.6.8 CEO Power, Managerial Ownership, and CEO Turnover  
            The result in Table 4.7 on the direct relationship between managerial ownership and CEO 
turnover was insignificant, nevertheless, as CEO power was introduced into the model as 
a moderator as displayed in Table 4.8, the result become positively significant at 10%. 
This means that CEO power weakened the relationship between managerial ownership 
and CEO turnover. This finding implied that, the higher the percentage of managerial 
ownership in the firm where CEOs have gained power through shares ownership, the 
lower the probability of the CEOs being replaced or dismissed. Shares ownership by the 
CEOs leads to entrenchment and gives significant power to the CEOs to interfere with the 
decisions of the board which inhibits turnover decision. The hypothesis has been 
supported by the result and the finding is consistent with the previous empirical findings 
of other researchers like Hornstein (2013) and Ruan and Tian (2011) who reported that 
with a high level of managerial ownership, the CEOs become entrenched and it weakens 
the monitoring and disciplinary controls of the board, hence, they are not likely to be 
replaced.    
4.7 Sensitivity Test for CEO Turnover 
This section examines the robustness of the model using alternative measures for some 
key independent variables like board composition; board member gender, board member 
religiosity, and CEO power to test whether the reported results were sensitive to the 
measures used. Table 4.9 presents the results of the additional sensitivity test for CEO 
turnover for both the direct and moderated models. For some board structure variables, 




alternative proxies were used. The sensitivity test was performed by using the actual 
number of non-executive directors on the board for the board composition, for board 
gender, it was the actual number of female directors on the board, while board religiosity 
was thebactual number of Muslim directors on the board. Meanwhile, for the CEO power, 
a dummy was used as the proxy for CEO ownership. That is “1” where the CEO owned 
shares in the firm and “0” if no shares were owned.  
The result of the old proxy was placed above, highlighted and italicised while the new 
proxy was placed below and not highlighted as presented in Table 4.9.  In both models 
the accounting-based performance (ROA) was used as the performance indicator. While 
in the old model, the ROA had a negative coefficient significant at the 5% level, for the 
additional sensitivity test, the performance indicator (ROA) was insignificant, though the 
coefficient maintained the negative sign. The result displayed in Table 4.9 revealed that 
the coefficient of the ROA was reduced from -.4.946 in the old model to -3.447 in the 
alternative model. This result using the alternative proxy model showed that, unlike in the 
old model, performance had no significant influence in the decision to replace or dismiss 
an underperforming CEO. The results indicated in Table 4.7 confirm the explanatory 
power of the model of this study. For the board attribute variables, the direct number was 
used instead of the proportion used in the old model. As shown in Table 4.9, there were 
no changes in either the directions or the significance levels of the coefficients of the 
variables. The difference in measurement of the independent variables did not change the 
relationship with the dependent variable. All the variables maintained their relationship in 





Result of CEO turnover Using Alternative Measurements 
 Alternative Proxies Below & Italicized. 
 
For the moderated model, the alternative model did not yield any significant results except 














ROA - -4.946 2.315 -2.14 0.033** 
  ROA - -3.447 2.443 -1.410 0.158 
Board Structure BCOMP + 0.335 1.169 0.29 0.774 
  BCOMP + 0.010 0.117 0.09 0.931 
  BGNDR - -3.826 1.883 -2.03 0.042** 
  BGNDR - -0.414 0.197 -2.11 0.035** 
  BRLGN - -0.893 1.119 -0.8 0.425 
  BRLGN - -0.003 0.128 -0.02 0.983 
Ownership 
Structure 
CEOPWR - -0.094 0.036 -2.61 0.009*** 
  CEOPWR - -2.203 0.501 -4.40 0.000 
MODERATED 
MODEL            
  CEOROA - -5.012 3.592 -1.400 0.163 
  CEOROA - -2.438 2.702 -0.900 0.367 
  CEOBSIZE + -0.789 0.445 -1.770 0.076* 
  CEOBSIZE + -0.325 0.197 -1.650 0.100 
  CEOBCOMP + 8.616 3.865 2.230 0.026** 
  CEOBCOMP + 7.067 4.730 1.490 0.135 
  CEOBGNDR - -17.458 9.070 -1.920 0.054* 
  CEOBGNDR - -12.628 8.625 -1.460 0.143 
  CEOBRLGN - -1.965 1.919 -1.020 0.306 
  CEOBRLGN - -1.818 2.420 -0.750 0.452 
  CEOBHOWN + -0.143 0.069 -2.060 0.040** 
  CEOBHOWN + -0.082 0.057 -1.430 0.152 
  CEOFROWN + 0.083 0.048 1.730 0.084* 
  CEOFROWN + 0.052 0.031 1.670 0.094* 
  CEOMGOWN - 0.081 0.049 1.660 0.096* 




level of 10% like the old proxy. In conclusion, using the alternative proxies in the various 
models showed little changes in the level of significance for some variables, however, it 
did not affect the major conclusion based on the original models. Hence, the model 
adopted was robust and appropriate for this study. 
4.8 Summary of the Results of the Hypotheses for the CEO Turnover 
A total of seventeen hypotheses were tested for this study. A summary of the results as 
exhibited in Table 4.10 revealed that nine out of the seventeen hypotheses were discovered 
to have significant impacts in this study.  The rest of the hypotheses were not supported.  
Table 4.10: 
Result of the Tested Hypotheses 
  
  Variables 
Predicted 
Sign Finding (Direction) 
  Corporate Performance     
H1  ROA - Supported (-) 
  Board Structure    
H2  Board Size + Not Supported (+) 
H3  Board Composition          + Not Supported (+) 
H4 Board Member Gender - Supported (-) 
H5 Board Member Religiosity + Not Supported (+) 
  Ownership Structure    
H6 Blockholder Ownership + Not Supported (+) 
H7 Foreign Ownership + Not Supported (+) 
H8 Managerial Ownership - Not Supported (-) 
H9 CEO Ownership (CEO Power)  Supported  
H10 CEO power moderate ROA   Not Moderated 
H11 CEO power moderates Board Size    Moderated 
H12 CEO power moderates Board composition    Moderated 
H13 CEO power moderates Board gender    Moderated 
H14 CEO power moderates Board Religiosity    Not Moderated  
H15 CEO power moderates Blockholders ownership   Moderated 
H16 CEO power moderates Foreign Ownership Size    Moderated 




4.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter contained the results of the empirical investigation of the factors that 
influenced the CEO turnover in the Nigerian non-financial PLCs. This study used a 
matched-pair dataset of 144 companies for a period of five years (2011 to 2015), using the 
logistic regression to estimate the model. The main findings of this chapter were related 
to firm performance, board attributes, ownership structure, and the moderating role of 
CEO power. The result showed that the accounting-based performance indicator proxied 
by the ROA was a significant determinant of CEO turnover, while the market-based 
performance, proxied by Tobin’s Q was not significant in the CEO turnover decisions. 
The findings on board structure revealed that only board member gender diversity was 
significant, thus, the appointment of female directors on the board of the companies would 
influence the decision to change the CEOs. Other board attributes variables were not 
significant in the direct model. Similarly, findings on ownership structure showed that 
only CEO power measured by CEO shares ownership was significant in the decisions to 
dismiss the poorly performing CEOs.  The result indicated that in firms where the CEOs 
own shares in the equity, the CEOs would be less likely to be removed.  
Meanwhile, with the introduction of CEO power as a moderator, the relationship between 
these variables were strengthened, as such, they exhibited strong influences on the CEO 
turnover decisions. For example, board size, board composition, and board gender were 
all significant when interacting with the CEO power. This means that, in a firm where the 
CEO owns shares the smaller the board size the higher the likelihood of CEO turnover. In 




ownership, and a high proportion of non-executive directors in the board composition. 
While there would be less likelihood of turnover in firms with female directors if the CEOs 
were part of the shareholders. 
           In addition, in a blockholder controlled firm with CEO ownership, the probability of 
turnover is low. On the contrary, foreign ownership-controlled firms are more likely to 
change their CEOs if the CEOs own shares in the companies. Similarly, if the CEOs have 
shares in the firms that have high managerial ownership, the likelihood of turnover will 
be high.  In sum, the findings of this study shades light on the factors that influence 




CHAPTER FIVE   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON CEO SELECTION CHOICE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the study with regards to the factors that 
influence the selection choice of the CEOs following a turnover in the Nigerian PLCs. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the descriptive characteristics of 
the sample. Section 5.3 discusses the univariate analyses of the study. Section 5.4 presents 
the multivariate analysis and the logistic regression results with regards to the factors that 
determine whether a successor is selected from outside or inside the firm. While Section 
5.5 reports the additional sensitivity test relating to the CEO selection model. Section 5.6 
discusses the summary of the hypotheses tested in this study. Finally, Section 5.7 
summarises the findings of the CEO selection choice.   
5.2 Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample 
Based on the data from the turnover companies as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
second stage of this study has examined the influence of corporate performance and 
corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) on the 
selection of a successor following the occurrence of a turnover, that is whether an outside 
or inside successor will be selected to replace the ousted or incumbent CEO. As discussed 
in chapter three, an inside successor is one who is promoted from within the ranks of a 
firm while an outside successor is one who is appointed from an outside organisation. The 
re-designation of other directors’ positions to either CEO or MD is also termed as inside 




segment of this study. Thus, the sample was categorised into three categories, namely; the 
full sample, outside selection and inside selection. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive 
characteristics of the CEO selection on the basis of year, sector, performance, ownership 
structure and company attributes (size, leverage, diversification and age). 
As shown in Table 5.1, out of the total of 72 CEO turnovers that occurred within the period 
of this study, 37 cases representing 51%, selected outside successors while 35 equivalents 
to 49%, of the cases selected inside successors. This result implies that for the CEO 
turnover events that took place in the Nigerian corporate environment, they were replaced 
with approximately equal numbers of internal and external successors. That is, there was 
not much difference in the number of the new CEOs appointed from inside or outside the 
firms. Panel A of Table 5.1 reveals that the companies preferred inside successors in the 
years 2011 and 2013 as the percentages of the inside selections were 68.75% and 63.64% 
respectively. While in the years 2012, 2014, and 2015 the firms preferred outside 
successors as replacements for the changed CEOs. This might have been due to the need 
by the boards to turn around the fortunes of the firms which is consistent with the adaptive 
view that firms prefer outsider successors who are not a part of the old strategies that have 
affected the firms’ performances. In addition, the Nigerian corporate environment was 
characterised with poor corporate performance leading to the CEO succession. This fact 
is reflected in the percentage of the outside selection in these years, 2012 (64.29%), 2014 
(60%), and 2015, (62.505%), accordingly.  
According to the classification by sectors as reflected in panel B, the majority of the 




consumer goods sectors which preferred outsiders as 62.5% and 68% of the CEO 
selections came from outside the firms. This may have been due to the homogeneous 
nature of the firms and the spread of the firms within these sectors. In addition, most of 
the firms within these sectors were usually large in size, hence they had more access to 
vital human resources from the external environment. The classification based on 
performance as depicted in panel C of Table 5.1, shows that 27 out of 53, representing 
51%, of the companies with positive performances selected outsiders as replacements 
while 49% selected insider replacements. Meanwhile, 53% of the firms with low 
performance (negative ROA) selected outside CEOs. This result suggests that the firms 
with poor performances were inclined to select outside CEOs which is consistent with the 
adaptive view of CEO selection that, outside succession will attract investors ‘attention 
which could increase firms’ future performances.  
Panel D of Table 5.1 shows that outside succession was most preferred in the blockholder 
controlled companies. From a total of 66 successions in the blockholder dominated firms, 
35 representing 51%, came from outside the companies. Similarly, from 46 successions 
in foreign ownership-controlled firms, 25firms representing 54% selected their successors 
from external sources. Managerial ownership-controlled firms also showed a similar result 
as 33 out of 65 which was 51% of the successions came from outside sources. However, 
firms with more CEO ownership were more inclined to select inside successors. As 
presented in Table 5.1, 11 out 17 successions which represented 65% selected their 
successor CEOs from the internal source (within the firm). This may have been because 




decisions, and thereby influenced the selection of insiders to continue with the policy and 
strategy designed by the old CEOs.  
Firms with two and above business segments tended to select outside successors as 
compared to those with just one line of business. As revealed in Table 5.1 panel E, out of 
the total of 39 companies with multiple business segments, 24 of them representing 62% 
selected their CEOs from external sources. This may have been due to the less 
complexities in the nature of the operations of the firms thereby making it relatively easy 
to get adequate readily available capable hands, therefore, more competent candidates 
were hired from outside the firms as successors. Meanwhile, the majority of those firms 
that had a single business segment preferred inside successors. As indicated in panel E, 
20 out of 33 firms with a single business segment selected insider as replacements for their 
CEOs, this fraction represented 61% of all the companies that operated a single business 
segment. This was so because, the firms with a single business segment were more 
complex and difficult to manage, hence, the firms relied on insiders as capable 
replacements from within their firms. In addition, due to the monotonous nature of the 
operations, the insiders were believed to be more familiar with the operations of the firms 
which placed them at more advantage than the outsider counterparts, hence, more insiders 
were selected as replacements. 
 Furthermore, highly leveraged firms were more inclined to selected insiders as 
successors, nine out of 15 representing 60% select insiders as their CEOs. This may have 
been due to the poor financial position of the firms as a result of high indebtedness which 




While low leveraged firms would have attracted more of the outside CEOs as 31 cases out 
of 57 cases of the CEO turnovers selected outside successors. This is because external 
candidates are more attracted to a firm that is not threatened by a debt burden and 













PANEL A Year:       
  2011 5 11 16 
  2012 9 5 14 
  2013 4 7 11 
  2014 9 6 15 
  2015 10 6 16 
PANEL B Sector:    
  Agriculture 1 1 2 
  Conglomerates 2 3 5 
  Construction/ Real Estate 2 3 5 
  Consumer Goods 15 7 22 
  Healthcare 2 4 6 
  Industrial Goods 10 6 16 
  Natural Resources 2 1 3 
  Oil and Gas 2 7 9 
  Services 1 3 4 
PANEL C Performance:    
  High Performance (+ ROA) 27 26 53 
  Low Performance (- ROA) 10 9 19 
PANEL D Ownership Structure:   
 
  Blockholders 35 31 66 
  Non-Blockholders 2 4 6 
  Foreign  25 21 46 
  Non- Foreign 12 14 26 
  Managerial 33 32 65 
  Non- Managerial 4 3 7 
  CEO Ownership 6 11 17 
PANEL E Firm Characteristics:   
 
  Firm Diversity (more than 2 segments) 24 15 39 
  Firm Diversity (one business segment) 13 20 33 
  Leverage (Above average > 80%) 6 9 15 
  Leverage (Below average < 80%) 31 26 57 
  Firm Age (Above average > 40 years) 17 21 38 





Meanwhile, the older firms tended to select insiders as their successors as 21 out of 38 
cases selected inside successors. This may have been because the older firms have 
established succession plan and strategy, hence, the internal candidates get promoted to 
the position of CEOs. On the other hand, younger firms were more disposed to select 
outside successors. As shown in panel E, 20 cases out 34 which was equivalent to 59% 
selected outside successors. This could be as a result of the fact that younger firms are 
more opened to creativity and innovations and, as such, are more inclined to hiring from 
the external sources, candidates with competitive knowledge that can measure up with the 
current tides and dynamics.   
5.3 Univariate Analysis 
Four distinct types of univariate tests were carried out in this study. Firstly, continuous 
measures like the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation were 
analysed to highlight the descriptive characteristics of the sample. Secondly, the 
differences in the means for the outside selection and inside selection companies were 
conducted using the t-test for the assumption of normal distribution, thirdly, the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was conducted to test the sensitivity of the results for the non-parametric 
test which did not require assumption of normality. Fourthly, the logistic regression for 
each of the independent variables was run separately. Table 5.2 shows the descriptive 
statistics; fifteen independent variables were considered in this study. Two alternative 
proxies were used for firm performance, the ROA for the accounting-based performance 
and Tobin’s Q for the market-based performance. The mean for the ROA for the full 




of the insider firms which was at 0.006. All the means of the ROA for all the categories 
had positive value, indicating that on average all the sample firms had healthy financial 
statuses. Moreover, the Wilcoxon signed rank test showed a significant difference 
between the medians of the outsider selection and the insider selection. The mean of 
Tobin’s Q for the full sample was 2.230 while for the outside selection firms was 2.920 
which was higher than mean for the insider selection firms at 1.500.  
The mean of the board size for all the full sample and outside selection firms was nine 
members on the board, while that of insider selection firms is eight. The maximum number 
of members was seventeen while the minimum number of members on the board was five. 
This result is consistent with that of the Malaysian firms of eight reported by Ishak (2010).  
There was no marked difference between the percentages of the non-executive directors 
on the board for all the categories of the firms. For the full sample the percentage of the 
board composition was 72%, the outside selection sample the percentage was 70% while 
for the insider selection firms it was 75%. This finding implies that more than half of the 
board members for all the samples were made up of non-executive directors (outside) and 
that the firms in Nigeria had complied with the regulation of the SEC codes that requires 
that one third of the board members should be made up of outside directors. 
Meanwhile, there was no significance difference between the percentages of the board 
nominating committee independence for all the categories of the firms. For the full sample 
the percentage of the board nominating committee independence was 67%, for the outside 
selection sample the percentage was 68% while for the insider succession it was 66%. 




independent nominating committee to oversee the issues of CEO succession in the 
respective firm.  As for the mean of the board members’ gender was 8% for the full 
sample, while the external selection companies was 11% and for the inside firms was a 
bit lower at 6%. Overall, this result indicated a low representation of female directors on 
the board, in fact, some firms did not even have any female on their boards as the minimum 
score was zero percent indicating no female director on the board. Nevertheless, the result 
reveals that, the firms with more female board members were more disposed to select their 
CEOs from the external sources. Similarly, the mean of the board member religiosity was 
20.2% for the outsider sample, 21.3% for the full sample while that of the inside selection 
firms was 22.4%. This result shows that the proportion of Muslim directors on the 
corporate boards of the Nigerian listed public companies was very low and there were 
some firms that did not even have any Muslim on the board as the minimum score 
indicated zero.  
There was a significant difference in the means of blockholder ownership in all the 
categories of the samples. For the full sample, the mean was 55%, while the outside 
selection and insider successor companies were 60% and 50% respectively. The mean of 
foreign ownership was 34% for the outsider successor companies which was higher than 
that of insider firms at 28% and the full sample which was at 31’%. This result suggests 
that the firms with blockholder ownership and foreign shareholders were likely to select 






Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
Variables Full sample (N= 72 Companies) 
Outside Selection (N= 
37) 
Inside Selection (N = 
35)  Outside vs Inside Selection 
                Paired t-test 
Wilcoxon signed rank 
test 
  Mean 
Media










Dev t-test p-value z-test p-value 
ROA 0.004 0.035 -0.933 0.207 0.151 0.002 0.048 0.195 0.006 0.022 0.086 0.105 0.458 -1.707 0.088* 
TOBINSQ 2.230 1.156 0.022 47.953 5.638 2.920 1.182 7.773 1.500 1.074 1.156 -1.069 0.856 -0.839 0.401 
BSIZE 8.778 9.000 5.000 17.000 2.369 9.270 9.000 2.446 8.257 8.000 2.201 -1.844 0.965 -1.639 0.101 
BCOMP 0.724 0.800 0.125 0.929 0.200 0.700 0.800 0.254 0.749 0.778 0.117 1.038 0.151 -0.525 0.600 
BNCID 0.669 0.750 0.000 1.000 0.398 0.683 0.800 0.410 0.655 0.750 0.391 -0.297 0.617 -0.561 0.575 
BGNDR 0.083 0.038 0.000 0.333 0.100 0.109 0.100 0.109 0.055 0.000 0.082 -2.353 0.989 -2.069 0.039** 
BRLGN 0.202 0.143 0.000 0.667 0.190 0.178 0.111 0.186 0.227 0.200 0.194 1.090 0.140 1.533 0.125 
BHOWN 54.946 58.820 0.000 94.890 26.283 59.693 61.720 24.805 49.928 55.400 27.215 -1.593 0.942 -1.572 0.116 
FROWN 30.808 23.870 0.000 87.950 29.631 33.632 43.000 29.484 27.822 18.060 29.918 -0.830 0.795 -0.814 0.416 
MGOWN 11.749 1.335 0.000 74.700 19.998 8.779 0.450 18.795 14.890 4.420 21.008 1.302 0.099* 1.601 0.109 
CEOPWR 1.020 0.000 0.000 29.090 4.232 0.352 0.000 2.124 1.726 0.000 5.624 1.386 0.085* 1.824 0.068* 
FSIZE 
(million) 70.100 13.700 0.094 1110.000 164.000 94.500 28.400 208.000 44.400 10.500 95.700 -1.299 0.901 -1.482 0.139 
LFSIZE 16.537 16.429 11.450 20.828 1.881 16.869 17.163 1.918 16.187 16.169 1.802 -1.552 0.937 -1.482 0.139 
LEVRGE 0.797 0.609 0.022 13.451 1.533 0.541 0.537 2.135 0.543 0.701 0.235 -0.619 0.731 2.648 0.008*** 
FAGE 40.208 42.500 5.000 91.000 18.826 36.432 39.000 17.471 44.200 44.000 19.621 1.776 0.040* 1.465 0.143 





As for managerial ownership, the means of the full sample was 12%, for the outsider 
selection sample it was 9%, and 15% for the insider succession companies. This result 
indicates that the firms dominated with managerial ownership were inclined to select 
insiders as replacements, this could have been due to the desire of the management to 
retain their control over the firms and protect their interests by selecting from amongst 
themselves. However, there was a significant difference between the means of the CEO 
ownership for the outsider succession and insider succession firms. CEOs in the outside 
selection sample held very small shares, 0.04% compared to their counterparts in the 
insider firms which was 2%. This result shows that the firms with more managerial 
ownership and those with their CEOs owning shares in the companies were more disposed 
to selecting internal candidates as their CEOs in order to perpetuate their control over the 
firm and preserve their collective interests.  
The mean for the firm size was higher in the outside successor firms than in the insider 
succession companies, this implies that the majority of the firms that selected outsiders as 
their CEOs were large size companies. Similarly, for leverage which is the ratio of total 
debt to total asset, the mean was 80% for the full sample, while that of the outsider 
selection sample and insider succession was 54% each. The result indicates that all the 
firms that selected either outsiders or insiders as successors had high debt burden and 
obligation. This was because, in the Nigerian business environment most firms rely on 
debts due to an inadequacy of funds and insufficient internal sources of funds to finance 
their operations.  For the firm age, the mean age for the companies that selected external 




that the older firms favoured the selection of insider successors. This might have been 
because the older the firm, the more established their succession plan and strategy, as such 
candidates from within the firms are trained and groomed to ascend to the position of the 
CEOs.  
A comparison between the outside selection sample and the inside selection sample using 
both the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed that, none of proxies of 
the performance measures has a significant difference as the p-value of the mean was not 
significant for either measurement. Furthermore, comparing the medians of the two 
measures of performance; the return on assets and Tobin’s Q, the Wilcoxon test indicated 
a significant difference at the 10% level for only the ROA. As for the board structure 
variables, there was no significant difference in board size, board composition, board 
nominating committee independence or board member religiosity for either the outsider 
sample or the insider firms. Only board member gender displayed a significant difference 
as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was significant at the 5% level.  
Similarly, blockholder ownership and foreign ownership revealed no significant 
difference in either the outside selection sample or the inside selection firms. However, 
managerial ownership exhibited a significant difference in the median between the 
external selection and the internal selection companies. This was reflected in the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test result which shows a p-value significant at the 10%. Meanwhile, CEO 
ownership showed a significant difference in the mean and median of the two categories, 
because both the paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test had their p-values significant 




in the means and medians in both the outsider and the insider firms. While in the case of 
firm leverage, it showed a significant difference in the median between the outsider 
selection and insider selection companies. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed a p-
value at the 1% significance level. As for the firm age, there was   a significant difference 
in the mean for both categories as the paired t-test has a p-value significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, the logistic regression was run individually for all the independent variables. The 
essence of this test was to determine whether the independent variables had influence on 
the dependent variable (CEO selection).  The results as projected in Table 5.3 revealed 
that the board size was positively associated with the outsider selection and was 
statistically significant at the 10%. This result implies that firms with large board size 
selected their successor CEOs from the external candidates. Likewise, the board members’ 
gender was positively significant at the 5% level, indicating that firms with more females 
on its board were more likely to appoint their CEOs from the outsiders. This could have 
been due to the fact that the performance of the firms would be good owing to the effective 
monitoring and accountability brought into the firms by the female directors and as such, 
the external candidates were attracted to the firms. For the control variables, only the firm 
age showed a significant relationship with the CEO selection. The negative coefficient 
explained that in Nigeria younger firms tended to select outsiders as their CEOs. This 
might have been because the younger the firm the less established their succession plan 
and strategy would have been, as such candidates from within the firms would not have 




rest of the variables were not significant; however, all the significant variables had the 
same direction as with the predicted sign.   
 
Table 5.3: 











95% C.I for expected  
Lower Upper 
ROA - -0.168 1.579 -0.110 0.915 -3.263 2.928 
TOBINSQ - 0.102 0.142 0.720 0.473 -0.177 0.381 
BSIZE + 0.195 0.109 1.780 0.075* -0.020 0.409 
BCOMP + -1.284 1.246 -1.030 0.303 -3.727 1.159 
BNCID + 0.180 0.596 0.300 0.763 -0.989 1.348 
BGNDR + 5.916 2.669 2.220 0.027** 0.686 11.147 
BRLGN - -1.385 1.274 -1.090 0.277 -3.882 1.111 
BHOWN + 0.015 0.009 1.560 0.118 -0.004 0.033 
FROWN + 0.007 0.008 0.840 0.404 -0.009 0.023 
MGOWN - -0.016 0.013 -1.280 0.202 -0.041 0.009 
CEOPWR  -0.110 0.095 -1.160 0.246 -0.297 0.076 
LFSIZE   0.202 0.132 1.520 0.128 -0.058 0.461 
LEVRGE   0.115 0.199 0.580 0.564 -0.275 0.504 
DVRSTY   -0.009 0.473 -0.020 0.984 -0.937 0.918 
FAGE   -0.023 0.013 -1.730 0.084* -0.049 0.003 
 ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level 
 
In summary, the results of the univariate tests offer evidences consistent with the proposed 
hypotheses of the study, specifically for board size, board member gender, and firm age. 
Although, for the ownership structure variables and some board structure variables, the 
univariate results showed mixed findings. Thus, there was a  need to investigate further 
for the robustness of these findings, hence, the next section presents the discussions on 




5.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This section presents the multivariate analysis used in this study to determine the 
relationship that existed between corporate performance, board structure, ownership 
structure and the CEO selection. It discusses the reports of the correlation analysis, test 
for multicollinearity and logistic regression analysis. 
5.4.1 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis was carried out in this study to reveal the relationship that existed 
among the variables. Thus, Table 5.4 displays the reports of the correlation between all 
the variables contained in this study. The result was based on the 72 CEO turnover events 
for the full sample consisting of 37 companies for the outsider selection and the 35 insider 
selection firms. It covers all the listed non- financial public companies on the NSE 
between 2011 to 2015. The results of the correlation matrix have been categorised into 
three main categories, those with a correlation higher than 0.5 for a strong correlation, 
between 0.3 and 0.49 for moderately correlated while less than 0.3 was regarded as weakly 
correlated.   
As displayed in Table 5.4, only Tobin’s Q and the ROA; leverage and the ROA; and 
leverage and Tobin’s Q showed a correlation above 0.5 which were regarded as strongly 
correlated.  However, this range did not expose the model to any problem of 
multicollinearity because scholars are of the view that multicollinearity is only 
encountered when the correlation coefficient is more than 90% (Hair et al., 2014; and 
Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). There was a strong correlation between Tobin’s Q and the 




of a low ROA. This is followed by the correlation between leverage and the return on 
asset. As reflected in Table 5.4, the coefficient of the correlation between these variables 
was -0.781, and the relationship was negatively and statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance. This implies that a strong correlation existed between these two variables. 
This is followed by the correlation between leverage and Tobin’s Q, according to the result 
in Table 4.5, the correlation coefficient between these variables was 0.697, and this 
relationship was statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that the two variables 
were strongly correlated. 
However, some of the variables showed a moderate correlation as their coefficient values 
ranged between 0.300 to 0.499. For example, board nominating committee independence 
and board size was 0.378, foreign ownership with blockholder was 0.452; firm size with 
ROA, board size, board composition and board nominating committee have correlation 
coefficient as follow; 0.457, 0.384; -0.322 and 0.363 respectively, and they were all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A positive correlation of 0.452 between foreign 
ownership and blockholder ownership implies that some of the blockholders were part of 
the foreign ownership. This is because proportion of shares owned by foreigners was 
usually more than 5%.  
Likewise, the significant positive relationship between board nominating committee 
independence and board size connotes that the firms with nominating committee 
independence were normally companies with large board size. In addition, the positive 
correlation of 0.457 between firm size and the ROA means that firms that have large asset 




large board size, and adequate board nominating committee independence but a low 
proportion of outside directors in the board composition. While leverage was negatively 
correlated with firm size with a coefficient of -0.322 significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that highly indebted firms are usually small in size. This is true because their 
small asset size cannot sustain their financial obligations, so they apply for loans from 
creditors, hence increasing their indebtedness.  
Furthermore, there existed a positive correlation coefficient of 0.362 between firm 
diversity and board member gender. This implies that a more diversified firm, that is a 
firm with more than one segment of business were more likely to have more female 
directors on its boards. Similarly, firm diversity has a positive correlation with 
blockholders at 0.384; foreign ownership at 0.452 and firm size at 0.434. This suggests 
that firms with two or more business segments usually have more blockholders and 
foreign ownership and are mostly large in size. Likewise, firm age showed a positive 
correlation with foreign ownership was statistically significant at the 1% level and had a 
coefficient of 0.334. This result means that older firms have more foreign ownership 
constituting the bulk of their ownership structure.   
As regards the specific correlation of the independent variables with the dependent 
variable, only board size, board member gender diversity and firm age had significant 
correlation with the dependent variable. Board size was positively correlated with outside 
selection. The correlation coefficient was 0.271 and significant at 10%. This result implies 
that a larger firm size leads to the selection of external successors. This may be because 




linkage and access to the external resources as suggested by the resource dependence 
theory. Similarly, board member gender diversity exhibited a positive significant 
correlation with the outside selection, with a correlation coefficient of 0.271. This result 
indicates that firms with more female directors on the board are more likely to appoint 
external candidates as their CEOs. This might be due to the efficient and effective 
governance which the female directors bring on board leading to enhanced firm 
performance thereby making the firms attractive to external candidates seeking to be part 
of the firms. Meanwhile, firm age had a negative correlation with outside selection. The 
result suggests that older firms are less likely to select outsiders as their CEOs. This could 
be suggestive of the fact that older firms are more established and have dependable routine 
succession plans and policies in place which groom the internal employees to occupy the 














Pairwise Correlation (N = 72) 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 OUTSIDER 1.000               
2 ROA -0.013 1.000              
3 TOBINSQ 0.127  -0.684*** 1.000             
4 BSIZE  0.215* 0.071 -0.027 1.000            
5 BCOMP -0.123 -0.092 -0.109 0.109 1.000           
6 BNCID 0.036 0.178 -0.167  0.378*** 0.106 1.000          
7 BGNDR  0.271* 0.048 -0.089 0.213* -0.189 0.277* 1.000         
8 BRLGN -0.129 0.186 -0.157 0.177 0.078 0.186 -0.052 1.000        
9 BHOWN 0.187 0.065 -0.003 0.132 -0.148 0.072 0.024 0.080 1.000       
10 FROWN 0.099 0.076 -0.032 0.223* -0.041 0.091  0.213* -0.028 0.452*** 1.000      
11 MGOWN -0.154 -0.098 -0.114 -0.087 0.031 -0.035 -0.134 -0.124 0.090 -0.040 1.000     
12 LFSIZE 0.182 0.457***  -0.284**  0.384*** -0.332*** 0.363*** 0.297*** 0.286*** 0.270**  0.269** -0.080 -0.118 1.000   
13 LEVRGE 0.074  -0.781*** 0.697***  -0.003 -0.054 -0.185 -0.088 -0.134 -0.015 -0.032 -0.059 -0.007 -0.322*** 1.000  
14 DVRSTY -0.002 0.107 -0.073 0.043  -0.257**  0.315*** 0.362*** -0.065 0.384***  0.452*** -0.122 -0.232* 0.434*** -0.085 1.000 
15 FAGE -0.208* 0.148 -0.057 0.003 0.007 -0.042 0.149 -0.201* -0.031  0.3345* -0.075 0.005 -0.108 -0.082 0.153 
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level 
 
ROA = Return on Asset, TOBINSQ = Tobin’s Q, BSIZE = Board size, BCOMP = Board composition, BNCID = Board nominating committee 
independence, BGNDR = Board member’s Gender, BRLGN = Board member’s Religiosity, BHOWN = Blockholder ownership, FROWN = Foreign 
ownership, MGOWN = Managerial ownership,CEOPWR = CEO Power, FSIZE = Firm size, LFSIZE = Log of firm size, LEVRGE = Firm leverage, 




Some variables are weakly correlated as displayed in Table 5.4. These variables, though 
weakly correlated have significant association at 1% level. For instance, board size with 
CEO selection 0.215 positively significant at 1% level. This result implies that firms with 
large board size are inclined to select outsiders as their new CEOs. While firm age has a 
weak correlation coefficient of -0.208 with CEO selection. This indicates that older firms 
are more inclined to appoint insiders as their new CEOs. This could be because of the fact 
that older firms are more established and have succession strategies in place that enable 
them to groom their leaders internally.  
In the same vein, board member gender had a positive significant correlation of 0.271 with 
CEO selection. This result suggests that firms with more female directors on their boards 
are more likely to appoint external candidates as their new CEOs. Besides that, board 
member gender also had a significant positive correlation with board size at 0.213 and 
board nominating committee independence at 0.272 respectively. This means that firms 
with more female directors do have large board size and have more independent members 
in the nominating committee. Furthermore, foreign ownership had a weak correlation with 
board size at 0.213 and with board nominating committee independence at 0.277. These 
positive correlation coefficients imply that firms dominated by foreign ownership are 
usually of large board size and have more independent nominating committees.   
5.4.2 Test for Multicollinearity 
This section presents the results for the collinearity diagnostics conducted to determine 
the existence of intercorrelations amongst the independent variables.  According to the 




less than 0.01 and the variance inflation factor is greater than 10.  Table 5.5 revealed that 
there was no multicollinearity existing among the variables in this study. This is so 
because all the tolerance values were respectively greater than 0.01 and VIF was less than 
10.  
Table 5.5: 
Multicollinearity Test: Tolerance Value and VIF 
Variables COLLINEARITY STATISTICS 
TOLERANCE 
VALUE VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR 
ROA 0.290 3.450 
TOBINSQ 0.797 1.250 
BSIZE 0.626 1.600 
BCOMP 0.690 1.450 
BNCID 0.643 1.550 
BGNDR 0.720 1.390 
BRLGN 0.783 1.280 
BHOWN 0.629 1.590 
FROWN 0.557 1.800 
MGOWN 0.842 1.190 
LFSIZE 0.375 2.670 
LEVRGE 0.338 2.960 
DVRSTY 0.483 2.070 
FAGE 0.708 1.410 
 
5.4.3 Logistic Regression 
The dependent variable (CEO selection) was a binary variable representing the outside or 
inside selection choice. Hence, the logistic regression was adopted to examine the 
influence of the corporate performance, board structure, and ownership structure of the 
firm on the CEO selection choice. The model for the CEO selection choice as discussed 












ROA is profit before interest & tax / Book value of the total assets   
 Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of equity + debt capital / Book value 
of the total assets 
 




Proportion of non-executive members on the board  
BCOMP Board composition 
 
BNCID Proportion of non-executive members on the nominating committee  
 
BGNDR Proportion of female directors on the board  
BRLGN  Proportion of Muslim directors on the board  
BHOWN  Individuals or institutions with 5% or more interest in the company 
  
FROWN The percentage of shares directly or indirectly owned by foreigners to the total 
shares in the company 
 
MGOWN The percentage of shares directly or indirectly owned by executive directors other 
than the CEO to the total shares in the company 
 
FSIZE  Natural log of the book value of the total assets  
 
DVRSTY A firm with more than one business segment 
 
LEVRGE  Total debt / book value of the total assets 
  
FAGE Number of years of the existence of the firm 
 
Logistic regression is used to determine the effect of several independent variables both 
continuous, and categorical simultaneously, on a single categorical dependent variable. 
Table 5.6 presents the logistic regression result for the analysis of the relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables.  The model shows significant chi-




classification accuracy of the model was 73.61 percent. Meanwhile, the result of the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit for the model was 14.45 percent which was more than 
5 percent, and thus, implies that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable level.  
The McFadden's R2 was 28.7 percent indicating a considerable explanation between the 
dependent and independent variables of this study. 
 
5.4.3.1 Corporate Performance and the CEO Selection Choice 
Similar to the turnover, both accounting and market-based performance measures were 
used alternatively in the regression. For the accounting-based measure, the ROA was used 
as the proxy for corporate performance, while market-based performance was proxied by 
Tobin’s Q. This study has hypothesised that firms with poor performance select outsiders 
as their new CEOs and that there is a negative relationship between corporate performance 
and outside CEO selection. However, this study could not support the hypothesis as the 
coefficient displayed in Table 5.6 was positive and the p-value was insignificant. This 
finding is contrary to the finding reported by Bereskin and Hsu (2011)  that in the event 
of a turnover following a poor performance, the board of directors are more likely to select 
an outside CEO as a successor in order to turn the strategies around and improve the firm’s 
performance. However, this finding is consistent with the result of  Ishak et al. (2013) 
which could not find any significant relationship between performance and CEO selection 
choice in the Malaysian PLCs. This result implies that poor accounting performance may 







5.4.3.2 Board Structure and the CEO Selection Choice 
This study has considered five board structure variables that potentially influence the CEO 
selection choice. These variables as tested in this study were, board size; board 
composition, board nominating committee independence; board member gender and 
board members’ religiosity. The results of the logistic regression as shown in Table 5.6 
revealed that board size had a positive coefficient, but the p-value was not significant. 
This result did not support the hypothesis which postulated that they would be a significant 
positive relationship between board size and the selection of an outside CEO as a 
successor. This finding is contrary to the position of previous researchers that, firm with 
large board size are more likely to select their new CEOs from the external source because 
larger board size enables the board to link the firm to the external environments and benefit 
from the vital resources from the external environments (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Similarly, board composition which is the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board has been hypothesised to have a positive relationship with the CEO selection choice.  
This study has proposed that firms with more outsiders on their boards are more likely to 
select outsiders as their new CEOs. However, the result as indicated in Table 5.6 showed 
a negative coefficient and was not significant. Thus, the result did not support the 
hypothesis that had been postulated. This result means that the composition of the board 
does not influence the decision of the board on the selection of an outsider as the new 
CEO. In the same vein, this study has predicted that firms with a high proportion of 
outsiders on the board nominating committee are more likely to select outsiders as their 




hypothesis. Hence, board nominating committee independence was immaterial in 
determining the selection of outside CEOs. This might have been due to the few members 
of the committee and the presence of the CEO on the committee, inhibiting its effective 
functioning in the Nigerian corporate environment. This result is surprisingly contrary to 
the argument advanced by Masulis (2015) that for firms with a functional nominating 
committee in place and dominated by outsider board members, external candidates are 
easily recruited as replacements.  
 Table 5.6: 
Logistic Regression for CEO selection 











ROA - 1.895 3.573 0.53 0.596 
BSIZE + 0.252 0.192 1.31 0.191 
BCOMP + -0.052 2.093 -0.50 0.615 
BNCID + -0.244 0.922 -0.26 0.792 
BGNDR + 11.449 4.570 2.51 0.012*** 
BRLGN - -4.964 2.050 -2.42 0.015** 
BHOWN + 0.028 0.015 1.90 0.058* 
FROWN + 0.012 0.014 0.90 0.369 
MGOWN - -0.028 0.016 -1.75 0.080* 
LFSIZE  0.084 0.258 0.33 0.744 
LEVRGE   0.154 0.348 0.44 0.657 
DVRSTY   -1.941 0.907 -2.14 0.032** 
FAGE   -0.052 0.023 -2.30 0.022** 
Constant  -1.129 4.603 -0.25 0.806 
Chi-square   28.65***(df=13)   
Pseudo R2    0.2872    
McFadden's R2   0.287    
Hosmer-Lemeshow   14.45    




Below is the regression Table 5.6b, using Tobin’s Q, which was the proxy for the market-
based performance.  It was the alternative measure of performance used in this study. 
However, due to the inherent draw backs and disadvantages of market-based performance 
especially in the context of this study being a developing market, the main analysis and 
discussions of this study have been based on the ROA, the accounting-based performance. 
Table 5.6b:  
Logistic Regression for CEO selection (Using Tobin’s Q) 
***Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% 
 
With regards to board member gender diversity, this study has proposed that firms with a 










TOBINSQ - 0.146 0.326      1.41    0.157     
BSIZE + 0.275 0.196 1.40    0.161     
BCOMP + -0.442 2.170 -0.20 0.838     
BNCID + -0.419 0.956 -0.44    0.661     
BGNDR + 11.704  4.660 2.51 0.012*** 
BRLGN - -4.499 2.036    -2.21    0.027** 
BHOWN + 0.023 0.015 1.57 0.117     
FROWN + 0.014 0.014 0.97 0.331 
MGOWN - -0.022 0.016 -1.40 0.161 
LFSIZE  0.101 0.256 0.40 0.691 
LEVRGE   -1.602 1.174 -1.36 0.173     
DVRSTY   -1.670 0.902 -1.85 0.064* 
FAGE 
 
-0.049 0.022 -2.27 0.023** 
Constant   -1.693 4.623 -0.37 0.714     
Chi-square   31.04***(df=13)    
Pseudo R2    0.3112     
McFadden's R2   0.311    
Hosmer-Lemeshow   8.60    




as their new CEOs. The result of the logistic regression as presented in Table 5.6 revealed 
a positive relationship between female directors and outside CEO selection. The 
coefficient of the p-value was 0.012 with significance level at 1%. This finding implies 
that firms with more female directors on the board prefer outside CEOs as successors. 
Thus, the result supported the hypothesis. This finding is equally consistent with the 
opinions of Alves et al. (2015), that gender diversified board of directors enhances the 
efficiency and independence which, in turn, leads to outsider selection. This is also 
affirmed by the resource dependency theory as canvassed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
that, firms’ survival depends on their access to the resources from their external 
environment.  
Gender diversity guarantees easy and convenient access to these resources, and the most 
crucial human capital resource of the firm is its CEO. Similarly, on the issue of board 
member religiosity and CEO selection relationship, this study predicted a negative and 
significant relationship between the proportion of the Muslims on the board of directors 
of the company and outside CEO selection. The logistic regression results as shown in 
Table 5.6 revealed that board members’ religiosity was significant at the 5% level with a 
negative coefficient of -4.964 and the p-value at 0.015. The result supports the hypothesis. 
This finding implies that board members’ religiosity does have significant impact on the 
choice of the origin of the CEOs, and that the more Muslims on the boards of the 
companies the less the likelihood of selecting an outsider as the new CEO.  This finding 




connections amongst the board members. Hence, board members are more likely to 
appoint an insider, with whom they have religious affinity, as the successor.  
5.4.3.3 Ownership Structure and the CEO Selection Choice 
This study has postulated that firms with blockholders ownership are more likely to select 
outside successors as their CEOs. The result as displayed in Table 5.6 shows that blockholders 
ownership was significant at the 10% level with a positive coefficient and the p- value of 
0.058. This result implies that, the more the percentage of blockholder ownership in the 
company, the higher the probability of selecting an outsider as the new CEO. This finding 
supports the hypothesis and is consistent with the results of Ishak et al. (2012) who studied a 
sample of Malaysian firms and found that, blockholders controlled firms were more likely to 
select outside CEOs as successors in the events of poor performance. It equally agrees with 
the previous empirical results of works by researchers like Vafeas and Vlittis (2014) and 
Thanh and Heaney (2013)  that, firms controlled by blockholders were more independent and 
were inclined to select external candidates as CEOs.  
In addition, foreign ownership, which was hypothesised to have a significant positive 
relationship with outside CEO selection, was found not to be significant. Although, the 
coefficient was positive, it did not support the hypothesis. This result implies that regardless 
of the percentage of the foreign ownership in a firm, the company is less likely to select an 
outsider as the new CEO. The plausible reason for this insignificant result might have been 
because of the foreign shareholders not interfering with board decisions, especially as it relates 
to CEO selection. Meanwhile, related to managerial and CEO ownership, Hypothesis 9 




the decision of the firms to select insiders as successors. This hypothesis supported, the 
logistic regression result revealed a negative coefficient and the p-value of 0.080 significant 
at the 10% level. This finding implies that managerial ownership plays a key role in the 
company’s decision to select an insider as the successor. This finding is consistent with the 
position of previous scholars like Ishak (2010) and Ruan and Tian (2011) that, firms 
controlled by managerial ownership favoured the selection of insiders in order to preserve 
their interests and perpetuate their control over the firms.  
 
5.4.3.4 Firm Attributes and the CEO Selection Choice 
Four firm characteristics were used in this study as control variables, namely, firm size; 
leverage, firm diversity, and firm age. This study found that, the large firms and the firms 
with high leverage had no significant influence on the selection of outsiders as successors. 
On the contrary, the firms with more than one business segment (diversified firms) and 
the older firms were more likely to select insiders as successors. This was so because of 
the complex  nature of the firms in the industry and the fact that the insiders were more 
familiar with the operations of the firms, and coupled with the availability of a large 
number of suitable candidates from within the firm (Fatima et al., 2014; Ishak & Abdul 
Latif, 2012; Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013; Lindrianasari & Hartono, 2012). In the same vein, 
the older firms are assumed to have a very organised and formal structure of decision 
making, and a succession plan, and they relied on these established routines of decision 
making and succession policy due to the long existence of the firms to select the insiders 




5.5 Sensitivity Test for the CEO Selection Choice 
This section examines the robustness of the model using alternative measures for some 
key independent variables like board composition, board nominating committee 
independence, board members’ gender diversity, and board members’ religiosity. Table 
5.7 presents the results of the additional sensitivity test for the CEO selection model. The 
alternative model as presented in Table 5.7 used the accounting-based performance (ROA) 
as the performance indicator. The result displayed in Table 5.7 revealed that the 
accounting-based performance in the alternative proxies’ model had no significant impact 
on the choice of either outsiders or insiders as successors. For some board structure 
variables, such as, board composition, board nominating committee independence, board 
members’ gender diversity, and board members’ religiosity, alternative proxies were used.  
The sensitivity test was performed by using the actual number of the non-executive 
directors on the board for the board composition, for the board nominating committee 
independence it was measured as the proportion of the non-executive members on the 
committee excluding the CEO.  For board gender it was the actual number of female 
directors on the board, whilst board religiosity was the actual number of Muslim directors 
on the board. The results indicated in Table 5.7 confirmed the explanatory power of the 
model using the alternative measurements as both had the overall classification accuracy 
of the model at 72.22 percent and the McFadden's R2 for the original model and the 
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1.832 3.575 0.51 0.608 
 ROA - 1.979 3.574 0.55 0.580 
Board Structure BCOMP + -0.990 2.095 -0.47 0.637 
  BCOMP + 0.046 0.225 0.20 0.839 
 BNCID + -0.244 0.923 -0.26 0.792 
 BNCID + -0.200 0.843 -0.24 0.812 
  BGNDR + 10.790 4.589 2.35 0.012*** 
  BGNDR + 1.072 0.477 2.25 0.025** 
  BRLGN - -4.937 2.031 -2.43 0.015** 
  BRLGN - -0.529 0.212 -2.49 0.013** 










   
 Alternative Proxies Below & Italicized. 
The differences in the measurements of the independent variables did not change their 
relationship with the dependent variable. Although all the variables maintained their 
relationship in the alternative model, board composition, which was negative in the 
original model, contrary to the predicted direction in the hypothesis became positive in 
the alternative model. However, the changes of the coefficient sign were not significant. 
5.6 Summary of the Results of the Hypotheses for the CEO Selection 
A total of nine hypotheses were tested for this study. A summary of the results as exhibited 
in Table 5.8 revealed that, only four out of the nine hypotheses were discovered to have 
significant impacts on the outside selection choice, which were board members’ gender 
diversity, board members’ religiosity, blockholders, and managerial ownership. The rest 





Result of the Tested Hypotheses 





  Corporate Performance:     
H1 selection  ROA - Not Supported (+) 
    
  Board Structure:    
H2 selection Size + Not Supported (+) 
H3 selection Composition          + Not Supported (-) 
H4 selection Gender Diversity + Supported (+) 
H5 selection Religiosity - Supported (-) 
H6 selection Nominating Committee Independence + Not Supported (-) 
    
  Ownership Structure:    
H7 selection Blockholder Ownership + Supported (+) 
H8 selection Foreign Ownership + Not Supported (+) 
H9 selection Managerial Ownership - Supported (-) 
    
 
5.7 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter contained the results of the empirical investigation of the relationship 
between corporate performance, corporate governance mechanisms, and CEO selection 
choice. The empirical findings in this chapter showed that corporate performance, board 
size, board composition, and board nominating committee independence were not 
significant in determining the selection of outsiders as new CEOs of their firms. However, 
board member gender and board member religiosity both had significant influence on the 
choice of the CEO selection. In addition, blockholder ownership exhibited a positive and 
significant relationship with the outside CEO selection. This result indicates that outsiders 
were more preferable to insiders as successors in the blockholders controlled firms. Whilst 
managerial ownership had a negatively significant relationship with the CEO selection 




outsiders as successors in managerial ownership-controlled companies. However, foreign 
ownership had no significant impact on the decision to select external or internal 
successors.  
Furthermore, four firm attributes were used as control variables in the CEO selection 
study. Of those four, firm diversity and firm age were significant and thus influenced the 
choice of CEO selection. However, firm size and leverage both played no role in the 
decision to select outsiders or insiders as successors. Finally, the sensitivity analysis in 
Table 5.8 of this study also found that the hypotheses were not sensitive to the changes in 





CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
6.1 Introduction 
The relevance of studying CEO succession cannot be over emphasised, given the 
important roles CEOs play in the life of any corporation. It is important to study CEO 
succession in Nigeria, not just because Nigeria is the largest emerging economy in Africa, 
but more so because most studies on CEO succession were conducted on the developed 
economies with strong capital markets like the UK, the US and Canada. CEO succession 
is a recurring phenomenon in the life of a corporation, however, little attention has been 
paid to this phenomenon in Nigeria and indeed Africa as a continent. This study has 
introduced CEO power as a moderating variable and another two new variables namely, 
board members’ gender diversity and board members’ religiosity to deepen the 
understanding and push forward the frontier of knowledge in this regard, especially as it 
relates to the emerging and developing economies. Hence, this study has examined the 
factors that determine the CEO succession in Nigerian PLCs.  CEO succession consists of 
two events; the CEO turnover and the selection of a new successor. Both events are 
related, as after the event of turnover, there must be the appointment of a successor. 
Therefore, these two events were studied concurrently.  
This last chapter summarises the major empirical findings of this study and its 
contributions to the body of knowledge. Thus, the chapter is structured as follows: Section 




of the study, whilst the limitations of the study were highlighted in Section 6.4. Section 
6.5 provides recommendations based on the findings and suggests directions for future 
research. The chapter ends with the concluding remarks in Section 6.6.  
6.2 Main Findings 
The main objective of this CEO succession study has been to examine the influence of 
corporate performance and corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and 
ownership structure) on CEO turnover in Nigerian PLCs. It equally examined the 
influence of corporate performance and corporate governance mechanisms (board 
structure and ownership structure) on the CEO selection choice in the Nigerian PLCs. In 
addition, the moderating role of CEO power over corporate performance, corporate 
governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure), and CEO turnover was 
also investigated. 
In this study, both accounting-based and market-based performance indicators were used 
in measuring corporate performance. Accounting based performance measured by the 
ROA was found to have a significant negative relationship with CEO turnover. The 
significant ROA supports the view that firm performance is the most reliable yard stick in 
evaluating the effectiveness and performance of CEOs in the decision to either dismiss or 
replace them with new CEOs. For corporate governance mechanisms, this study 
categorised corporate governance mechanisms into two broad categories, board structures 
and ownership structures respectively. For the board structures, there were four variables 
considered in the CEO turnover, these were, board size, board composition, board 




found to moderate the relationship, between Corporate governance mechanisms and CEO 
turnover. 
 For the board members’ gender diversity, this study found that board with female 
directors were less likely to replace their CEOs. This is because female directors have 
superior monitoring ability and enhanced managerial accountability and CEO 
responsibility (Nguyen et al., 2014). Even in a firm where the CEO owns a stake in the 
shares, the board is less likely to change the CEO if there is significant female 
representation on the board.  
Furthermore, the study on the CEO selection choice attempted to unveil the factors that 
determine the selection of an outsider or insider as the successor in the event of CEO 
turnover. From the model, four of the independent variables which are board members’ 
gender diversity, board members’ religiosity, blocholders and managerial ownership and 
two of the control variables, firm diversity and firm age significantly influenced the CEO 
selection choice.  
Firms with a significant proportion of females on their boards are more likely to select 
outsiders as their CEOs. In the same vein, blockholders controlled firms prefer outside 
CEOs as replacements. On the contrary, board members’ religiosity and managerial 
ownership had a negative significant relationship with CEO selection. These findings 
implied that, in the Nigerian context, blockholders, managerial ownership, board 
members’gender diversity and board members’ religiosity were the main factors 




6.3 Implications of the Study 
This section discusses the implications of the study from the theoretical, practical and 
policy contributions. Most of the studies on CEO succession were centered on the 
developed economies with strong capital markets such as the UK, the US and Canada. 
Therefore, given the scanty nature of research on CEO succession (CEO turnover and 
selection) in developing economies like Nigeria, this study may provide evidences on the 
factors influencing CEO turnover and the selection of successors in the Nigerian PLCs. 
Specifically, this study provides both the theoretical and practical contributions as follow:  
6.3.1 Theoretical Implications  
For the theoretical significance, this study relies on the agency theory as the underpinning 
theory and has been supported with other theories, which are, the resource dependence 
theory, social networking theory and human capital theory to deepen the understanding; 
and establish empirical evidence on the CEO succession in the Nigerian PLCs. Applying 
this combination of theories in this study has contributed to taking the frontier of empirical 
knowledge on CEO succession as it relates to the developing markets to a new height. In 
addition, the introduction of the moderator of CEO power in this study has made it 
uniquely impactful and significant in addressing the dearth of literature in the CEO 
succession, especially from the emerging economies. 
 Specifically, the findings of this study revealed that CEO ownership (CEO power) is very 
significant in influencing CEO turnover. As a moderator, it strongly influences the 
relationship of the corporate governance mechanisms with the CEO turnover. It was 




mechanisms in determining CEO turnover. This is because, moderate share ownership by 
the CEOs leads to goal congruence and aligns the CEOs’ interests with that of the 
shareholders, thereby mitigating agency problems. However, CEO ownership might lead 
to CEO entrenchment which weakens other governance structures of the firms. Further, 
this study found that board diversity, especially board members’ gender diversity was the 
most significant board structure element in the study of CEO succession in Nigerian PLCs. 
Asides from the fact that this study is among the first to study the influence of board 
members’ gender diversity on CEO succession, it has revealed that female directors are 
very important in the decisions to replace or retain a CEO, and in the event of a turnover, 
the female directors are very influential in the decision to select an outsider as the 
successor for better and more enhanced performance.  
6.3.2 Practical and Policy Implications  
Therefore, this study recommends that the Nigerian government should enact a legislation 
on gender quota or affirmative law to ensure that a significant percentage of females are 
appointed to the boards of corporations. The appointment of female directors could 
enhance good governance which may guarantee the continuous survival of the 
corporations and boost investors’ confidence in the Nigerian corporate markets. In 
addition, there is a need for the regulatory authorities to put a limit or ceiling on the 
quantity of shares that CEOs can own in the firms which they superintend, to forestall 
possible entrenchment which could lead to poor firm governance and the expropriation of 




Furthermore, there is a need for the government through its regulatory agencies like NSE 
and CAC to encourage more blockholder ownership as it serves as a strong governance 
prorate practices mechanism in ensuring good and healthy corporate practices. In the same 
vein, the regulators should discourage managerial ownership in the firms as it has the 
tendency to weaken the effective monitoring and governance of the corporation. This 
study provides some insights and guidance to the companies, the shareholders, and those 
entrusted with the task of hiring and firing CEOs. In deciding to retain or replace a CEO 
and whether to select an outsider or insider as the successor, corporate performance, board 
structure, and ownership characteristics are the factors that are usually considered. Hence, 
there is a need to review the NCCG to accommodate good reforms to enhance good 
corporate practices and the regulatory agencies to ensure compliance for a better corporate 
environment. Because, the survival and wellbeing of a company largely depend on the 
quality of its governance mechanisms and top management, especially the board and the 
CEO.  
6.4 Limitations of the Study 
There are some factors that might pose as limitations to the level of usefulness of the 
findings of this study. Firstly, this study utilised only data on the non-financial sector of 
the NSE, hence, the results might not be generalised to all the registered companies in 
Nigeria. In addition, the period of the study was limited to five years (2011 to 2015). 
Moreover, the findings of this study may not necessarily be applicable to the developed 
economies with strong corporate governance regulations and dispersed ownership 




the developing market which is dominated with concentrated ownership and is a weak 
market with inherently weak corporate governance regulations. Nigeria, the focus of this 
study, is a developing economy with a weak corporate environment and dominated with 
a concentrated ownership structure by blockholders and foreign ownership.  
This study utilised three variables for ownership structure, namely; blockholders, foreign, 
and managerial ownership. It is quite possible that other ownership variables like family 
ownership, which was not included in this model may yield a more robust finding. In 
addition, this study did not consider types of CEO turnover, especially forced turnover 
and voluntary turnover; each type of turnover may give a different result.  
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future studies on CEO succession may consider extending the current study by increasing 
the population of the study to cover both the financial and non-financial sectors so that the 
results can be conveniently generalised. Another aspect to be looked at by future 
researchers is the type of turnovers, whether forced or voluntary. The necessary 
information on the causes of the turnover should be obtained to enable the researchers to 
determine whether the CEO turnover is a forced turnover or voluntary; because, each type 
of turnover might have a different influence on the origin of the new CEO to be selected.  
In addition, researchers may consider carrying out a similar study in other emerging 
economies with similar features within the African continent. For example, economies 
like South Africa, which has more listed companies on its stock exchange than Nigeria 




doubt would bridge the gap in literature on CEO succession between the developed and 
developing markets. 
6.6 Conclusions  
This study has concentrated on those factors that determine CEO succession and the 
moderating effect of CEO power over corporate performance, internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, and CEO turnover. This study is among the first empirical 
research on CEO succession in the Nigerian corporate environment and indeed the entire 
continent of Africa. This study found that corporate performance, board structure (board 
members’ gender diversity and board members’ religiosity), and ownership structure 
(CEO power, managerial ownership, and blockholders) influenced the CEO succession in 
the Nigeria PLCs. Board members’ gender diversity, board members’religiosity, CEO 
power, blockholders and managerial ownership appeared to have the most impactful 
influence on the CEO succession. 
 For instance, boards with a substantial percentage of female directors are not likely to 
change their CEOs, but in the event that turnover does happen, they are disposed to hire 
an outsider CEO. Likewise, blockholders controlled firms have a high probability of CEO 
turnover and subsequently, of appointing an outsider successor. Furthermore, this study 
found that CEO power effectively moderated the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms, and CEO turnover as all the variables which were hitherto not 
significant in the direct model, became significant after the interaction. Hence, CEO 





 Finally, it is believed that this study has no doubt contributed to the body of knowledge, 
especially in addressing the dearth of empirical literature on corporate governance in 
general, and specifically, on the CEO succession in the emerging economies. Moreover, 
it is hoped that this study serves as a source of guidance to those responsible for hiring 
and firing CEOs and the regulatory authorities on the formulation, and enforcement of 
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